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Résumé 
 
 Le présent manuscrit développe une problématique liée à l’implication des capacités 
de gestion de buts et d’engagement des fonctions exécutives dans le raisonnement par 
analogie et son développement. Les trois premières expériences étudient cette problématique 
dans deux tâches de raisonnement par analogie différentes à travers l’étude des stratégies 
visuelles employées par des adultes et des enfants de 6-7 ans. Les résultats montrent des 
différences de stratégies visuelles entre les tâches, liées aux buts différents de celles-ci, ainsi 
que, entre enfants et adultes, des différences de patterns visuels liés à l’inhibition de 
l'information non pertinente pour la résolution des problèmes. Les deux expériences suivantes 
étudient les stratégies visuelles, toujours en lien avec le fonctionnement exécutif et le 
maintien du but, dans une tâche A:B::C:? dont la difficulté est manipulée afin de mettre en 
évidence des différences d’engagement de processus de contrôle et d’évaluation. Les résultats 
montrent un effet de la difficulté des essais, ainsi que du type de distracteur, dans les 
stratégies visuelles. Enfin les trois dernières expériences étudient l’implication de la flexibilité 
cognitive, une des fonctions exécutives, dans le raisonnement par analogie, chez l’enfant (5-6 
ans), limité dans sa flexibilité. Les résultats montrent que l’ancrage dans un type de 
représentation, pertinent ou non pour la solution du problème, est lié à leur capacité à résoudre 
le problème, et suggèrent une difficulté à changer de représentation au cours de la résolution. 
Ces résultats sont finalement discutés en rapport aux modèles de raisonnement par analogie et 
de développement de cette capacité. 
 
Mots-clés: raisonnement par analogie; fonctions exécutives; gestion du but; eye-tracking; 
stratégies 
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Abstract 
 
This manuscript develops an issue related to the involvement of goal management 
capabilities and executive functions in this type of reasoning and its development. The first 
three experiments examine this issue in two tasks of analogical reasoning, the scene analogy 
task and the A:B::C:? task, through the study of visual strategies used by adults and children 
aged 6-to-7. The results show differences in visual patterns related to goals, and to the 
inhibition of irrelevant information for the solution of the problems, between the different 
tasks, and between children and adults. The following two experiments study the visual 
strategies, always in relation to executive functioning and goal management, in an A:B::C:? 
task whose difficulty is manipulated to highlight the difference in involvement of monitoring 
and evaluation processes. The results do show an effect of the difficulty of the test and the 
type of distractor in the visual strategies employed. Finally, the last three experiments 
investigate the involvement of cognitive flexibility, one of the executive functions, in the 
analogical reasoning of preschool children (5-6-year-olds), limited in their flexibility. The 
results show that their early anchoring in a type of representation, relevant or not to the 
solution of the problem, is related to their ability to solve the problem later, and thus suggest a 
difficulty in shifting their representation during the resolution of the problems. These results 
are finally discussed in relation to models of analogical reasoning and of the development of 
this ability, especially those integrating goal management and executive functions. 
 
Keywords: analogical reasoning; executive functions; goal management; eye-tracking; 
cognitive flexibility; strategies 
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Résumé 
 
I. Introduction théorique 
Le premier chapitre de la thèse est consacré à la revue de la littérature dans le domaine 
du raisonnement par analogie et de son développement, ainsi que des principaux modèles et 
théories rendant compte des phénomènes observés empiriquement dans cette littérature. Nous 
commençons par définir le raisonnement par analogie comme étant le processus de 
comparaison de la similarité entre les structures relationnelles de deux domaines: le domaine 
source qui dirige l’analogie, et le domaine cible qui est souvent moins complètement 
représenté et qui fera alors l’objet d’inférence sur la base de la structure relationnelle du 
domaine source (Gentner, 1983). L’analogie doit être distinguée, du fait qu’elle résulte 
purement sur la structure relationnelle entre les éléments composant les domaines et non sur 
des caractéristiques de surface, de ce que Gentner (1989) appelle la similarité de pure 
apparence (mere appearance) qui résulte de la ressemblance des propriétés de surface des 
domaines comparés uniquement, de la similarité littérale, qui est la ressemblance de ces 
domaines à la fois en termes de propriétés de surface et de structure relationnelle. La 
comparaison entre des domaines ne partageant ni propriétés de surface, ni structure 
relationnelle, est appelée anomalie. 
Nous continuons par la description des sous-processus psychologiques impliqués dans 
le raisonnement par analogie, faisant par ailleurs l’objet d’un large consensus dans la 
communauté scientifique (Gentner & Smith, 2012; Holyoak, 2012; Sternberg, 1977). Ceux-ci 
sont la récupération d’un domaine source, l’encodage des domaines, la mise en 
correspondance de ces domaines, l’inférence de nouvelles propriétés structurelles dans le 
domaine cible, et l’évaluation de la mise en correspondance. La récupération d’un domaine 
source intervient lorsque celui-ci n’est pas donné explicitement et consiste à invoquer un 
exemple en mémoire à long terme ayant une structure relationnelle similaire au domaine cible 
avec lequel on veut faire une analogie, et le faire passer en mémoire de travail. L’encodage est 
la construction d’une représentation des domaines source (s’il est donné) et cible en mémoire 
de travail afin d’effectuer les opérations suivantes. La mise en correspondance des domaines 
consiste à trouver les similarités en termes de rôles (pour les entités) et de relations dans les 
structures relationnelles comparées afin de maximiser la correspondance globale au niveau 
17 
 
des relations de premier ordre et d’ordre plus haut. Le domaine cible étant souvent moins 
complet dans la représentation de sa structure relationnelle que le domaine source, le 
processus d’inférence utilise la mise en correspondance des deux domaines pour transférer 
des propriétés structurelles de la source vers la cible lorsque cette possibilité se présente. 
Enfin le processus d’évaluation de la mise en correspondance vérifie la cohérence globale et 
locale des correspondances entre les deux domaines et peut corriger cette mise en 
correspondance lorsqu’elle donne lieu à des aberrations logiques et peuvent mener à une re-
représentation des domaines comparés sur la base de ces corrections. Cette théorie des 
différents processus impliqués dans le raisonnement par analogie vient de données 
expérimentales de Sternberg (Sternberg & Nigro, 1980; Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979; Sternberg, 
1977) ayant montré que le modèle de régression attestant le mieux des données adultes était 
celui impliquant ces différents processus chez l’adulte. Cependant, chez l’enfant, la plus faible 
capacité de mémoire de travail limiterait la complétude des différents processus et la capacité 
des plus jeunes à trouver les correspondances entre la source et la cible. 
La section suivante est dédiée aux différentes théories du raisonnement par analogie, 
et notamment du processus de mise en correspondance entre les domaines, qui est 
généralement considéré comme crucial dans ce type de raisonnement. Cette section s’attache 
aussi à décrire les implémentations informatiques de ces différentes théories. La première 
théorie décrite est la théorie de Gentner (Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989; Gentner, 
1983) de la mise en correspondance de structure (Structure Mapping Theory). Cette théorie 
décrit le processus de mise en correspondance dans ses détails, et est encore très influente. 
Elle établit notamment que différents principes contraignent les mises en correspondance 
possibles: les relations entre les objets doivent être conservées le plus possible durant la mise 
en correspondance des objets, les relations de plus haut niveau contraignent les mises en 
correspondance de relations de plus bas niveau, et les propriétés de surfaces tendent à être 
ignorées durant la mise en correspondance des objets. La théorie des contraintes multiples 
(Multiconstraint Theory; (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989) reprend en grande partie ces 
contraintes, auxquelles elle ajoute des contraintes pragmatiques: le but de la tâche pour 
laquelle est opérée la mise en correspondance influence son produit. Nous présentons 
également le modèle LISA (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997) qui intègre les contraintes liées à la 
capacité limitée de la mémoire de travail chez l’être humain, l’aspect dynamique et 
incrémentale de la mise en correspondance des domaines comparés, la sensibilité à certaines 
manières de présenter le problème, et certains aspects stratégiques, en plus des contraintes 
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déjà prises en compte dans les anciens modèles. Deux modèles apparentés de par leur 
architecture et tentant d’expliquer la façon dont les représentations structurées émergent de 
l’interaction entre le matériel présenté et les concepts formés en mémoire à long terme, par 
une exploration en parallèle de différentes pistes et la stabilisation de la piste la plus 
prometteuse. La dernière théorie présentée est la théorie du path-mapping (Salvucci & 
Anderson, 2001). Celle-ci innove par rapport aux précédentes théories et aux modèles 
présentés jusque là par le fait que le processus de mise en correspondance des deux domaines 
est inséré dans une architecture utilisée pour la résolution de problème. Cette architecture 
comporte ainsi un système de gestion des buts de la tâche, qui au-delà d’influencer 
simplement les mises en correspondance de différents éléments, va produire des actions 
mesurables (pouvant mener ainsi à des prédictions quant à certains comportements fins tels 
que les mouvements oculaires) et terminer la tâche dès lors que le but principal est atteint. 
Cette théorie permet donc de générer des hypothèses quant aux différences entre les tâches de 
raisonnement par analogie, dont les buts ne sont pas équivalents en termes d’opérations de 
traitement de l’information.  
Nous présentons également les trois principales théories du développement du 
raisonnement par analogie: la théorie de la transition relationnelle (Relational Shift), la théorie 
de la primauté relationnelle (Relational Primacy), et la théorie de la complexité relationnelle 
(Relational Complexity). La première établit que l’attention des enfants dans la comparaison 
de différents domaines va passer d’un focus sur les objets et leur similarité de surface à un 
focus plus orienté vers les relations entre les objets. La seconde s’oppose à la première par le 
fait qu’elle reconnait une attention de l’enfant envers les relations dès la naissance, mais 
explique l’apparition d’un raisonnement par analogie plus élaboré par un développement de la 
compréhension des contraintes qui pèsent sur ce type de raisonnement au niveau métacognitif. 
Ces deux théories mettent en avant le rôle du développement de la connaissance structurée du 
monde dans le développement de cette capacité. La théorie de la complexité relationnelle 
s’oppose aux deux autres par le fait qu’elle met l’accent sur les contraintes que posent les 
capacités de traitement de l’information en terme de mémoire de travail et des fonctions 
exécutives qui lui sont liées, tout en reconnaissant que la structuration du savoir de l’enfant 
peut dégager des ressources de traitement de l’information. 
Après l'expositions des différentes théories sur le raisonnement par analogie, nous 
faisons la revue des différents facteurs affectant ce type de raisonnement, allant de facteurs 
perceptifs jusqu’à des facteurs stratégiques et métacognitifs, en passant par des facteurs liés à 
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l’organisation du savoir et au langage, ainsi que des facteurs exécutifs, démontrant ainsi que 
le raisonnement par analogie est lié à l’interaction de modules cognitifs de bas comme de haut 
niveau. Parmi les facteurs perceptifs, les propriétés de surface du matériel utilisé pour 
présenter les domaines semble affecter le raisonnement analogique des enfants comme des 
adultes, notamment la concrétude de ce matériel, dans le sens de la quantité d’information que 
le matériel apporte. Les enfants sont également affectés par le fait que l’élément lié au but de 
la tâche se distingue des autres objets dans le domaine source. Un autre facteur perceptif, les 
similarités aussi bien relationnelle que de surface, affecte la capacité à faire des analogies 
quelque soit l’âge. La similarité de surface peut avoir un effet positif sur la mise en 
correspondance des éléments dans les deux domaines comparés, lorsqu’elle converge avec la 
mise en correspondance relationnelle, mais peut s’avérer nuisible lorsque ce n’est pas le cas. 
Néanmoins, malgré la difficulté à séparer ces deux aspects, des études montrent que ce n’est 
pas la similarité intrinsèque des domaines qui aurait un effet, mais la similarité entre les 
représentations de ces domaines par le sujet. La qualité de la représentation des domaines et 
de leur structure relationnelle parait d’ailleurs déterminante à plusieurs égards, et différentes 
manipulations ont tenté d’augmenter artificiellement cette qualité, par exemple la 
comparaison de différents exemples de la même structure relationnelle, ou des questionnaires 
ciblant cette structure. A un niveau plus intégré, de nombreux facteurs sémantiques 
apparaissent comme étant influents dans la capacité à raisonner par analogie: la distance 
sémantique entre les domaines comparés parait cruciale dans la capacité de remarquer 
l’analogie entre les structures et de transférer de l’information de l’une à l’autre. Egalement, 
l’organisation du système sémantique humain en différentes catégories semble guider la mise 
en correspondance des éléments des domaines. Un des effets les plus explorés dans 
l’influence que peut avoir le système sémantique humain sur le raisonnement par analogie est 
le rôle organisateur et attentionnel du langage dans la représentation des domaines, ainsi que 
la capacité à utiliser des mots en lieu de structure complète afin de réduire leur poids cognitif 
en mémoire de travail de ces structures. D’ailleurs, les limitations de la capacité en mémoire 
de travail, les différents systèmes qui la sous-tendent, ainsi que ses aspects exécutifs, ont 
également été étudiés dans le raisonnement par analogie, montrant son implication dans ce 
type de raisonnement et lui imposant des limites en termes de complexité des computations 
effectuées par l’être humain. Du point de vue du contrôle exécutif, cependant, la majorité des 
études se sont focalisées sur le rôle du contrôle inhibiteur, c’est-à-dire la capacité du sujet à 
empêcher certaines informations non pertinentes pour la tâche d’entrer en mémoire de travail. 
Les autres aspects exécutifs (la capacité à garder actif et mettre à jour le contenu de la 
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mémoire de travail, et celle de changer de représentation du problème de manière active pour 
répondre de manière correcte à des variations dans la tâche) ont peu été étudiés dans le 
raisonnement par analogie. Un aspect lié à l’engagement des fonctions exécutives dans la 
résolution de problèmes est la capacité du sujet à maintenir des buts en mémoire de travail, et 
d’élaborer et de mettre en place une stratégie pour la résolution du problème rencontré. Ces 
aspects métacognitifs de planification mettent en jeu les fonctions exécutives qui vont 
permettre d’effectuer les opérations planifiées sur les représentations en mémoire de travail. 
Les aspects stratégiques ont beaucoup été étudiés dès le début de la recherche dans ce 
domaine, et ont mené à la découverte de l’utilisation de stratégies de construction de la 
réponse, surtout dans les cas plus simples, et d’élimination des mauvaises réponses dans le cas 
de problèmes plus complexes. Du point de vue du développement, les jeunes enfants semblent 
avoir du mal à prendre en compte toutes les contraintes nécessaires à l’élaboration d’une 
solution valide, et, dans un premier temps, se limiter à des réponses associées au domaine 
cible mais ne partageant pas, avec ce domaine, de relation similaire à la relation entretenue 
entre les éléments du domaine source. Cette difficulté des enfants à établir une stratégie 
correcte pour la solution des problèmes analogiques semble être liée au maintien du but des 
tâches de trouver une réponse qui entretienne la similarité de relation entre les domaines, ce 
qui est suggéré par une étude récente utilisant la technologie d’eye-tracking (Thibaut, French, 
Missault, Gérard, & Glady, 2011). 
Le but principal de cette thèse est d’apporter, à travers notamment l’étude des 
stratégies visuelles employées dans les différentes tâches couramment utilisées pour tester le 
raisonnement par analogie, des connaissances sur les liens entre ces différents niveaux de 
fonctionnement cognitif. Certains de ces niveaux ont déjà été abordés mais dont la 
connaissance de leur implication dans le raisonnement par analogie reste lacunaires. En effet, 
de nombreuses données empiriques suggèrent que l’inhibition d’information non pertinente 
pour la tâche est impliquée dans le raisonnement normal et que des déficits dans ce module 
expliquent les difficultés de certaines populations de patients et des enfants avec les tâches de 
raisonnement par analogie. Cependant, la capacité d’inhibition de l’information est la fonction 
exécutive la plus étudiée dans ce raisonnement et nous ne savons quasiment rien de 
l’implication de la flexibilité cognitive (la capacité à changer de représentation de 
l’information pour s’adapter à la solution d’une tâche), ou du maintien et de la mise à jour de 
l’information en mémoire de travail. De même, les études sur l’implication des buts des 
tâches mais également de leur maintien et de leur oubli, une capacité connue pour se 
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développer avec l’âge (Blaye & Chevalier, 2011; Chevalier & Blaye, 2008a; Marcovitch, 
Boseovski, Knapp, & Kane, 2010), manquent dans la littérature sur le raisonnement par 
analogie. Ainsi le but principal de cette thèse est de comprendre comment les buts des tâches 
vont affecter les stratégies visuelles des adultes et enfants, et l’engagement de ressources 
exécutives, et de savoir si des différences en termes de maintien du but et de fonctions 
exécutives peuvent expliquer les différences, notamment en termes de stratégies visuelles, 
entre ces différents groupes d’âge. 
 
II. Stratégies visuelles dans des problèmes analogiques sous forme de 
scènes 
 Le second chapitre présente des études sur la comparaison dans deux tâches de 
raisonnement par analogie: la tâche d’analogie formelle A:B::C:? et la tâche d’analogie entre 
scène. La première de ces tâches met clairement l’emphase sur la similarité entre les relations 
sans pointer particulièrement la nécessité de mettre en correspondance les éléments les 
composant, alors que la seconde, de part le fait que ses instructions établissent la nécessité de 
mettre en correspondance les éléments des deux domaines, pointe directement vers cette mise 
en correspondance. Ainsi nous nous attendions à ce que les différences entre l’emphase de ces 
tâches sur différents types d’information se répercutent sur les stratégies visuelles employées.  
 La première expérience de ce chapitre visait à étudier les différences 
développementales dans les stratégies visuelles dans la tâche d’analogies entre scènes, 
perspective qui n’avait encore jamais été étudiée. Nous avons répliqué la plupart des résultats 
obtenus dans une version papier et crayon de cette tâche par Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak 
(2006), à savoir que les enfants de 6-7 ans faisaient plus d’erreurs de type relationnel (le fait 
de choisir un élément impliqué dans la relation du domaine cible mais ne jouant pas le même 
rôle que l’élément pointé dans le domaine source), avaient des taux de réponses correctes 
moins bons et des temps de réaction supérieurs aux adultes. Cependant nous n’avons pas 
retrouvé le grand nombre d’erreurs dû au choix du distracteur ressemblant à l’objet pointé 
dans le domaine source. Cette différence est peut-être due à l’utilisation d’instructions 
ambigües quant au type de similarité à utiliser pour résoudre la tâche, instructions que nous 
avons clarifiées. Du point de vue de la recherche visuelle d’information, ce focus attentionnel 
sur la correspondance de rôle entre l’élément pointé dans l’image source et un des éléments de 
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l’image cible, ainsi que cette absence d’effet des distracteurs perceptifs ont été retrouvés: les 
participants ont globalement plus regardés ces éléments que les autres, et très peu fixé le 
distracteur. Les saccades les plus fréquentes étaient effectuées entre les objets reliés par une 
relation à l’intérieur des domaines, ainsi qu’entre les éléments liés au but de la tâche 
(l'élément pointé et celui jouant le même rôle dans le domaine cible) uniquement dans le cas 
des adultes. Cette différence dans la quantité de saccades directement liées au but de la tâche, 
à savoir aligner les objets liés aux buts, correspondants en termes de rôles entre adultes et 
enfants, est cohérent avec notre explication de l’échec des enfants par l’impossibilité de 
maintenir ce but correctement tout au long de la tâche, et pourrait expliquer le plus grand 
nombre d’erreurs relationnelles de leur part. Les enfants ont également regardé 
proportionnellement plus longtemps que les adultes le distracteur, même si le taux de fixation 
était faible, ce qui suggère une plus grande difficulté à l’inhiber. 
 La seconde expérience présentée dans ce chapitre visait à comparer les stratégies 
visuelles des enfants de 6-7 ans et des adultes dans la tâche d’analogie entre scènes, et la tâche 
A:B::C:?. Cependant, pour minimiser les différences entre les deux tâches du point de vue de 
la présentation, cette dernière était présentée sous forme de scène, mais avec les instructions 
originelles (trouver quelque chose qui a la même relation avec l’élément pointé que celle qui 
existe entre les deux éléments de l’image source). Les différences entre adultes et enfant dans 
les erreurs relationnelles, les taux de réponses correctes et temps de réaction ont été retrouvés 
dans la tâche d’analogie de scène, et étaient également présentes dans la tâche A:B::C:? (mis à 
part les erreurs relationnelles qui n’étaient virtuellement pas possibles). Le distracteur relié à 
C dans cette tâche, par contre, a été souvent choisi comme réponse par les enfants. Du point 
de vue de la recherche d’information, les résultats précédents dans la tâche d’analogie de 
scène ont été répliqués. Dans la tâche A:B::C:?, les fixations étaient plus centrées sur C et la 
solution, et les enfants fixaient le distracteur de manière conséquente. Au niveau des saccades, 
celles impliquant des objets reliés à l’intérieur des domaines étaient également présentes. 
Cependant la tâche de type A:B::C:? n’a pas élicité de saccades inter-domaines, même chez 
les adultes. L’intérêt des enfants pour le distracteur c’est également montré par de plus 
nombreuses saccades entre celui-ci et C que chez les adultes. Ainsi les stratégies visuelles 
entre les deux tâches semblent avoir des caractéristiques communes dans la mise en place de 
stratégies pour leur résolution, à savoir le fort intérêt pour les relations entre les éléments dans 
les deux domaines. Cependant la tâche d’analogie de scène, du fait que sont but principal 
ciblait plus la mise en relation des éléments en termes de rôles dans les relations, élicite des 
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saccades entre ces éléments, ce qui ne se retrouve pas dans la tâche A:B::C:?. Egalement le 
temps passé sur le distracteur était plus long dans la tâche A:B::C:? que dans la tâche 
d’analogie de scène. Ceci s’explique par le fait que l’accent, dans cette tâche, est mis sur la 
similarité entre les relations et que le distracteur en possède une avec C. Il est donc important 
de l’éliminer comme réponse potentielle. 
 La troisième expérience présentée dans ce chapitre, visait à comparer la tâche 
d’analogie de scène avec deux versions différentes de la tâche A:B::C:?, la version en 
contexte précédemment utilisée, et la version classique, avec les différents termes présentés 
dans des cadres séparés. En effet, la présentation sous forme de scène de l’information 
visuelle attire l’attention vers les relations entre les différents objets plutôt que vers les objets 
en eux-mêmes (Humphreys et al., 2010). Ainsi nous nous attendions à des différences à la fois 
en termes de taux de réponses correctes et de stratégies visuelles entre les deux versions de 
cette tâche. Les résultats comportementaux ont effectivement montré des différences de 
précision de réponse entre les deux versions de la tâche de type A:B::C:? chez les enfants, 
avec de meilleurs scores lorsque l’information est présentée sous forme de scène. Cette 
différence de score s’accompagnait d’une différence dans le nombre de saccades entre les 
éléments composant le domaine cible, suggérant une augmentation de l’attention portée à 
l’information relationnelle et à sa comparaison sous cette forme de présentation que dans la 
version classique. Dans l’ensemble, les mêmes patterns de fixations et de saccades, et les 
mêmes différences ont été retrouvés dans les deux tâches utilisées précédemment. Les 
différences entre la tâche de scène et celle de type A:B::C:? en contexte se retrouvent 
également entre la tâche de scènes et la tâche A:B::C:? classique. Ces données convergent 
avec celles de l’expérience précédente, et suggèrent que le but va moduler la stratégie utilisée 
dans la tâche de raisonnement par analogie. Egalement, elles suggèrent des différences 
perceptives liées à la présentation de l’information chez les enfants, avec une facilitation du 
traitement de l’information relationnelle lorsqu’elle est présentée sous forme de scène. 
 Ainsi les différentes études présentées dans ce chapitre montrent des résultats 
convergents quant aux stratégies visuelles employées dans les différentes tâches par les sujets. 
Les participants font beaucoup de saccades à l'intérieur des domaines afin d'encoder les 
relations entre les différents éléments les composant, mais au final font peut de mise en 
correspondance entre les domaines, sauf si le but de la tâche l'exige explicitement. Ces 
résultats sont en accord avec les prédictions du modèle de path-mapping: les sujets sont 
guidés par les buts de la tâche dans leur stratégie visuelle et effectuent la mise en 
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correspondance entre les éléments liés au but de la tâche. Une fois que l'information 
nécessaire pour résoudre le problème a été récupérée, le sujet répond, sans mettre en 
correspondance de manière exhaustive les éléments des domaines comparés. Les différences 
entre enfants et adultes obtenues sont également compatibles avec le point de vue voulant que 
le raisonnement par analogie se développe en partie au moins grâce au développement du 
maintien du but et des fonctions exécutives. En effet, les enfants montrent moins de patterns 
de mouvements oculaires liés au but de la tâche d'analogie de scène, et cela en concordance 
avec des inversions de rôle plus fréquentes (c'est-à-dire des erreurs relationnelles). Ces études 
montrent également que la façon dont le matériel est présenté influence la capacité des enfants 
à résoudre des problèmes analogiques, notamment en guidant leur attention vers l'information 
importante pour résoudre les problèmes. 
 
III. Stratégies visuelles des adultes dans des problèmes de types 
A:B::C:? complexes 
 Le troisième chapitre de la thèse présente deux expériences cherchant à tester la 
robustesse de la stratégie observée dans les problèmes de types A:B::C:? chez les adultes dans 
des problèmes imposant un coût cognitif plus conséquent. En effet, des différences ont été 
observées dans ce types de tâche avec la difficulté: les essais comportant un plus grand 
nombre de relations entre A et B provoquait le changement d'une stratégie de construction de 
la réponse vers une stratégie d'élimination des réponses non plausibles (Bethell-Fox, Lohman, 
& Snow, 1984). D'autres facteurs comme le type de distracteur affectent également la 
performance, notamment chez l'enfant. Il est donc possible qu'un distracteur évoquant de 
manière plus directe le but principal de la tâche (trouver un objet qui complète une relation 
similaire à celle observée entre A et B) affecte les stratégies visuelles des adultes. 
 La première expérience visait donc à savoir si un changement de stratégie tel que celui 
décrit par Bethell-Fox et al. (1984) était observé également lorsqu'un autre facteur que la 
charge en mémoire de travail était manipulé, à savoir une difficulté à se représenter la relation 
de manière suffisamment claire pour construire la réponse avant d'avoir vu les solutions 
possibles. Nous espérions que cette manipulation affecte l'engagement des fonctions 
exécutives telles que la flexibilité cognitive et l'inhibition. En effet, il est possible que les 
sujets dans les essais difficiles soient amenés à changer leur représentation de la relation entre 
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A et B face à la difficulté de trouver une solution correcte dans l'espace solution, et envisage 
plus les distracteurs, l'information provenant d'eux devant alors être inhibée pour se focaliser 
sur l'information correcte. Les résultats vont effectivement dans ce sens: le taux de fixation du 
distracteur est plus grand dans les essais plus difficiles que dans les essais faciles, tout comme 
le taux de saccades entre C et le distracteur. Les saccades entre C et la bonne réponse, et entre 
la solution et le distracteur étaient également moins fréquentes dans cette condition que dans 
la condition facile. Nous avons également divisé les essais en trois tranches afin 
d'appréhender la dynamique des stratégies visuelles dans ces différents essais. L'espace 
solution est déjà fixé lors de la première tranche des essais difficiles, et les participants 
effectuent déjà des saccades entre les différents mots de l'espace solution au début de ces 
essais, puis refont des saccades entre A et B durant la tranche médiane, et la dernière tranche, 
de ces essais. Ceci suggère effectivement une stratégie d'élimination de réponse, et que la 
paire AB est re-représentée face à l'information donnée dans l'espace solution. Les résultats 
vont également dans le sens d'une difficulté des participants à engager des ressources 
d'inhibition envers les distracteurs dans les essais plus complexes. Ainsi, cette étude suggère 
que la charge en mémoire de travail n'est pas le seul facteur rendant difficile la résolution de 
problèmes de type A:B::C:?. Le facteur de difficulté ici était un facteur général, mais 
l'observation du matériel suggère que l'imageabilité des relations différait entre les essais 
faciles et difficiles, et donc que la cette propriété module le raisonnement par analogie des 
adultes, ce qui est visible à travers leurs stratégies visuelles et l'engagement de ressources 
exécutives en réponse au matériel utilisé pour construire les analogies. Cette hypothèse 
concernant l'imageabilité devra cependant être testée de manière contrôlée par la suite.  
 La seconde expérience présentée dans ce chapitre est liée à l'étude des modulations des 
stratégies des adultes par le but de la tâche en cours. En effet, nous avons manipulé le type de 
distracteur pour qu'il soit plus ou moins lié au but principal de la tâche: la moitié des essais 
comportait des distracteurs reliés à C par n'importe qu'elle relation sémantique, ce type de 
distracteur étant peu attractif car ne répondant pas au but de similarité de relation entre les 
deux paires comparées dans les problèmes de type A:B::C:?; l'autre moitié des essais 
comportait des distracteurs reliés à C de la même manière que B à A, mais dans une 
correspondance croisée, c'est-à-dire que les rôles de C et de la solution étaient inversés. Nous 
avons fait l'hypothèse que ce type de distracteur serait beaucoup plus attractif du fait de leur 
lien direct avec le but de la tâche. Les résultats comportementaux suggèrent effectivement que 
ce type de distracteur est plus attractif: les participants ont choisi ce type de distracteur plus 
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souvent que les distracteurs simplement liés à C, ce qui a causé des scores moins bons dans la 
première condition que dans la seconde. Cette sélection accrue s'est accompagnée de variation 
dans la recherche d'information visuelle par les participants: les participants ont regardé la 
solution moins longtemps et le distracteur plus longtemps en proportion dans les essais avec 
distracteur relié à C de manière opposée que dans les autres essais. Ils ont également fait 
moins de comparaisons entre les différentes solutions possibles dans la première condition 
que dans la seconde. Enfin les temps de réactions étaient plus brefs avec les distracteurs reliés 
de manière opposée qu'avec les distracteurs simplement reliés à C. Ces différents résultats 
suggèrent que l'information procurée par le distracteur relié de manière opposée, du fait de 
son lien avec les buts de la tâche, a été un puissant attracteur dans le raisonnement des 
participants, les poussant à peu ou ne pas engager leur inhibition envers cette information, et à 
passer outre le processus d'évaluation de la mise en correspondance des éléments des deux 
domaines. 
 Pris dans l'ensemble, les résultats de ces deux expériences confirment les rôles des 
saccades entre A et B, et C et les solutions possibles dans les problèmes de type A:B::C:?en 
lien avec l'encodage des relations entre ces différents termes. Elles confirment également 
l'absence de saccades liées à la mise en correspondance des éléments des différents domaines, 
ceci en lien avec le but de la tâche qui n'est pas de les mettre en correspondance, mais de 
mettre en correspondance les relations entre ces éléments et de les comparer. Ce focus sur la 
similarité relationnelle en elle-même, indépendamment des éléments qui les composent est 
également suggéré par la puissance du distracteur relié à C de manière opposée qui ne devrait 
pas être choisi si cette mise en correspondance entre éléments était faite spontanément dans 
cette tâche. Ces études confirment également l'engagement différentiel des fonctions 
exécutives en lien avec les contraintes de la tâche et ses buts. 
 
IV. Une nouvelle méthode pour classer des trajectoires visuelles 
 Le quatrième chapitre est consacré à la description et l'utilisation d'un nouvel 
algorithme de tri de trajectoires visuelles afin de savoir si des groupes diffèrent réellement 
dans ces trajectoires. Cet algorithme, basé sur la méthode d'analyse des scanpaths de Jarodzka 
et al. (2010) alliée à une technique de positionnement multidimensionnel (Multidimensional 
Scaling) permettant la cartographie des différents individus en se basant sur les différences 
entre leurs trajectoires visuelles respectives, et à un réseau de neurone (perceptron 
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multicouche) permettant la classification des points sur la carte, est utilisé afin de distinguer si 
les trajectoires visuelles des enfants et des adultes dans les trois tâches présentées dans la 
troisième expérience du second chapitre de ce manuscrit diffèrent réellement. Ce qui distingue 
la méthode d'analyse de Jarodzka et al. (2010) des autres méthodes d'analyse de données 
oculomotrices est sa capacité à tenir compte de la structure même des trajectoires visuelles 
alors que les autres moyens d'analyses tendent à ne pas tenir compte de cette information 
pourtant cruciale. Un second intérêt de cette méthode est la possibilité de comparaison de 
trajectoires visuelles de durées différentes, ce qui s'avère utile dans l'étude de données 
développementales dans lesquelles les temps de réactions moyens diffèrent. 
 L'algorithme commence donc par trouver une valeur de différence entre toutes les 
paires de trajectoires visuelles entre les enfants, entre les adultes, et entre enfants et adultes. 
Pour cela, chaque trajectoire est transformée de sa forme initiale (liste de cordonnées) en une 
suite de vecteurs. Chaque liste de vecteurs est alors réduite par addition des vecteurs 
consécutifs dont l'amplitude est en dessous du seuil choisi ou si deux de ces vecteurs 
consécutifs forment un angle approximativement droit. Une fois cette étape de simplification, 
chaque vecteur d'une liste (constituant une trajectoire visuelle pendant un essai) est comparé à 
chaque vecteur d'une seconde liste (constituant une seconde trajectoire visuelle) sur la base 
d'un critère (par exemple leur longueur) pour donner une matrice rectangulaire contenant 
chaque valeurs de différence entre chaque combinaison de deux vecteurs issue de ces deux 
listes. Le chemin dans cette matrice minimisant la somme totale des différences entre paires 
de vecteurs est trouvé, partant de la comparaison des deux premiers vecteurs et allant jusqu'à 
la comparaison des deux derniers vecteurs, est trouvé itérativement, en autorisant uniquement 
les déplacements dans cette matrice entre des cellules contenant des comparaisons de vecteurs 
adjacents à ceux utilisés dans la comparaison de l'itération précédente. La somme des 
différences se situant sur ce chemin de moindre différence est alors la valeur de la différence 
entre les deux trajectoires visuelles comparées.  
 Une fois comparées deux à deux toutes les trajectoires de tous les participants dans des 
essais identiques, la moyenne des différences entre ces individus est calculée, et les 
participants sont positionnés sur une carte ou la distance entre deux individus reflète la 
différence moyenne entre ces deux participants. Les coordonnées de ces points sont utilisées 
pour entrainer et tester un réseau de neurones multicouche, en utilisant une technique 
validation croisée de Leave-One-Out (avec un échantillon de n sujets, n-1 sujets sont utilisés 
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pour entrainer le réseau est la classification du dernier sujet par le réseau est testée; tous les 
sujets sont testés alternativement au cours de n procédures d'entrainement et de test).  
 Les résultats obtenus montrent effectivement que les enfants et les adultes sont classé 
par le réseau de manière non aléatoire dans leurs groupes respectifs dans les trois tâches 
(tâches d'analogie entre scènes, tâches A:B::C:? avec et sans contexte). Ainsi cette technique 
permet de répondre de manière quantitative à la question de la différence des stratégies 
visuelles entre enfants et adultes de manière positive. 
 
V. Implication de la flexibilité cognitive dans le raisonnement par 
analogie des enfants  
 Le cinquième chapitre est quant à lui consacré à des expériences tentant de démontrer 
l'implication de la flexibilité cognitive, une des fonctions exécutives fréquemment citées, dans 
le raisonnement par analogie à travers ses limitations chez l'enfant. En effet, les enfants en âge 
préscolaire réussissent mal certaines tâches nécessitant de changer de représentation durant 
leur solution. Ainsi, si le raisonnement analogique nécessite dans certains cas de faire appel à 
la flexibilité cognitive, ces enfants devraient avoir des difficultés à parvenir à résoudre des 
tâches de raisonnement par analogie.  
 La première des expériences présentées dans ce chapitre utilise une tâche de type 
A:B::C:? modifiée afin d'induire un représentation de la paire AB, A et B étant possiblement 
liés par deux relations différentes (une seule étant utilisée pour construire la pair C:solution) 
en utilisant deux paires d'images avant la présentation du problème en lui-même. Ces deux 
paires pouvaient être reliées soit par la relation identique à celle utilisée pour construire le 
problème (condition de facilitation) ou bien par une relation différente (condition de re-
représentation), la seconde étant celle demandant d'engager de la flexibilité cognitive. Ces 
deux conditions étaient comparées à une troisième, contrôle, ne présentant que deux paires de 
cadres vides à la place des paires d'images. Avec cette tâche, nous avons testé des enfants de 
5-6 ans et de 7-8 ans. Les résultats de cette tâche sont mitigés: nous n'avons pas trouvé d'effet 
de la condition, ni d'interaction de ce facteur avec l'âge sur les scores, ni sur les temps de 
réaction. Le seul indice d'un effet de la présentation de paires avant le problème est une 
diminution du temps de réaction chez les participants plus âgés, dans la condition de 
facilitation. Cette absence d'effet peut s'expliquer de différentes manières: la tâche en elle-
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même était peut-être trop complexe pour de jeunes enfants dans sa structure, et ceux-ci n'ont 
peut-être pas compris le bénéfice de prêter attention à l'information relationnelle de ces deux 
paires, étant donné que les essais d'entraînement étaient peu nombreux et montraient chaque 
condition une seule fois. Ainsi, un seul essai d'entrainement montrait une information 
pertinente venant des paires d'images précédent le problème. 
 La seconde expérience de ce chapitre visait à créer une procédure facilitant 
l'intégration de la paire AB, basée sur les résultats de Thibaut et al. (2011) montrant que les 
enfants ont du mal à maintenir le but de similarité des relations entre A et B, et C et la 
solution, et qu'ils prêtent peu attention à la relation entre A et B. Afin de faciliter le maintien 
du but chez les enfants préscolaires, nous avons modifié la procédure habituelle de la tâche 
A:B::C:?: la paire AB était présentée en premier et l'enfant devait dénommer la relation entre 
A et B, avant qu'on lui présente le reste du problème et qu'il puisse tenter de le résoudre. Cette 
procédure a été testée avec des enfants de 5-6 ans, en comparaison de la procédure standard. 
Nos résultats montrent qu'en effet, les scores sont meilleurs lorsque l'enfant doit nommer la 
relation liant la paire AB qu'il voit avant le reste du problème, que lorsqu'il ne doit pas le faire 
et voit le problème entier dès le départ. Cette procédure est encore une fois une démonstration 
de la difficulté qu'ont les enfants à maintenir le but de la tâche tout au long de la résolution du 
problème. Ainsi, augmenter le focus attentionnel des enfants sur la paire AB et la relation 
entretenue par ses éléments l'un avec l'autre facilite le maintien de ce but. 
 La dernière expérience présentée dans ce chapitre utilise ce résultat de la procédure 
dans laquelle les enfants voient la paire AB avant le reste du problème et verbalise la relation 
entre ses éléments pour étudier le lien entre flexibilité cognitive et raisonnement par analogie. 
Ainsi nous avons utilisé des essais différents dans cette tâche: certains essais devaient être 
résolus simplement en utilisant la relation d'identité de couleur entre A et B, pour trouver une 
solution qui partageait sa couleur avec C. Un autre type d'essai étaient basés sur la relation 
sémantique entre les images représentées en A et B, ces images ne partageant pas leur 
couleur, et se résolvaient en trouvant une image qui partageait la même relation sémantique 
avec C. Le troisième type d'essai, crucial pour l'étude de la flexibilité, était constitué de paires 
AB à la fois liées par l'identité de couleur de ses éléments et par une relation sémantique, mais 
ne pouvait se résoudre que par la relation sémantique, aucun objet dans l'espace solution 
n'ayant la même couleur que C. Ainsi, si les enfants interprètent la paire sur la dimension 
couleur avant de voir le reste du problème, ils devront faire preuve de flexibilité cognitive 
pour trouver l'autre représentation nécessaire à la solution de ces essais. Les résultats vont 
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effectivement dans le sens d'une difficulté à changer de représentation durant les essais 
nécessitant ce changement: les scores étaient plus faibles, dans la condition ambigüe quant à 
la représentation à adopter pour la paire AB, lorsque les enfants utilisaient l'identité de 
couleur que dans les conditions non ambigües. Cependant l'analyse des scores dans les essais 
dans lesquels les enfants ont trouvé directement la relation sémantique entre A et B ne montre 
aucune différence significative avec les essais non ambigus sémantiques. Ces résultats 
suggèrent que l'interprétation initialement incorrecte de la paire AB a été difficile à surmonter 
pour les enfants qui ont alors été incapables de résoudre correctement les problèmes 
analogiques. 
 Les résultats de ces études sont compatibles avec la vision du développement du 
raisonnement par analogie comme dépendant au moins partiellement de celui de la capacité à 
maintenir le but et des fonctions exécutives. Cependant ces études laissent la question du 
déficit d'engagement des fonctions exécutives due à un déficit de maintien du but, ou bien 
d'un déficit dans la capacité de flexibilité cognitive de ces enfants en elle-même. Cependant 
ces études sont une illustration du coût cognitif lié à la re-représentation du matériel. 
 
VI. Discussion générale 
 Le cinquième et dernier chapitre de cette thèse s'intéresse à la discussion des résultats 
que nous avons obtenus dans les différentes expériences présentées dans cette thèse par 
rapport au cadre théorique et la problématique élaborés durant l'introduction et notamment les 
modèles présentés et la littérature utilisant l'eye-tracking pour étudier le raisonnement par 
analogie. Il présente également les perspectives qu'ouvre le travail de recherche décrit.  
 Les résultats que nous avons obtenus sont consistants avec d’autres données obtenues 
dans la tâche d’analogie de scène par Gordon & Moser (2007), et dans la tâche de type 
A:B::C:? par Bethell-Fox et al. (1984). La première de ces études montre effectivement une 
majorité de saccades entre les éléments d’un même domaine, des fixations plus importantes 
sur les éléments impliqués dans une relation, et peu de fixation des distracteurs. Nos résultats 
chez l’adulte sont cohérents avec ces données mais ajoutent à cette connaissance préalable 
l’information des saccades inter-domaines, notamment celle liée au but de la tâche: les 
participants dans cette tâche d’analogie de scène aligne visuellement les éléments liés au but 
dans le domaine source (l’élément pointé) et dans le domaine cible (celui qui partage le même 
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rôle que ce dernier), montrant une influence du but de la tâche sur la stratégie employée, et 
donc certainement sur les processus mis en jeu durant la tâche. 
 La seconde étude est moins directement comparable à la notre étant donné que nous 
avons utilisé un type d’analyse différent de celui de Bethell-Fox et al. (1984), mais reste 
cohérente avec les données que nous avons obtenues. En effet, en faisant varier la complexité 
relationnelle des essais, ces auteurs ont observé de plus nombreux retours sur la paire AB 
dans les essais complexes que dans les essais simples et l’emploi d’une stratégie d’élimination 
de la réponse, alors qu’une stratégie de construction de la réponse était employée dans les 
essais plus simples. Nos études, en plus de révéler le même type de stratégies et de retour sur 
AB dans les essais complexes, suggèrent également que les participants n’alignent pas 
directement les deux domaines, mais se contentent de comparer la similarité de la relation, 
étant donné que les instructions de la tâche mettent l’accent sur ce point. Ceci est cohérent 
avec le fait qu’un distracteur qui partage, avec C, la similarité de relation avec la paire AB, 
mais dont la mise en correspondance en terme de rôle est inversée par rapport à AB, provoque 
un grand nombre d’erreurs chez les adultes, et diminuent le nombre de comparaison dans 
l’espace solution. Ainsi le but principal de la tâche étant atteint, la tâche se termine sans 
l’opération d’évaluation de la mise en correspondance des deux domaines.  
 Ainsi, dans les différentes tâches de raisonnement par analogies proposées à nos 
participants, nous avons trouvé des composantes communes: l’encodage des relations se fait 
de la même manière, et l’attention portée aux distracteurs directement liés au but principal de 
la tâche est plus grande que sur des distracteurs peu liés au but. Egalement, dans ces deux 
tâches, on observe peu de saccades liées à la mise en relation directe des éléments des deux 
domaines, mise à part les mises en correspondances directement liées au but principal de la 
tâche. La principale différence entre ces deux tâches est, elle aussi, liée aux buts distincts de 
ces deux tâches: la présence de saccades entre les éléments correspondants en terme de rôles 
dans les relations n’est présente que dans la tâche d’analogies entre scènes dont les 
instructions demande explicitement cette mise en correspondance. 
 Les effets du but sur la tâche ont été pris en compte par deux modèles: ACME 
(Holyoak & Thagard, 1989) et le modèle de path-mapping (Salvucci & Anderson, 2001). Le 
premier cependant est limité dans ses prédictions du fait que ce n’est qu’un modèle du 
processus de mise en correspondance et ne dit rien sur l’encodage ou l’évaluation de la mise 
en correspondance. Ce modèle est néanmoins critiquable du fait qu’il atteint 
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systématiquement une mise en correspondance totale entre les deux domaines, ce que nos 
données ne semble pas confirmer. Au contraire elles supportent plus les prédictions du 
modèle de path-mapping qui veut que, lorsque l’information et les comparaisons nécessaires à 
la résolution du but principal de la tâche ont été effectuées, la réponse est donnée. Egalement, 
le fait que les participants continuent à explorer le matériel tout au long de la tâche, et que les 
sujets reviennent sur le domaine source après avoir exploré le domaine cible dans certains cas 
d’essais complexes, suggère que la représentation des domaines comparés est influencée par 
les processus de mise en correspondance, de transfert et d’évaluation, comme le suggère les 
modèles Copycat et Tabletop (French, 1995; Mitchell, 1993). 
 Du point de vue développemental, plusieurs de nos données suggèrent que les enfants 
ont des difficultés à maintenir le but de la tâche au cours de sa résolution. En effet, les enfants, 
dans la tâche d’analogie de scène, font moins de saccades entre les éléments liés par leur 
communauté de rôle dans les domaines source et cibles, et parallèlement font plus d’erreurs 
de type relationnelles, c’est-à-dire d’erreur de rôle dans la relation cible. Egalement, de 
manière cohérente avec les résultats de Thibaut et al. (2011) qui montraient que les enfants 
regardaient moins le domaine source, en proportion, comparés aux adultes, nos résultats 
montrent qu’en aidant les enfants à se focaliser sur AB par une procédure montrant cette paire 
avant le reste du problème, et leur demandant de verbaliser la relation entre ces images, ceux-
ci réussissent mieux dans cette tâche.  
 Les théories du développement du raisonnement par analogie (c’est-à-dire les théories 
de transition relationnelle, de primauté relationnelle et de la complexité relationnelle) laissent 
la place à de tels facteurs métacognitifs, mais seulement de manière vague. Ces données sont 
un argument pour la prise en compte explicite du développement du maintien du but dans ces 
théories. Egalement, les modèles de raisonnement par analogie, et notamment celui-de path-
mapping, pourraient être adaptés pour tenir compte de la difficulté des enfants à maintenir le 
but de la tâche. Ainsi le modèle de path-mapping, en intégrant la structure de buts de la tâche 
dans les objets retenus en mémoire de travail, et donc en laissant la possibilité que cette 
structure ne soit pas rappelée correctement, pourrait modéliser ce genre de données. Ce 
modèle prédirait une compétition en mémoire de travail de la structure de buts de la tâche et 
de la complexité relationnelle des structures des domaines comparés. 
 Les données que nous avons recueillies sont également discutées en termes de 
fonctions exécutives, et de leur interaction avec d’une part la représentation des buts de la 
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tâche, et d’autre part les représentations des domaines comparés. En effet, les fonctions 
exécutives sont à l’interface de ces deux types de représentations; elles permettent de 
manipuler l’information des représentations des domaines en vue de la transformer pour 
atteindre les buts posés par la tâche. Un des arguments en faveur de cette vision des fonctions 
exécutives est le fait que les distracteurs sont plus difficilement inhibés dans les cas où le 
distracteur prend en compte la plupart des contraintes qui reposaient sur la solution de la tâche 
(c’est-à-dire la similarité de sa relation avec C avec celle de la paire AB). Egalement, lorsque 
la représentation du domaine source n’était pas assez contraignante (c’est-à-dire représentée 
de manière suffisamment claire pour discriminer la solution des autres réponses possibles 
reliées à C) provoquait une difficulté pour les adultes à engager l’inhibition de l’information 
provenant des distracteurs. Cette difficulté d’inhibition s’est retrouvée dans les patterns 
visuels des participants, avec de plus grandes fixations sur le distracteurs reliés à C, et de plus 
nombreuses saccades entre ceux-ci et C. 
 Ces résultats correspondent bien avec les points de vue actuels sur les fonctions 
exécutives montrant leur lien d’une part avec leur substrat (Chevalier, 2010) et leur lien avec 
la représentation et le maintien du but (Blaye & Chevalier, 2011; Chevalier & Blaye, 2008b). 
Ils sont également consistent avec les modèles mettant l’inhibition de l’information en 
mémoire de travail au centre de leur fonctionnement. C’est le cas de LISA (Hummel & 
Holyoak, 1997), dont la construction d’une représentation en mémoire de travail est liée à sa 
capacité à inhiber et à coordonner les activations de certaines informations en mémoire de 
travail dans le temps. Cependant, ce modèle souffre des mêmes problèmes qu’ACME déjà 
relevés plus haut, à savoir le fait qu’il fasse une mise en correspondance globale des deux 
domaines, et que ses représentations soient pré-programmées par les expérimentateurs, ne 
laissant ainsi pas la place à des représentations peux claires d’influencer l’engagement de 
l’inhibition. Egalement, il serait difficile de le faire évoluer vers la prise en compte de buts 
spécifiques à différentes tâches de raisonnement par analogie et de faire des prédictions 
spécifiques à partir de ce modèle par rapport à des données de mouvement oculaires, celui-ci 
se limitant à la modélisation de la mise en correspondance et ne s’intéressant pas à 
l’encodage, ni aux autres processus du raisonnement par analogie.  
 L’engagement du contrôle exécutif dans le raisonnement par analogie est également 
suggéré par les données obtenues chez l’enfant. En règle générale, ils sont plus susceptibles 
de choisir des distracteurs reliés à C que les adultes, les regardent plus longtemps et font plus 
de saccades entre eux et les éléments qui leur étaient reliés. Ceci suggère une difficulté à 
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engager leur inhibition sur ces objets. Egalement, les enfants, lorsqu’ils sont ancrés dans une 
première représentation de la relation source qui n’était pas utile pour la résolution des 
problèmes par analogie, font plus d’erreurs que si leur représentation initiale se porte sur la 
relation correcte. Ceci suggère une incapacité à engager leur flexibilité cognitive pour re-
représenter le domaine source et résoudre le problème. Ainsi, une des possibilités que les 
données de cette dissertation font entrevoir est que le maintien du but, difficile chez l’enfant, 
va les empêcher de mettre en place des ressources exécutives lorsque c’est nécessaire. 
 Le manuscrit termine sur les perspectives que les données collectées dans les 
différents chapitres font entrevoir. Ainsi, à très court terme, il serait intéressant de contrôler 
plus avant les différences de matériel entre les tâche d’analogie de scène et A:B::C:? en 
contexte, car les matériels que nous avons utilisés, développés par différentes équipes, ne 
donnent pas la même information sur les relations représentées. En effet, les analogies de 
scène sont plus explicites dans les interactions entre les éléments composant les scènes que le 
matériel que nous avons créé pour la tâche de type A:B::C:?. Ainsi un contrôle serait d’utiliser 
le matériel de la tâche A:B::C:? en contexte dans la tâche de scène, en faisant varier 
simplement l’objet vers lequel la flèche pointe, et les instructions. 
 A moyen terme, il serait également intéressant d’étudier l’interaction prédite entre les 
charges en mémoire de travail qu’exercent les représentations respectivement des buts de la 
tâche et des domaines comparés, ainsi que de faire varier l’activation du but par l’entremise 
d’essais où la solution est rendue évidente par une similarité de surface soulignant les 
correspondances en terme de rôles, et d’observer à quel point cette extinction du but 
affecterait les performances chez l’adulte et l’enfant. Egalement il serait intéressant de 
dissocier l’incapacité à être flexible dans le raisonnement par analogie à cause d’une 
immaturité de cette fonction exécutive, d’une incapacité due à une difficulté à engager cette 
fonction liée à la négligence de but. Ces deux points de vue font des prédictions différentes au 
niveau des données eye-tracking qui seraient obtenues dans notre tâche testant l’implication 
de la flexibilité cognitive dans le raisonnement par analogie chez l’enfant. 
 A plus long terme, il serait également intéressant d’étudier chez l’adulte les différences 
d’engagement des fonctions exécutives dues aux propriétés sémantiques des domaines 
comparés impactant les représentations de ces domaines que se forment les participants. Nous 
avons vu qu’un de ces facteurs était peut-être l’imageabilité des concepts relationnels utilisés 
pour construire les problèmes. Cependant, ce facteur n’a pas été testé directement dans notre 
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étude. D’autres facteurs sémantiques pourraient également affecter l’engagement de 
ressources exécutives, tels que des aspects thématiques ou catégoriels. Un autre aspect à 
développer serait la modélisation des effets d’interaction entre maintien du but, d’engagement 
des fonctions exécutives, et de formation de représentation, ces trois facteurs n’ayant jamais 
été pris en compte simultanément dans un modèle, en se basant sur les points forts des 
modèles simulant ces différents facteurs de manière isolée.  
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Chapter I: Theoretical introduction 
 
I. Definition of analogy-making 
 Finding similarities between objects, movements or situations is one of the most 
common mental processes of human cognition. Indeed, it is so closely intertwined with 
human thought and knowledge. Much of what our brain does involve finding regularities and 
continuity in the world: the ability of finding things similar is part and parcel of everyday 
thinking to the extent it overshadows the constant changes in our environment. In fact, 
analogical perception is so central to our conceptual system that it has been called the "core of 
human cognition" (Hofstadter, 2001).  
 The exact definition of analogy-making has been debated by cognitive scientists for 
decades, some of them arguing that every act of finding things similar is an analogy (French, 
1995; Hofstadter, 2001; Mitchell, 1993), others constraining the domain of analogy-making to 
a subset of similarity processes (Gentner, 1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989). In this 
dissertation, we will adopt the more constrained view which defines analogy-making as the 
ability to compare and find similarities between two domains on the basis of the relations 
between the elements composing the two domains. Hence, we will not consider finding 
“mere” featural similarities between these elements to be analogical reasoning. In fact, in 
many cases it is precisely these featural similarities that have to be ignored in order to draw 
meaningful analogies. The domain whose representation is most complete (from the 
perspective of the person making an analogy) is often called source or base domain, while the 
other domain whose representation has to be completed is referred to as the target domain. 
Thus, drawing an analogy essentially involves comparing and transferring relational 
information from the source to the target domain. 
 Defined in this way, analogy lies somewhere on the continuum of similarity 
perceptions and judgments that contains cognitive processes, such as recognition, 
generalization, the ability to map perceptual inputs onto already formed concepts, and 
categorization (French, 1995). “Recognition,” according to these authors, requires the least 
“slippage,” and, as such, lies at one end of the continuum, whereas “analogy-making” is 
thought to be the similarity process that requires the most control and conceptual slippage, 
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and therefore lies at the other end of the continuum. We agree with French (1995) that 
analogy-making requires a greater degree of conceptual slippage than recognition and 
categorization. However the degree of slippage is a multidimensional concept, as expressed in 
Barnett & Ceci's (2002) taxonomy in which distance between two domains depends on their 
respective contents and their associated physical, temporal, functional, and social contexts. In 
addition, the perception of this distance might also change during development. 
 Another taxonomy of analogy-making has been made by Gentner (1989), who pits 
“mere appearance similarity” against “structural similarity”, the latter being the stuff of true 
analogies. In Gentner's view, similarity is two dimensional: similarity of features and 
similarity of relations. Mere appearance similarity is considered to be when only surface (i.e., 
feature) similarity exists between the two domains compared. For example, the words "dog" 
and "god" constitute a case of mere appearance similarity matching. Literal similarity is the 
case when surface similarity and relational similarity both contribute to the similarity of the 
two domains compared. An example of a literal similarity match would be one between two 
atoms, say, a carbon and an oxygen atom. Both are made up of electrons, neutrons and 
protons, and the organization between these entities is the same, i.e., the electrons revolve 
around a nucleus which consists of neutrons and protons. Analogies, on the other hand, 
involve the comparison of two domains on the sole basis of their relational structure. 
Comparisons between domains sharing neither surface, nor relational similarity are called 
anomalies.  
 Analogy-making should also be distinguished from metaphor comprehension and 
processing (Billow, 1977), which are often related to true analogies, for example, in Gentner's 
(1989) taxonomy, in which metaphors occupy considerable space in a two dimensional 
environment that includes true analogies, mere appearances matches, as well as anomalies. 
Holyoak (2012) relates metaphors to analogies, because both are designed to convey 
information from a source domain in order to induce a representation in a target domain so 
that the two domains can be mapped onto each other. However, Holyoak argues that 
metaphors are a special kind of analogy, since the two domains compared are always distant, 
often mixed together, rather than simply compared, and that metaphors often involve other 
conceptual blendings, such as metonymy. 
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 To sum up, we have argued that similarity detection and processing are central to our 
mind's behavior, and that similarity processing can be decomposed into different processes, 
among them: recognition, generalization, categorization, and analogy-making.  
 
II. The sub-processes of analogy-making 
 There is broad agreement on the sub-processes involved in analogical reasoning in the 
scientific literature. It is generally accepted that analogical reasoning can be divided into the 
retrieval of a source (if the source is not given explicitly), or the encoding of the source 
domain (if it is explicitly given), the mapping of the source onto the target domain, the 
evaluation of the mapping and potential inferences between the domains, and the transfer and 
inferences that are made in the target on the basis of what is known about the source (Gentner 
& Forbus, 2011; Gentner & Smith, 2012; Holyoak, 2012; Sternberg, 1977). Usually, mapping 
is considered to be the most crucial process (Gentner & Smith, 2012). These different sub-
processes were found to differentially modulate several brain areas' activation (Krawczyk, 
McClelland, Donovan, Tillman, & Maguire, 2010; Maguire, McClelland, Donovan, Tillman, 
& Krawczyk, 2012; Qiu, Li, Chen, & Zhang, 2008). Moreover, these sub-processes are 
subject to more general cognitive constraints, such as working memory capacity and 
executive functions.  
 
II. a. Retrieval/encoding of the source 
 The retrieval of a source domain is the sub-process of finding a domain in long term 
memory that has the same relational structure as the domain that is currently under 
consideration (i.e., the target domain) in order to draw an analogy. This happens when the 
source domain is not already explicitly given by the problem (this often occurs in so-called 
“explanatory analogies” in which we try to explain a novel situation by finding an analogy 
with another, better-known or more easily understood situation: “That’s like...”). By doing so, 
one activates a representation of the relational structure of a domain that has been previously 
stored in long term memory. This representation is kept active in working memory and the 
subsequent operations involving the analogy are carried out. An example of this process 
would be an elementary school teacher trying to teach her class fractions using an analogy 
with a domain with which the children are more familiar. Trying to explain “fractions,” the 
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teacher might try to retrieve a source analogue from memory, and find a familiar situation in 
which units are cut into smaller slices. She might retrieve a situation involving cutting a pizza 
into slices, for examples, which would activate a representation of the relational structure of 
"cutting pizza into slices" in working memory. 
 The encoding of the source is the counterpart of the retrieval sub-process when one is 
explicitly given the source domain. In this case, the source domain is translated into an 
internal representation of its relational structure and its objects and object features, and is kept 
active in working memory. In contrast to the situation where the teacher had to discover her 
own source domain (i.e., cutting pizzas into slices), in the teacher’s manual, fractions are 
described in terms of cutting a segment in different sub-segments. In this case, this description 
is encoded and maintained in working memory to permit the next sub-processes. 
 In the above examples, in one case, the teacher relied on memory search and retrieval 
to unearth an analogy (cutting a pizza into slices) to explain fractions to her pupils, and, in the 
second case, she encoded an explicit source domain (cutting a line segment into sections) 
provided by her teacher’s manual. Both resulted in the activation of a structured 
representation of an analog in our teacher's working memory.  
  
II. b. Mapping 
 The mapping phase of analogical reasoning is the phase in which the base and target 
domains are put into correspondence. During mapping, relations in the two domains are 
compared and aligned in order to find possible matches between the two domains' elements 
and relations. 
 Let us return to our example of cutting pizza slices and fractions. During the mapping 
sub-process, our teacher would put into correspondence the following elements and relations: 
the number of pizzas cut plays the same role as the number of units, the number of slices into 
which each pizza is cut corresponds to the denominator, and the number of slices picked by 
someone corresponds to the numerator. The relations between these different elements are 
also matched: the division of the fraction’s numerator by its denominator corresponds to the 
amount of a pizza eaten, i.e., the number of slices taken with respect to how many slices make 
up a pizza.  
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 The key idea is that mapping causes an alignment, however imperfect, between the 
two domains that are compared.  
 
II. c. Transfer and inferences 
 When the two domains are aligned, even partially, inferences in the target domain can 
be drawn using the knowledge from the source domain. This sub-process is usually called 
transfer or analogical inference. To illustrate the sub-process of inference, we can draw on the 
above analogy between pizza slices and fractions. A clever student might use this analogy 
between pizzas and fractions to derive the conclusion that to add fractions, they must be 
expressed with the same denominator, since only slices of the same size can be added 
conveniently to make an entire pizza. This is a case of analogical inference, as this student has 
used his knowledge about pizza slices and whole pizzas to predict functioning in the fraction 
domain.  
 Analogical inference thus can be seen as a generalization of a relational sub-structure 
of one domain to the other on the basis of their mutual correspondences.  
 
II. d. Evaluation 
 Evaluation is the sub-process that is used to control mapping and inferences. Mapping 
and inferences are evaluated on the basis, not only of their correspondence to facts about the 
world, but also on the basis of the goals of the analogical task, the adaptability of the source in 
order to draw an inference in the target, and the value of the knowledge derived from the 
source in the target (Gentner & Smith, 2012). The evaluation sub-process might also be 
involved in the control of potential errors in the mapping sub-process, and of the omission of 
some information or the justification of inference under low evidence (Sternberg, 1977).  
 To illustrate the evaluation process, imagine that, while elaborating her analogy 
between pizzas and fractions, our professor might have wondered if pizzas were appropriate 
to convey correct analogical inferences, due to the difficulty of cutting slices of exactly the 
same size. As a result she might have replaced them with the more abstract example of lines 
and segments of lines, given in her teacher’s manual. 
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 The clever student might have asked his teacher about how to add fractions, in order to 
justify his inference, his current knowledge not allowing himself to justify it by himself. A 
poorer student might have first mapped the total number of pizzas to the numerator, but 
corrected the mapping when faced with the contradictory evidence and incoherent 
descriptions that this choice led to. This leads to what Gentner calls re-representation (i.e., the 
modification of the representation of at least one of the two domains, based on the mapping 
between the two domains, to augment the match between them; Gentner & Kurtz, 2006) 
These examples illustrate the evaluation of the mapping and inferences sub-processes during 
analogical reasoning.  
 The evaluation of an analogy is intrinsically dependent on the subjective goals that are 
pursued by the subject, and, thus, it necessarily varies according to the context of the 
analogical task. 
 
II. e. Conclusion 
 The different sub-processes of analogical reasoning presented above are well-
acknowledged by the research community. We have tried to illustrate them by means of an 
example, showing that they arise naturally when a comparison of different domains occurs in 
everyday life. Different theories of analogy making account for these processes, especially the 
mapping process, in different ways. Little consensus has been reached concerning the 
cognitive computations involved in these operations. The next section is an attempt to present 
the main theories of adult analogical reasoning and to summarize the differences between 
various theories of analogy making in terms of these sub-processes. 
 
III. Theories of analogical reasoning  
 The following section first discusses the necessity of the sub-processes presented in 
the former section, and then describes the principal theories about analogical reasoning. It 
ends with comparisons of the different theories in terms of the postulated cognitive processes, 
psychological limitations, and order of information processing by subjects. 
 
43 
 
III.a. Necessity of the sub-processes 
 The necessity of the sub-processes presented in section II was highly debated in early 
research on analogical reasoning, and several proposals were made, including or not the 
totality of these sub-processes. One of these early scientific explorations of the sub-processes 
of analogical reasoning was done by Sternberg (1977). He proposed a theory of analogical 
reasoning in A:B::C:? problems including the sub-processes of encoding, inference (of the 
relations between objects constituting the problems), mapping, application of the inference to 
the C term (what we called transfer or inference above) along with justification which was 
considered optional. He tested his model of sub-processes against other models excluding 
mapping (Johnson, 1962; Shalom & Schlesinger, 1972; Spearman, 1923), and models 
excluding application (Evans, 1968; Winston, 1970) but including all other sub-processes 
against experimental evidence. Adult subjects were tested in three different types of problems 
(verbal, geometric, and people-pieces problems), measuring their reaction times when varying 
the number of terms (nothing, A, A:B, A:B::C) appearing before the chronometer started. By 
a multiple regression analysis of these reaction times, Sternberg showed that the reaction time 
data were better explained when mapping was included, along with all the other sub-
processes. However, the model that explained best participants' reaction times was a model 
with exhaustive inference sub-processes but only partial mapping and application sub-
processes. 
 The framework of multiple regression of experimental reaction times to models has 
also been used by Sternberg and collaborators (Sternberg & Nigro, 1980; Sternberg & Rifkin, 
1979) to study the sub-processes used by children of various ages. Sternberg & Rifkin (1979) 
showed that 8-year-olds did not use the mapping component while reasoning by analogy, 
while older participants (i.e., 10-, 12-year-olds and adults) used it with problems involving 
attributes that were separable from the whole picture (e.g., hats and bags in pictures of 
characters), but not in problems involving integral attributes (e.g., height or weight). The 
difference of usage of mapping in younger and older participants was linked to their ability to 
detect a higher-order similarity between the relations between A and B on one hand, and 
between C and the solution on the other. Another notable aspect of their work is the difference 
in the completeness of the componential sub-processes employed by the participants of 
different ages. The models best explaining children's reaction times all confirm Sternberg's 
(1977) results, application and mapping not being exhaustive. However, children differed in 
the completeness of the encoding and inference processes. Indeed 8-year-olds had both their 
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encoding and inference processes incomplete, when 10-year-olds had only the latter 
incomplete and older children both of them exhaustive. 
 To conclude, what seems to separate younger from older children's processes is their 
ability to encode and maintain the representations of the domains presented. The difference 
between older children and adults' processes resides in the inability of the formers to 
genuinely use the mapping process to put the two domains into correspondences. 
III.b. Theories of adult analogical reasoning 
 The most studied process in analogical reasoning is the mapping process, thought 
crucial for the success of the comparison between the two domains and the resolution of 
problems by analogy. Hence, most theories and models have focused on this process, giving 
little or no insight on the other sub-processes. In this subsection we review the most 
preeminent theories of analogical reasoning, i.e., the Structure Mapping Theory (Gentner, 
1983, 1989), the Multiconstraint Theory (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989), the theory behind 
Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997), and 
Copycat and Tabletop (French, 1995; Mitchell, 1993), and finally the Path-Mapping Theory 
(Salvucci & Anderson, 2001). 
 
Structure Mapping Theory 
 The Structure Mapping Theory (Gentner & Markman, 1995, 1997; Gentner, 1983, 
1989) assumes that the domains which are compared in analogical reasoning are represented 
by the subject as relational structures with objects (e.g., a dog, a ball), attributes (e.g., hairy, 
small), and relations between the elements (e.g., catches) which can be syntactically described 
as a propositional network of concepts, either under the form of predicates (i.e., attributes and 
relations) or of arguments to these predicates (i.e., objects). Attributes and relations 
distinguish themselves from each other in the number of arguments they can take: attributes 
are predicates with only one argument (e.g., small(ball)); relations are predicates taking two 
or more arguments (e.g., catches (dog, ball)). Gentner also distinguishes first-order predicates 
from higher-order relations: the first ones take objects as arguments, the second, relations.  
 Therefore, analogical reasoning is about comparing two of these domains: the 
mapping process is the process that finds the one-to-one correspondences between the objects 
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and the known relations in the two domains, based on their names, the number of arguments 
of the predicates, etc. These correspondences are then used to project new predicates from the 
base to the source (i.e., inference). However, the analogical mapping uses a set of rules to fit 
the definition of analogy given by Gentner (1983) to be purely relational: attribute 
correspondences tend to be discarded in the evaluation of the mapping, and relational 
predicates between corresponding objects tend to be preserved, based on the fact that higher-
level relations guide the mapping of lower-level relations (the Systematicity Principle) and 
that corresponding relations have corresponding objects. Thus, higher-order predicates are 
favored over first-order predicates, and determine which lower-order relational predicates are 
transferred and which are not. 
 This theory argues that subjects first find local matches between objects and relational 
predicates on the basis of a set of rules (i.e., if first-order relations or attributes are similar, the 
subject hypothesize that they match, then he checks if their arguments are of the same type 
(objects or relational predicates). Then, they create global matches on the basis of these local 
matches, using possible mappings of the different entities in the two domains, thus creating 
different system mappings including possible inference in the target (i.e., different possible 
interpretations for the comparison). Finally, subjects evaluate the different interpretations that 
were found, and choose the best one. To do this they use several types of evidence: the clarity 
of the mapping (i.e., one-to-one mappings are preferred), the number of potential inferences 
that can be drawn, and the depth of the relational structure preserved in the comparison in 
terms of the number of different predicates mapped, the level of these predicates (i.e., 
elements, first-order or higher order relations) higher level predicates being preferred, and 
how much they are connected (the Systematicity Principle).  
 The strong focus of this theory of mapping on relational predicates is supported by 
experimental evidence showing that adults, when presented with analogical comparisons, 
attended more to relational similarity than to attribute similarity to interpret it, in the case of 
true analogies and relational metaphors as in the case of metaphors focusing both attributional 
and relational similarity (Gentner & Clement, 1988; Gentner, 1980). Evidence for the 
Systematicity Principle effects on mapping and inference comes from Clement & Gentner's 
(1991) study described above. 
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Multiconstraint theory 
 The multiconstraint theory (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989, 1997) is one of the major 
alternative to the Structure Mapping Theory, even though it is very close in its assumptions 
about the key roles of relational similarity (along with superficial similarity) and systematicity 
constraints (called the structural constraint). The authors also add a third constraint: 
pragmatics constraints (i.e., the goal currently under consideration). These pragmatics 
constraints make the subject more aware of the features of the source and target domains that 
are relevant to his goals. Another goal of this theory is to account for both access and 
mapping aspects of human analogical reasoning. 
 This theory assumes that subjects generate local mapping hypotheses between the two 
domains and uses a set of constraints on the local mapping hypotheses to be included in their 
global mapping of the two domains at the same time. The mapping hypotheses which are 
generated are limited by a structural constraint to object to object and predicate to predicate 
matches. Object to predicate, and predicate to object match are discarded. Correspondences 
between objects that do not play the same role in the relations are also discarded by the 
subject. For instance, in the comparison of a cat chasing a mouse to a boy chasing a girl, the 
subject only generates local matches between the elements chasing and the elements chased, 
but not between a chasing and a chased element. Structural consistency also guides the subject 
toward certain types of mapping hypotheses. Lower-order predicates which are matched 
enhance the probability of the mapping hypothesis between two corresponding higher-order 
match to be chosen and vice versa. Thus, in the mapping between two situations, say a cat 
chasing a mouse causing the mouse to accelerate its running pace, and a boy chasing a girl 
causing the girl to accelerate her running pace, if the mapping hypothesis between the two 
“chasing” relations is envisaged, it will increase the probability of the mapping hypothesis 
linking the two “cause” instances to be also picked. The one-to-one mapping constraint has, 
on the opposite, an inhibitory effect: it decreases the probability of several hypotheses 
involving the same objects to be chosen by the subject at the same time. Similarity and 
purpose (i.e., the goal of the subject) are also constraints on the mapping: hypotheses 
involving semantically similar elements or which are goal relevant are more likely to be 
chosen. The subject arrives to a global mapping by picking the different local hypotheses that 
permit a coherent global mapping which takes the more of these constraints into account. 
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 The addition of pragmatic constraints on the way mapping are drawn is supported by 
evidence by Spellman & Holyoak (1996). They showed that participants whose goals were 
experimentally manipulated and who were asked to draw analogies which were ambiguous 
relative to their mapping made different objects in the two domains compared correspond, 
according to their ongoing goals. 
 
Learning and Inferences with Schemas and Analogies (LISA) 
 The LISA model (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003, 2005) is an effort to take into 
account both psychological and neural constraints that arose from the literature on analogical 
reasoning. It tries to account for the flexibility of human analogical reasoning and its structure 
sensitivity at the same time. It also tries to capture the psychological limitations on analogical 
reasoning, such as working memory capacity limits and time dependency, sensitivity to 
problem presentation and strategic factors, while keeping the same constraints on analogical 
reasoning (structure sensitivity, one-to-one mapping, semantic similarity, and pragmatic 
centrality). 
 LISA assumes that the knowledge of the subject is distributed. Hence, semantic 
knowledge is decomposed in objects, semantic knowledge about these objects, their roles in 
the relations, the relations themselves, the structure of the relations considered or 
propositions. These different levels of knowledge are represented by the subject in a 
hierarchical form: semantic features are linked to objects (representing objects and attributes), 
objects are linked themselves to role-fillers (the roles of objects in relations) which are linked 
to sub-propositions (representing the object-role binding), and sub-propositions are linked to 
propositions (representing relations). It also assumes that the representation of the knowledge 
of propositions is dynamical: different role-filler knowledge units and their corresponding 
objects are active in working memory in an out of synchrony manner to create a complete 
relational representation (e.g., John-lover and Mary-beloved are activated out of synchrony to 
represent the relation John loves Mary), this dynamics being due to lateral inhibition between 
different representations of the same type (inhibition component of working memory). 
Object-role bindings and relations are stored in long term memory with the means of sub-
proposition and proposition knowledge units respectively. The sub-proposition knowledge is 
able to recreate the dynamics of activation patterns of object, semantic features and role-fillers 
in working memory. Propositional knowledge is what binds sub-proposition knowledge units 
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in long term memory, and can also be bound in higher-order relations. The last type of 
representations assumed by this theory is schemas, which can be learned by the comparison of 
different structured representations which are analogous. 
 When the subject compares two domains, one domain (the driver) leads the mapping 
process, while the other domain (the recipient) is activated in working memory by the 
corresponding activity in the subject’s representation of the driver domain. Thinking of the 
driver domain leads to propositions in this domain being activated in turn. It is assumed that 
propositions which are relevant to the subject’s current goals will be activated earlier and 
more often than other propositions in memory. This activation of propositions then activates 
corresponding sub-proposition knowledge in turn. Objects and role-fillers along with semantic 
features which are linked to the activated sub-propositions are also activated in working 
memory in a dynamic fashion. Higher-order propositions are treated the same way, except 
that only one hierarchical level is activated at a time, and that propositions activated by the 
activation of a higher-order proposition as arguments are chunked (i.e., the detail of the 
structure they have is not available to the subject for treatment). 
 The activation of the recipient representation by the subject is the result of the 
activation of semantic features in working memory, which are linked to objects both in the 
driver and in the recipient. Thus, when the subject thinks of the semantic features in the driver 
domain via its own object and role-filler units, this activates the corresponding representations 
of objects and role-fillers in the recipient domain in synchrony of those in the driver domain, 
generating a mapping between these representations. During this activation, there is a 
competition between units of the same class, and cooperation between the units belonging to 
the same propositions, to model the dynamics of the representation of the driver. The co-
activation between the representations of the same class in the two domains thus creates a full 
mapping of the two domains.  
 However, to working memory limits analogical reasoning: the number of activated 
sub-propositions in the driver that are activated simultaneously in working memory is limited 
to 4-6 sub-propositions for adult, healthy participants. 
 The LISA theory accounts fairly well for a great variety of phenomenon related to 
analogical reasoning: the role of similarity in access and inference (Ross, 1987, 1989), the 
differential access of close and far analogs (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 
1980, 1983), the relevance of goals in the process of mapping (Spellman & Holyoak, 1996), 
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the difficulty people encounter with unnatural analogs (Keane, Ledgeway, & Duff, 1994), and 
ontogenetic changes in the ability to learn new structures (Halford & Wilson, 1980). 
 
Copycat & Tabletop 
 The theory behind these models (French, 1995; Hofstadter and the Fluid Analogies 
Research Group, 1995; Mitchell & Hofstadter, 1990; Mitchell, 1993, 2001) is that high-level 
perception (i.e., understanding of situations and similarity perception between highly 
structured inputs) emerges from the interplay between perception and a highly flexible 
conceptual system. This is achieved in a dynamic fashion, using parallel processing of 
different lower-level perceptual processes to construct a systematic representation of a 
problem at a higher level. These two models are based on similar architectures but evolve in 
different domains. Copycat uses proportional analogies between strings of letters, when 
Tabletop uses analogies between spatial settings of objects of everyday life. Due to their 
probabilistic functioning, they are well suited to model inter-individual differences in 
analogy-making (Mitchell, 1993). 
 These models postulate a distinction between three cognitive modules: the conceptual 
system in long term memory, with conceptual representations in a network, a working 
memory system were the temporary representations of the analogical problems are 
progressively built and destroyed until they stabilize, and different perceptual and higher-level 
hypothesis testing procedures which represent what the subject is able to perceive from the 
materials presented. It is the dynamic interaction between these three sub-systems that permits 
the subject to have a structured representation and interpret the analogies. The conceptual 
representations in the conceptual network are linked by association which allows slippage 
from one conceptual representation to another highly associated one (e.g., between the 
concepts of successor and predecessor). Activations of these representations are thought to be 
a function of their relevance to the problem at hand for the subject, and their association to 
other relevant concepts. The association strength between the concepts evolves during 
problem solving, depending on the dynamic representation of the problem by the subject. 
Slippage from one concept activation to another, highly associated concept is more or less 
probable depending on the other concepts activated when solving a problem and the subject’s 
interpretation of the problem and the correspondences he perceives between the domains. 
Thus the conceptual network of the subject is believed to be highly flexible.  
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 The structure of the representation of the problem in working memory is dynamically 
obtained by the engagement of his conceptual knowledge and the perceptual hypothesis 
testing procedures in parallel, and contains different types of information about the problem at 
hand: a description of the problem's elements, their interrelations, groupings of several 
objects, and correspondences between objects and group of objects (i.e., mapping). These 
representations are built as the result of the hypothesis testing procedures, which is the way 
for the perceptual system to determine some low level structure between elements within and 
between domains (i.e., their outputs correspond to the descriptions, interrelations, groupings 
and correspondences mentioned above), and result in the strengthening of these 
representations as a function of the degree of associations of related concepts in the 
conceptual network of the subject, the consistency of this representation (how frequently it 
has been found during the exploration of the different parts of the problem), and the activation 
of related concepts. The different perceptual hypothesis testing procedures are believed to be 
run based on their relevance to the structures which are built in working memory and their 
strength, leading to emergent, coherent representations of the problems in the subjects mind. 
Thus hypotheses about the structure which comfort the present representation of the 
problem’s structure are more probable to be run than irrelevant ones. In summary, 
representations of the problems by the subject reflect the coherence actively sought between 
the long-term knowledge he has acquired and what he perceives from the problem. As 
changes in the high level representations of the subject only after hundreds of hypothesis 
testing procedures run, the theory describes low level, highly parallel cognitive activities 
resulting in higher level, serial activities. 
 
The Path-Mapping Theory 
 The Path-Mapping Theory is an attempt to integrate analogical mapping with 
constraints on problem solving in the ACT-R architecture (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), a 
production system which leads to tractable "actions" which can be compared to real world 
behaviors in different tasks, such as eye-tracking data.  
 The knowledge of subjects is believed to be represented in a semantic network with 
semantic relations linking relations, roles and objects, and semantic knowledge about these 
objects, roles and relations, similarly to the knowledge network in the LISA theory. One of 
the parameters captured by the knowledge network of humans is how similar concepts are on 
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a semantic dimension. These concepts are activated through the processing of the problem, 
and the number of concepts activated at the same time in working memory is limited. In 
addition to this semantic knowledge, subject also has to engage his procedural knowledge 
about how to act when certain conditions are met (i.e., if this information is met, I have to do 
that). These rules determine which action is undertaken at what time by the subject. The 
subject triggers this procedural knowledge according to the goals of the task he has to 
perform. The subject gives an answer when the main goal of the task if achieved. Mapping is 
effectuated through such behavioral rules by mapping one object at a time. This is done by 
finding the path of a source object to its highest order relation in the knowledge structure of 
the representation of this domain, and then finding the correspondent of this path in the target, 
based on the similarity between the source and target chunks of knowledge. These 
correspondences between the two paths are stored and reutilized for the mapping of other 
objects, leading to a more global mapping if needed to solve the task. Organizational 
knowledge is also invoked by subjects to coordinate the mapping of the different domains 
with task specific actions such as encoding the information of the problem and responding.  
 This theory predicts the same effect as the Structure Mapping Theory and the 
Multiconstraint Theory — namely the Systematicity Principle and pragmatic effects due to 
the goals of the task at hand — and also surface similarity effects interacting positively or 
negatively with the mapping between the two domains. It successfully explains the same 
phenomena found in the analogical reasoning literature as the theory behind LISA (Hummel 
& Holyoak, 1997; i.e., isomorphism, similarity, pragmatic centrality, multiple possible 
mappings for a single analogy, facilitation effect of an initial correct correspondence, 
difficulty with unnatural mapping problems, and the possibility to map predicates with 
different numbers of arguments) along with other phenomenon not accounted for by LISA 
(the generation of non isomorphic mappings, the preference for many-to-one mappings over 
one-to-many mappings, and the ability to map complex analogs rapidly). It also accounts for 
the eye-tracking data gathered in a story mapping experiment (Salvucci & Anderson, 2001) in 
which subjects had to put into correspondences the different parts of two analogous stories. 
Participants started responding about the correspondences of subparts of the problem before 
encoding the totality of the stories, showing that they could split the mapping process, just 
like the path-mapping does. The theory also accounts for the saccades between the different 
parts of the stories to be mapped.  
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Comparison of the different theories 
 All the theories presented above share commonalities, but have their own ways to deal 
with questions about cognitive processing during analogical reasoning. The following 
comparison will be made on the basis of the following points: what the representations are for 
each theories and how they are built, how the mapping is effectuated, the psychological 
plausibility of the computations described in terms of cognitive limitations, the ability of 
goals to influence the reasoning process (which will be of crucial importance for this 
dissertation, see section V of this chapter), and the time course of the computations 
effectuated by the different sub-processes. 
 The encoding of the domains compared, as described in subsection II.a. of this 
chapter, is the sub-process that permits the building of a mental representation from 
information that is gathered by the subject about the problem. This issue has been avoided by 
most of the theories presented above, assuming that representations were common to every 
subject, and take a variant or another of the symbolic form, with predicates and arguments. 
The only theory that tackles this problem is the one behind Copycat and Tabletop which 
postulates a direct interaction between a flexible conceptual system which drives and is 
modified by a perceptual exploration of the problem. This exploration is thought to follow 
many leads in parallel, and the structure of the representation to arise from this parallel search. 
This way of representing the structures of the problems is able to explain the differences of 
interpretation that are observed in human participants in ambiguous problems (Mitchell, 
1993). 
 The mapping process is also described in different ways in these different theories. 
Gentner & Forbus (2011) classified these different theories using this criterion. We can use 
two broad classes they defined to describe the present theories: top-down and local-global 
mapping processes. The first class is the class of theories that argues that subjects first 
identify local relations in the source domain, and then try to find correspondences in the target 
domain. The mapping is thus built incrementally by finding all the correspondences between 
the source and the target domain. The theory behind LISA predicts this kind of mapping, as 
the mapping is performed by the activation of substructures of the driver domain in working 
memory by the subject, which finds the correspondences in the recipient domain basing his 
choice on the semantic properties of the elements that are common to both domains. The 
Path-Mapping Theory is another example of this class, predicting the subjects would start by 
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aligning each object of the two domains in term, considering only subsets of the relational 
structures, subsets which are linked to the objects compared. The second class predicts a local 
to global mapping by participants: subjects are believed to find all possible matches between 
the two domains in parallel, on the basis of the features and relations in the two domains 
compared. After this, they select the mapping that best suits the constraints on analogical 
reasoning to find the best mapping. Examples of these theories are the Structure Mapping 
Theory and the Multiconstraint Theory. The theory behind Copycat and Tabletop lies 
somewhere in the middle between these two broad classes. In this theory, participants follow 
different mapping leads at the same time, but during the building of the representation of the 
problem, they are more and more influenced by higher-level local relations in the way they 
interpret other relations, which can be compared to what LISA predicts. 
 These mapping sub-processes deal differently with the question of psychological 
plausibility of the computations they describe. Indeed, working memory capacity sets limits 
on the number of comparisons that can be done at the same time, and the structures that can 
be kept active (see subsection IV.b. for empirical evidence of this assertion). Thus the 
mapping sub-process as described in the Structure Mapping Theory, and the Multiconstraint 
Theory seems to be unlikely in a cognitively limited human mind. Indeed, the fact that they 
envisage all the possible mappings between the domains compared would exceed by far the 
working memory capacity of human individuals. The same problem is true for Copycat and 
Tabletop, as they do not give any upper limit of the number of items that can be kept active at 
the same time. LISA and the Path-Mapping Theory however envisage this possibility of 
limiting the number of relations and objects that can be processed at the same time. The first 
accounts for this by a limited number of relations activated at the same time, when the second 
accounts for it by a difficulty of reactivating knowledge in working memory, depending on 
the frequency of use of this knowledge and decay of its activation in working memory. 
However, all but one of the above-mentioned theories makes the prediction that the mapping 
is necessarily complete. The only theory predicting that sometimes the mapping is incomplete 
is the Path-Mapping Theory which states that when a subject has enough information to 
complete the task at hand, the mapping process stops.  
It follows from the last paragraph that it seems that goals of a task are relevant when 
studying analogical reasoning. The motivations of a subject to perform a mapping have been 
shown to influence the outcome of this sub-process (Spellman & Holyoak, 1996). This 
guiding of the mapping by goals has not been acknowledged in most of the theories presented 
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above. Neither the Structure Mapping Theory, nor Copycat or Tabletop predicts that subject 
would make different mappings on the base of the goals they are pursuing. However, the three 
other theories raise this possibility. The Multiconstraint Theory states that goals will influence 
the mapping between the different entities in the domains compared, biasing the mapping 
toward correspondences that fits the goals of the subject. LISA predicts that the frequency of 
activation in working memory of relations, i.e., the attention of the subject toward certain 
parts of the structural information of the domains, can be modulated by the goals of the 
subject. The Path-Mapping Theory states that not only participants’ mapping is affected by 
goals, but also their encoding of the domains and responding. 
From this comparison, it is apparent that the different theories make different 
predictions about how the information is used and operated on during analogical reasoning. 
All models have their strengths and weaknesses, even if some consensus about what the 
outcome of the analogical reasoning process should be in terms of the constraints it has to 
take into account (one-to-one mapping, the Systematicity Principle, and parallel connectivity, 
i.e., the fact that corresponding relations have corresponding arguments). However, these 
theories do not say much about how this mature reasoning arises from incompletely 
developed analogical reasoning in children. This issue is the topic of the next subsection. 
 
III.c. Developmental hypotheses of analogical reasoning  
 The following subsection presents the main hypotheses about the development of 
analogical reasoning, i.e., the Relational Shift Hypothesis (Gentner & Rattermann, 1991), the 
Relational Primacy Hypothesis (Goswami, 1991, 1992), and the Relational Complexity 
Hypothesis (Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998; Halford, 1993). 
 
The Relational Shift Hypothesis 
 Gentner & Rattermann (1991) introduced the “relational shift” hypothesis about the 
development of analogical reasoning. According to them, a relational shift occurs during 
childhood: children first process the similarity between objects and only after a developmental 
change are they able to process similarity between relations. Several findings by Gentner and 
other researchers support this hypothesis. Gentner (1988) reported results about the 
interpretation of metaphors in children. She found that 5-year-olds preferentially interpreted 
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metaphors in terms of featural similarity, whereas adults mainly used relational similarity to 
express the meaning of metaphors. Nine-year-olds gave in-between explanations, using both 
relational and object similarity, thus, apparently showing a state of saccade between the two 
types of focus. Similar findings were obtained by Billow (1975) in 5- to 13-year-olds. In a 
similar vein, Gentner & Toupin (1985, 1986) showed that children aged 6 were not affected 
by higher-level relations (i.e., a moral), only by the surface similarity between the objects, 
when performing a mapping task, whereas 9-year-old children were affected both by surface 
and higher-order relational similarity. The same effect of surface similarity was found in 5-
year-olds in an analogy problem-solving task (Holyoak, Junn, & Billman, 1984). Children 
were affected by the physical resemblance of the objects to be matched. 
 However, as mentioned by Richland et al. (2006) and Thibaut et al. (2010a), the 
reason for this shift remains unclear. Several hypothesis are proposed by Gentner & 
Rattermann (1991): a general maturational process such as the one proposed by Piaget et al. 
(1977), increase in domain knowledge, or the acquisition of mapping strategies. These 
different accounts lead to different predictions. The general ability account predicts a general 
change in cognitive abilities at a certain age. The domain-knowledge account, favored by 
Gentner and colleagues, predicts differences between the acquisition of the ability to map 
structures from different domains, depending on the degree of expertise of the child in these 
domains. The strategy-learning account predicts both differences in the time of the shift 
between more or less familiar domains, and cross-domain facilitation due to strategy learning. 
Note, however, that these three explanations are not mutually exclusive. Whenever the 
performances of children increase through age, there is still room for improvement in the 
tasks used to assess reasoning ability. Thus, part of the improvement might be due to better 
knowledge of conceptual domains, to better strategies, or to domain general cognitive 
abilities. 
 Another explanation of this shift was given by Bulloch & Opfer (2009) who argued 
the relational shift was the effect of the learning of a the difference in the predictive value of 
superficial similarity versus relational similarity in different contexts through development. 
Thus, children's use of relational matches in a generalization task should increase when 
relational similarity is highly predictive, but should decrease in a domain where superficial 
similarity is more predictive. The results they observed in a generalization task using 
offspring (a domain in which relational similarity is more predictive) and prey (in which 
superficial similarity is more predictive) in 3-, 4-, 5-year-olds, and adults support their 
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interpretation. Three- and 4-year-olds made relational matches more often than 5-year-olds 
and adults in the context of prey problems, but less than them in the context of offspring. This 
effect is mainly due to learning over time as 3-year-olds showed the same pattern in a 
repeated measure setting, when they were given feedback on their answers. 
 
The Relational Primacy Hypothesis 
 Goswami and her colleagues argued for an inherent capability of even young children 
and infants to use relational similarity to drive their inferences about the world (Brown, 1990; 
Goswami & Brown, 1990a, 1990b; Goswami, 1991, 1992; Vosniadou, 1988). However, even 
if children are able to reason by analogy early in life, qualitative changes, such as 
metacognitive processes, occur throughout development. Goswami and Brown (1990b) tested 
children aged 3, 4 and 6 in a causal A:B::C:? forced-choice task (using, as foils, the same 
object as C with an incorrect relation, a different object with the correct relation, a mere-
appearance match, and a thematic/category match) and assessing their knowledge of the 
causal relations in a control task. They found that, with age, the knowledge of the causal 
relations increased, and that the analogical performances increased accordingly. The majority 
of the errors made were children choosing the correct object, but associated with the wrong 
relation. This view of analogical reasoning development is supported by children's early 
ability to solve reasoning problems when surface similarity supports the mapping between the 
different domains (Chen, Sanchez, & Campbell, 1997; Holyoak et al., 1984), when a proper 
representation of the problem has been encoded (Brown, Kane, & Echols, 1986), or when the 
relational similarity between the problems to be compared is highlighted (Brown, Kane, & 
Long, 1989; Crisafi & Brown, 1986). 
 
Relational Complexity 
 The relational complexity theory (Halford et al., 1998) posits that what limits the 
analogical comparisons that can be made is the relational complexity of the domains to be 
compared. Relational complexity is defined as the number of dimension relations have at the 
same time (i.e., the number of arguments a relational predicate takes). For example, reasoning 
about speed as a function of distance over time involves a ternary relation, where speed, 
distance and time are three arguments in this relational structure. Thus, what is limited in 
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working memory capacity is the number of arguments feeding a relation which can be 
handled at the same time, called the arity of a relation. Complex concepts often involve more 
than four dimensions. To deal with these concepts, one has two possibilities: chunking several 
dimensions into a single one (but the detailed relations within the structures chunked cannot 
be accessed) or segmenting the concepts into several sub-concepts involving lower dimension 
relations. Thus the effective complexity is the lowest dimensionality allowed by chunking and 
segmentation that has to be processed without loss of information. The relational complexity 
that can be handled increases through development: unary relations can be processed by one 
year of age, binary relation by two (only binary relations have to be handled in proportional, 
A:B::C:? problems), ternary relations by five, and quaternary relations by 11. 
 The relational complexity theory is supported by several findings. First, children 
display an early competence (before the age of 5) in the classical A:B::C:? task when 
appropriate material and experiment procedure are used (Goswami & Brown, 1990a; Singer-
Freeman, 2005). Nevertheless, when the relational complexity is increased above the 
threshold of binary relations, young children have lower performances (Doumas, Morrison, & 
Richland, 2009; Hosenfeld, van der Maas, & van den Boom, 1997a, 1997b; Richland et al., 
2006). Performance is far from perfect when only binary relations are used in such tasks at 
early stages of development, which suggest that other factors than the clarity of the relations 
used play a role in the development of analogy making, such as the executive component of 
working memory (Richland et al., 2006; Thibaut, French, & Vezneva, 2010a, 2010b, see 
subsection IV.b. for a description), and knowledge accretion (Brown, 1990; Goswami & 
Brown, 1990b). 
Conclusion 
 These different hypotheses focus on different factors in analogical reasoning 
development, but are not strictly mutually exclusive. It is even likely that knowledge 
accretion, metacognitive aspects, working memory capacity and its executive component play 
distinct roles in the development of analogical reasoning. These different factors might even 
interact as it is suggested, for instance, by current views of executive functions as being 
dependent on their substrate, i.e., the representations they operate on (Chevalier, 2010). Thus 
further work should aim at investigating these interactions in the development of analogical 
reasoning. 
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IV. Factors affecting analogical reasoning in adults and children 
 In this section, we will review the literature of factors affecting analogical reasoning 
and its development. Analogical reasoning is affected by a variety of factors from low to high 
level on the bottom-up continuum of information processing, such as the perception of the 
stimuli (i.e., intrinsic features of the materials, bottom-up attentional triggers), the 
organization of the conceptual system and language (i.e., categories and taxonomies stored in 
long term memory, and their labeling), the different components of working memory 
functioning and their limitations (i.e., short term storage and voluntary treatment of the 
information, including inhibition of part of the information, cognitive flexibility, and working 
memory refreshing) and the ability to plan strategically the task as well as metacognitive 
abilities (i.e., ordering and achieving the different goals of the task, knowing one's own 
capacities and limitations).  
 
IV.a. Intrinsic features of the domains compared 
 In this subsection we review the literature on analogical reasoning and its 
development, with a special focus on the features of the domains compared which affect 
analogical reasoning. These factors are mainly surface features of the domains compared, like 
their concreteness (i.e., the amount of information irrelevant to the task they bring), the 
saliency of the relational structure, the depth of the relational structure of the domains in 
itself, and the distinctiveness of the goal object from the rest of the domain, as well as the 
surface and structural similarity of the two domains compared. For the factors which were 
tested both in adults and children, it seems that they affect their ability to reason by analogy 
similarly, but at different degrees. 
 
Surface features of the materials compared 
 The properties of the domains which are used is an unavoidable source of variations in 
adults' reasoning, as the saliency of certain features of these domains will attract the attention 
of the subject, when other will not retain his attention, and generally will bias the 
representation of the domains in some configurations. These biases can be congruent with 
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what is important for the solution of the problem, or not, which will lead to facilitation or 
difficulties to solve the problem. 
 
Mature reasoning 
 A clue of the effect of surface features of the domains compared on transfer were 
obtained by Didierjean & Nogry (2004) by manipulating the difficulty of the solution of a 
source problem by varying its presentation and observing how participants were affected in 
their transfer of this solution to an analogous target problem. The authors showed that varying 
the difficulty to solve the source problem by making the structure of these elements more or 
less salient (i.e., present both in the diagram given and the verbal explanation, or only in the 
diagram) impacted the way participants encoded the source: simple source problems (i.e., 
when the relational structure was obvious) were encoded more shallowly and resulted in 
poorer transfer, when more difficult ones (i.e., with less salient structural features) were 
encoded in depth, resulting in more transfer of these abstract principles to the target problems.  
 Another surface factor affecting analogical reasoning is the concreteness of the 
elements composing the domains which are compared. Kaminski, Sloutsky, & Heckler (2013) 
defined concreteness as the quantity of information brought by a specific instance of a 
concept. Using this metric, they showed that the less concrete the instances analogically 
compared are (i.e., the less superfluous information they convey), the more transfer the 
participants do. However, when helped in the alignment of the two domains, the difference 
between concrete and generic (i.e., not concrete) instances vanishes. This was interpreted by 
the authors as concreteness affecting mapping: the concreteness (i.e., the amount of 
information brought by the material) is an obstacle in the alignment of the two domains, the 
non-alignable extraneous information masking the similarity between the structures of the two 
domains. 
  The systematicity (i.e., the fact that first-order relations are connected or not by 
higher-order relations) of the source domain also guides the analogical matches that are drawn 
by participants. Clement & Gentner's (1991) results show that participants rated more similar 
two analogous facts that were part of stories that had higher degrees of structural similarity 
than stories that were only similar in the fact that had to be compared (see materials in Figure 
1). Similarly, participants were more prone to infer facts in the target domain that were parts 
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of more global structures than isolated facts at the level of structural consistency between the 
two domains. Thus, the embedding of a fact in a relational structure influences both 
analogical judgments and inference.  
 
 
Figure 1: Materials used by Clement & Gentner (1991) 
 
 These different studies show the effect of surface features is present at different levels 
in adult analogical reasoning. It can influence encoding, mapping and transfer. 
 
Reasoning development 
 Children are also affected by the perceptual features of the material used to assess 
analogical abilities. Rattermann & Gentner (1998a, Experiment 1) used visually rich (i.e., 
concrete, as defined by Kaminski et al., 2013) or sparse (i.e., generic) objects in a triad 
mapping task (see Figure 2) using size as the relational frameworks in the domains to be 
compared. Three-, 4- and 5-year-olds were tested in this task and performed better in the 
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sparse than in the rich condition. This suggests that concreteness (as defined by Kaminski et 
al. (2013), see above) also affects children's performance. 
 
 
Figure 2: Materials from Rattermann & Gentner 1998a 
 
 A related study by Paik & Mix (2006) explored the effect of the distinctiveness 
between the objects to be matched with the other objects of the domains compared on 3- and 
4-year-olds. Making the solution and the matching object in the source more distinctive from 
the other objects in their respective domains made children have better performances in a 
simple mapping task, but had the opposite effect in a cross-mapping task (when similar 
objects have different roles in the two domains). Vasilyeva & Bowers (2006) also have data 
that could be explained by the distinctiveness of the elements to be matched. They gave 3- to 
6-year-olds a spatial mapping task using isosceles triangles as maps. They found that children 
were better able to find the target object on the basis of the map indication when it was the 
distinctive angle that was used to hide it than when it was one of the two identical angles. 
 Taken together, these results about surface features of the domains compared suggest 
that adults as well as children are affected in their ability to perform a mapping between two 
domains by the intrinsic visual characteristics of the objects constituting them: the amount of 
information given by the scene, but also the similarity within the domain and how easily the 
relational structure is inferred from the visual characteristics of the objects. 
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Similarity between sources and targets 
 We saw that the intrinsic features of the materials within domains affect analogical 
reasoning in both children and adults. However another kind of features, the similarity 
between the domains, also impacts the way people compare different domains. 
 
Mature reasoning 
 The spontaneous retrieval of a source in long term memory, despite its everyday 
usefulness, is a notoriously difficult task (Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983), and is also affected 
by several low level factors, like surface and structural similarity between the two analogs. 
Holyoak & Koh (1987, Experiment 2) presented different analogical sources, varying either 
the structural (i.e., the constraints on the application of a solution to the problem) or the 
surface (i.e., the resemblance of the apparatus used to solve the problem) similarity, or both 
structural and surface similarity between the source and the target domains, but all sharing the 
same solution to the problem. They observed higher rates of correct, spontaneous application 
of the previously seen solution to a new, analogous problem in the condition where the to-be-
retrieved source was similar both on the structural and surface dimensions. A decrease in 
similarity on either or both of these dimensions impaired participants spontaneous retrieval. 
This suggests that retrieval is dependent on both these similarity properties. Similar evidence 
comes from Gentner & Landers (1985). They designed a set of scenarios similar to the targets 
either in their first-order relations, or in both their first-order relations and their surface 
properties, or in both their first-order and their higher-order relations. Participants reminded 
more source stories that shared surface similarity in addition to analogous first-order relations, 
and to a lower extent stories that shared both first- and higher-order relations, than stories 
only similar in their first-order relation. Wharton et al. (1994) also showed that retrieval was 
affected by structural similarity when a competition arose between different potential analogs 
sharing either surface or structural similarity with the current story. However, although 
surface similarity can be helpful for accessing a previously encountered analog (Gentner & 
Landers, 1985; Holyoak & Koh, 1987), it can also be detrimental, as shown by Ross (1987, 
1989). He showed that using source and target domains with same objects in different roles 
impaired participants' ability to retrieve a previously seen example to solve the current 
problem. 
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 Both structural and surface similarities affect the mapping of one domain on the other, 
even if there are dissimilarities in their effects. Holyoak & Koh (1987) showed that in 
addition to affecting the retrieval of the source, structural similarity had an impact on the 
ability to draw an analogy (i.e., to transfer an already seen solution to a new problem after 
being given a hint to use the source story as an analog of the problem at hand). However, the 
surface similarity did not seem to have any effect on the use of the source after being given 
this hint. Nevertheless, Ross (1987, 1989) showed that surface similarity can be detrimental 
not only on the retrieval of a source (as presented above) but also on the use of the source, 
when it is pitted against structural similarity (i.e., when elements are similar in the source and 
target domains but do not play the same role, referred to as cross-mapping in the remainder of 
this dissertation).  
 Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbus (1993) also showed that surface similarity had 
differential effects on retrieval and analogical inference in adults. Participants were asked to 
retrieve previously encountered stories from a large set, using target stories, and to judge how 
much the inferences from one story of the set could be inferred analogically in another story 
of the set. They rated higher the inferential power of structurally similar than superficially 
similar stories, but retrieval was more linked to surface than structural similarity, which led 
the authors to conclude to a dissociation between the information that is used to retrieve 
analogs in long term memory and the information that is used to reason by analogy and to 
infer information in a new domain from another one. 
 From a wider perspective, the retrieval of a source analog is also altered by the 
similarity between the contexts of exploration of the source and target analogs. Spencer & 
Weisberg (1986) showed that the change of experimenter between the presentation of the 
source and the target analogs decreased the spontaneous retrieval of the source's solution for 
the solution of the target problem. 
 Hence, both structural and surface similarity between the domains compared have 
consequences on adults' analogical reasoning, but affect different processes: surface and 
contextual similarity seem to have a greater impact on retrieval than on mapping and transfer, 
which is the reverse of the effect of structural similarity. Differential effects of the two kinds 
of similarity are also observed depending on the fact that this similarity supports the relational 
alignment between the two domains or if it is pitted against this alignment on a relational 
basis. 
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Reasoning development 
 Children's analogical reasoning is also influenced by superficial and structural 
similarity between the source and the target domains. Holyoak, Junn, & Billman (1984) used 
a problem solving task, known as the Genie problem. In this task, they have to transfer the 
solution used by the genie to solve a similar problem themselves. Changing the source story 
in its surface similarity (adding a new character) or in the primary goal the genie was pursuing 
lessened dramatically the number of transfers of 6-year-olds when compared to a control 
group using higher surface and structural similarity. 
 Similar findings were obtained by Gentner & Toupin (1985, 1986). They asked 4-6- 
and 8-10-year-olds first to act out stories with toy dolls and then to act them out a second time 
with different characters. They varied the systematicity of the stories by adding or not a moral 
to them. The superficial similarity was also manipulated as the children had to act out the 
stories with different toy dolls the second time, these toy dolls having high superficial 
similarity and same roles, no superficial similarity, or high superficial similarity but different 
roles (referred as cross-mapping). Performances of the younger children were generally lower 
than those of the older group. Both ages were negatively affected by the decrease of 
superficial similarity, and even more dramatically by the cross-mapping condition in both 
high and low systematicity conditions. However, a difference between the two systematicity 
conditions appeared only in the low superficial similarity and cross-mapping conditions in 
older children, suggesting a developmental trend toward the use of systematicity in analogical 
reasoning and that it helped them overcome the most difficult mapping condition (i.e., cross-
mapping). Kotovsky & Gentner (1996, Experiment 1) found converging evidence using a 
mapping task between triads of geometrical forms varying on the dimension of the relational 
structure (e.g., size, color) and the polarity of the relation (e.g., a big-small-big pattern in the 
source corresponding to a big-small-big pattern in the target [same polarity], or to a small-big-
small pattern [different polarity]). They found main effects of both these kinds of similarity 
and that the ability to handle more superficially dissimilar materials developed between 4 and 
8 years of age. Convergent findings come from another study by Chen (1996) which explored 
surface and structural similarities. Chen also manipulated procedural similarity of the 
implementation of the solutions (adding water or combining different items with the same 
goal) and surface similarity in the source and target (Chen, 1996; Experiment 2) and found a 
65 
 
significant effect of this kind of similarity on 5-to-8-year-olds, with higher similarity 
supporting mapping between elements to be matched. 
 Thus, what might negatively affect very young children's ability to transfer a solution 
from one problem to another might be their inability to notice this similarity between the 
structures of the two problems. Crisafi & Brown (1986; Experiment 2 & 3) explored this issue 
in 2-3-year-olds. Children who were given hints that the two problems were the same 
outperformed those who did not have any explicit clue of the two problem's similarity from 
the experimenter. This finding was reliable, even in highly superficially dissimilar problems. 
 Daehler & Chen (1993) further explored which similarity aspects were determinant in 
children's use of a source to solve a target problem. They varied the similarity between the 
source and the target in several ways: resemblance between the main characters of the stories, 
the main themes, or the goal objects, and tested 5- and 7-year-olds. The younger group's 
transfer rate and reaction time were mainly affected by the goal object similarity and 
marginally by the theme similarity between the two domains. The older group was not 
affected by the manipulations of these types of similarities. Thus, goal object similarity seems 
to be crucial in young children’s ability to solve problems by analogy. 
 The effect of similarity between the source and target domains is one of the most 
reliable finding in the analogical reasoning literature. This similarity can be helpful, especially 
when testing very young children, when it supports the matching between the objects and 
relations in the domains compared. However, it is detrimental when this similarity leads to 
inconsistent mapping (e.g., in the cross-mapping task). 
 
IV.b. Features of the mental representations and the influence of the 
conceptual system 
The evidence reviewed in this subsection show that features of the domains compared 
are not the unique factor influencing analogical reasoning. Indeed, the mental representations 
of the domains and their quality, as well as their psychological characteristics linked to the 
organization of the conceptual system (categorization of the elements composing them, 
perceived semantic distance between the domains, and use of language to describe the 
domains) have a deep impact on analogical reasoning 
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Mental models formed from the two domains and their similarity 
 The precedent studies about features of the domains compared showed that similarity 
between the domains compared, either superficial or structural, influenced analogical 
reasoning. However, the studies presented below tend to show that what is really important is 
not the intrinsic similarities of the domains, but the similarity between the representations of 
these domains, constructed by the participants. 
 
Mature reasoning 
 The similarity between the representations of the domains built by participants seems 
to be an important factor in the ability to compare them and find correspondences between 
them. Day & Goldstone (2011) discussed the distinction between intrinsic concreteness of the 
stimuli and the concreteness of the representations of these stimuli. They observed a transfer 
of the knowledge acquired about a fairly simple physical system to a novel task, apparently 
very dissimilar. These results were influenced by the similarity of the mental models 
constructed: when keeping the similarity between the source and the target constant, the 
authors observed better transfer performance when mental models constructed from the 
interaction with the first simple physical system (i.e., the source domain) leads to a 
representation that has the same direction of variation as the target domain than to an opposite 
direction of variation. 
 Lee & Holyoak (2008) also addressed the question of whether people utilize mental 
causal models and how the similarity between the causal structures in the two domains 
compared influence inference. They showed that the presence of a preventive cause (A tends 
to cause B not to happen) shared by both analogs increases similarity judgments of the two 
analogs but decreases the inferential power of the analogy (if a preventive cause is present in 
both analogs, participants tend to have lower confidence in inferences made in the target). 
This effect is suppressed when only generative causes are included in the target. The reversal 
of a relational preventive cause (e.g., if having more hormone A than hormone B prevents the 
development of a certain type of glands, what happens when something has more hormone B 
than hormone A?) augments inferential power from a source to a target and has the same level 
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of inferential power as a fully generative source (in which all causes are positively affecting 
the presence of an effect). 
 Similarly, Bassok, Wu, & Olseth (1995) showed that participants reinterpreted the 
relational structure of their problem to fit their assumptions about the cover stories used to 
present the problems to them. They used two types of cover stories for source and target 
problems, one eliciting an interpretation of an assignment as a pairing between two sets (e.g., 
doctors from different hospitals have to work in pairs) and one eliciting an interpretation of an 
assignment as someone getting something from someone (e.g., students given prizes by their 
professor). The assignment equations from the source domain had then to be transferred to a 
new, analogous problem. Problems eliciting different types of interpretations were 
experienced as non analogous by participants, even though they were. 
 These empirical works support that dissociation can be made between the intrinsic 
similarity or dissimilarity between two domains and the one that is processed during 
analogical reasoning, which also depends on the interpretation of the domain that is done by 
the subject. 
 
Reasoning development 
 The extent to which the features of the mental models formed by participants during 
the analogical task influence their transfer has also been investigated in children. Brown, 
Kane, & Echols (1986) contrasted the effect of different conditions on 4- and 5-year-olds 
analogical transfer of the solution of the Genie story in analogous problems: in the Explicit 
Goal Structure condition, they helped children construct a mental model of the source that 
integrated the relational structure of the Genie story, and compared it to a Recall condition in 
which children had only to retell what they remembered from the story, and a Control 
condition in which they had nothing to do but transfer the solution to the new problem. In 
their experiments, performance was higher in the Explicit Goal Structure and Recall 
conditions than in the Control condition, but these first two conditions did not differ reliably, 
although a slight advantage for the former on the latter appeared. However, when separated 
on the basis of their ability to recall the goal structure, the children in the Recall condition 
who were more goal-centered in their explanations were more successful in transferring the 
solution than those who did not give goal-related explanations. In their third experiment 
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Brown et al. (1986), after assessing children's ability to recall the goal structure of the Genie 
problem, separated them into three groups: good goal structure "recallers" and a control group 
of children not recalling the goal structure were directly given the transfer problem, and a 
third group of poor goal structure "recallers" were administered the Explicit Goal Structure 
questionnaire to help them form a goal-centered mental model of the source story. Both the 
children in this latter condition and the good "recallers" achieved transfer to a greater extent 
than those in the control condition. Moreover, these children did not have any difficulty to 
recall the goal structure when prompted to do so, suggesting an attentional failure toward the 
goal structure rather than an inability to recall it. 
 Similar findings were obtained by Crisafi & Brown (1986; Experiment 4 & 5) whose 
study tested 3-4-year-olds in a context of transferring the solution from a "game" to another. 
In one condition, children were explicitly given the rules by the experimenter and were asked 
to tell these rules to a puppet in order for it to use this rule. This condition was compared to a 
simple transfer condition, without rule telling either by the experimenter or the children. 
Similarly to previous results, children in the first condition had higher performances than 
those in the second one. Therefore, telling the rule to a puppet in order of it to be able to use it 
helped children to construct an efficient mental model. 
 These results suggest that it is in fact the representations of the domains and their 
structural similarity, in addition to the ability of participants to attend to the correct aspects of 
the representations that supports the mapping between the two domains. This could explain 
Sternberg's (1977) observation of a correlation between accuracy and time spent encoding the 
analogical problem. However, the similarity between the representations of the domains is 
often correlated to the visual similarity between the different components of the domains, 
which make this factor difficult to manipulate. 
 
Quality of the representation of the structures compared 
The quality of the representation in terms of clarity of the relational structure of the 
domains encoded, in contrast to shallower representation, seems to impact deeply the way 
people draw analogies. This better quality is usually attained by focusing participants on the 
relational structure of the domains, for instance by using comparison between similar 
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structures. Generally, and as will be seen in the studies reviewed below, the clearer the 
relational structure is represented, the better analogies are processed by adults and children. 
 
Mature reasoning 
 The perceptual modality used to encode the source and the target might be important 
in focusing participants’ attention toward the relational information. Markman, Taylor, & 
Gentner (2007) showed that the ability of participants to retrieve a previously encountered 
proverb with a new proverb as a cue differed depending on the presentation of these proverbs 
was in the visual (i.e., reading) or auditory modality. Participants hearing the proverbs 
recalled more relational information from the previously encountered proverbs in the long run 
than those reading them. There was also a positive correlation between the quantity of 
relational information used to define the filler problems and the quantity of analogical 
information recalled. Definitions using surface information were also more frequent in the 
visual than in the auditory modality when the quantity of relational information used did not 
differ. Taken together, these results suggest a bias to extract purer relational information when 
the material is encoded in the auditory than in the visual modality, influencing later retrieval 
of an analog.  
 These results, showing that people encoding analogous proverbs in the auditory 
modality are more focused on relational information, retrieve more relationally similar source 
proverbs than in the visual modality, and thus might have a representation of the relational 
structure of a better quality, are consistent with Holyoak and collaborators' (Catrambone & 
Holyoak, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1983) accounts of a better encoding of the source's 
relational structure positively affecting later spontaneous retrieval. These different studies 
examined the effect of a focus on relational information while encoding the to-be-mapped 
analogs, using comparison to enhance this structural encoding. Gick & Holyoak (1983) were 
the first to explore this possibility: they asked their participants to compare two source stories 
before giving them the target problem. Performance was greater when comparing two analogs 
or two dissimilar stories than when only a single source analog was given. This performance 
enhancement is most likely due to a better encoding of the relational structure of the source, 
as participants gave more relational descriptions in these conditions than in the single story 
condition. A verbal description of the convergence principle used to solve the problems or a 
diagrammatic representation of this principle also enhanced participants’ spontaneous transfer 
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of the solution by the means of a better encoding of the relational structure. Catrambone & 
Holyoak (1989) showed that this effect was due to the comparison of the two analogs and not 
to the mere exposure to two analogous stories, and that this effect was robust even after a 
delay of a week between the exposure to the sources and the target problems. A convergent 
piece of evidence comes from Clement, Harris, Burns, & Weatherholt (2010) who studied the 
eye movements of participants in a similarity judgment task after giving them multiple 
examples of the same relational structure. They found that giving two analogous pictures and 
asking participants to compare them prior to the judgment task per se lowered the attention 
toward structurally irrelevant objects that were similar at the surface level in the two scenes 
during the judgment task, when compared to participants only having to look at two 
analogous scenes prior the judgment task. Thus, encoding of the source seems to be affected 
by the comparison of different instances of the same relational structure.  
 However, a better encoding of the to-be-retrieved sources is not the only factor 
affecting the retrieval of a source. Loewenstein and colleagues (Gentner, Loewenstein, 
Thompson, & Forbus, 2009; Kurtz & Loewenstein, 2007; see Loewenstein, 2010 for a 
review) showed that a better encoding of the relational structure of problems by comparing 
them is also a factor determining retrieval of source analogs, in autobiographical memory as 
well as in a set of pre-given source stories. The effect of comparison was effective on 
encoding as participants showed better comprehension of the target problems than those 
seeing both problems without comparing them. 
 These studies suggest that a better representation of the domains' structure, either by 
the perceptual modality used to encode the information, or by the alignment between different 
instances of the same structure, helps people retrieve analogous instances of a relational 
structure. 
 
Reasoning development 
 The Progressive Alignment hypothesis states that it should be easier for children to 
achieve complex, remote mapping by first giving them simple examples of the higher-order 
relation, and then progressively giving them more and more distant mapping examples. Thus, 
by comparing the different instances but first keeping a common ground between them, the 
structural alignment between the domains to map should become more obvious and easier to 
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handle for them. Kotovsky & Gentner (1996, Experiment 2 & 4) used a Progressive 
Alignment procedure to help children acquire the ability to handle cross-dimensional 
analogies (e.g., matching a big-small-big pattern to a white-black-white pattern). Indeed, 4-
year-old were helped by the experimental procedure consisting in first being presented with 
the Same-Dimension trials and only then the Cross-Dimension trials. In this condition, they 
outperformed the control group of 4-year-olds (presented with Same- and Cross-Dimension 
trials in a random order) in both sets of trials. In the fourth experiment, children were trained 
to achieve a criterion in the Same-Dimension trials before being given the Cross-Dimension 
trials. Children trained with the Same-Dimension trials performed better after the training than 
before. The effect of Progressive Alignment was found again in an A:B::C:? task (Anggoro, 
Gentner, & Klibanoff, 2005). Progressive Alignment thus seems to efficiently focus 
children’s attention on the relational information, and help them solve analogical problems. 
However, this effect might be due to the comparison of different instances of the problems 
helping children understand the constraints on the solution (Goswami, Leevers, Pressley, & 
Wheelwright, 1998). 
 Comparison between different problems of the same type is not the unique comparison 
useful to children. Indeed, the simultaneous comparison of different instances of the same 
relation as source before the solution of an analogical problem has also been shown to foster 
attentional focus on the relations rather than the objects composing them in children. Christie 
& Gentner (2010) tested 3-to-4-year-olds in a Relational Matching to Sample task in which 
children had to find between two cards, the one that was the most similar to the one presented 
as a standard. They found that children did relational matching more when two standards were 
compared simultaneously than when they were presented sequentially or only one standard 
was presented. 
 Together, these results support that comparison, either between different sequential 
instances of further and further examples, or between different instances of the same relation 
simultaneously, help children construct a representation that is more focused on the relational 
information than on the objects composing them when reasoning by analogy, as was shown in 
adults when they have to retrieve a source. 
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Semantic distance between the domains compared 
Other characteristics of the mental representations of the domains compared, linked to 
the organization of concepts in long term memory, influence the ability to draw analogies. For 
instance, it is intuitive that the semantic distance between two domains compared is a factor in 
analogical reasoning. It is more difficult to draw an analogy between the hunt of a wolf pack 
and the ball-seeking behavior of a football team, than between the same wolf pack and a 
group of lions, even though both make reference to a “hunting” behavior. The following 
review show examples of this factor interacting with analogical reasoning. 
 
Mature reasoning 
 Semantic distance is a blurry concept: it is used by various authors to talk about 
different dimensions of variations of this distance in analogical transfer. This was 
acknowledged by Barnett & Ceci (2002) who proposed a taxonomy for semantic distance. 
They divided the different dimensions of variations along two groups: variation of content and 
variation of context for the application of knowledge in one domain to another. The first 
group includes dimensions such as the type of learned skills, the dependent variable on which 
the expected performance change should occur, and the memory demands elicited by the task. 
The second group refers to the dimensions of knowledge domain to which the skill (here, 
"skill" should be seen in a broad sense) is to be applied, the similarity of the physical, 
temporal, functional and social contexts of the two domains, and the modality used in the two 
domains.  
 The knowledge domain distance has been of special interest in analogical reasoning 
researches and has been proven to activate differentially the brain in judgments of the validity 
of A:B::C:D analogies. Vendetti, Knowlton, & Holyoak (2012) assessed participants' 
judgment of validity of A:B::C:D analogies with near and far domains (defined as both A and 
C on one hand, and B and D on the other, belonging to the same category in the case of near 
analogy, or to different categories in far analogy, the relation being kept the same). They 
observed a general decrease in hits and increase in false alarms with the increase of semantic 
distance. This factor has also been shown to modulate the activation of brain areas and the 
dynamic of the brain processes during analogical judgment, with the semantic distance 
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between the domain measured with a Latent Semantic Analysis (Green, Kraemer, Fugelsang, 
Gray, & Dunbar, 2010; Kmiecik & Morrison, 2013). 
 In conclusion, we have seen both behavioral and neural evidence that near and far 
analogies are processed differently by adults: they rate far analogies less valid than close 
analogies, and that brain areas that are usually engaged in relational integration are more 
activated by far than near analogies. 
 
Reasoning development 
 The effect of domain knowledge distance is also visible in children. Chen & Klahr 
(1999) tested the transfer of the principles of controlling variables in scientific experiments in 
children (8-, 9-, and 10-year-olds) within and across domains. To do this, they were 
introduced to the way one domain (e.g., springs) worked during the familiarization phase of 
the experiment and then were assessed on their ability to control variables to test hypothesis in 
this domain. On a subsequent test phase, they were asked to transfer the same ability in other 
domains (e.g., sinking, slopes). Finally, children were tested on their ability to choose 
between two settings the one which was suitable for hypothesis testing in distant and close 
domains. The younger group of age showed more transfer in close domains than in remote 
ones, and only the older group was able to transfer to semantically distant domains the 
knowledge they had acquired. 
 Thus, semantic distance, defined here by the distance between the knowledge domains 
which have to be compared, affects both children and adults in their ability to evaluate 
analogies and transfer relational structures from one domain to the other. The greater the 
semantic distance perceived, the more difficult it is to draw analogies. 
 
Categorization and concepts of the elements composing the systems compared 
The characteristic of semantic distance between the two domains compared is not the 
only psychological feature of representations that influence participants’ ability to reason by 
analogy. Another one is the category relations between the different elements composing the 
problem. However, these two types of factor might be partially overlapping, the difference of 
74 
 
categories between the source and target elements contributing to the semantic distance 
between the two domains. 
 
Mature reasoning 
 A series of experiment by Green and collaborators examined the influence that the 
categorization of the domains' elements had on the mapping process.  
 In the first of these studies (Green, Fugelsang, & Dunbar, 2006), participants were 
presented a four-word stimulus (forming a square) and had either to judge if the pairs of 
words presented in rows were of the same category, or if there was an analog between the 
four words. After this judgment, they had to name the color of the ink of a word that was 
either of the same category as words presented in rows, or not. Results showed that 
participants responded more slowly (i.e., that the automatic category activation interfered with 
the color labeling) in both category and analogy judgment conditions. However, reaction 
times were only slower in the analogical judgment condition when the word was a categorical 
instance of the relation between the words pairs formed in columns. There was no difference 
when the words were unrelated. This suggests that categories between elements of the 
domains (i.e., words presented in rows) are activated in both category and analogy judgment 
tasks, but that the relations between the words presented in columns are only activated in the 
analogy judgment task, thus facilitating later activation of these concepts. 
 Similar findings were found by Green et al. (2008). They showed that naming an 
instance of an element category was quicker when an analogical or categorical judgment had 
previously been achieved when compared to a task of judgment of the presence of a relation 
within the two domains (i.e., judging if there was a relation between the words presented in 
columns). Naming of an instance of the same relational category as the ones used to construct 
the analogies was also quicker when people had to simply say if there was a relation between 
the words presented in columns or to judge if the four-word analogy was true than when 
participants were only asked if between-domain elements were of the same category. 
 Gentner & Kurtz (2006b) showed that not only element categories but also relational 
categories were important in adults' analogical reasoning. Their participants accepted 
analogies as valid even though relational concepts the two domains carried were not strictly 
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overlapping, but carried commonalities. They were also prone to judge these analogies as 
highly similar. 
 These experiments argue in favor of the activation of the categories that are common 
to the objects and relations put into correspondence in the two domains during analogical 
reasoning. This category activation might also help to guide the mapping process, which is 
coherent with the previously reviewed literature about distance between domains: distant 
domains might elicit categories that are hierarchically more distant to the basic level of 
categorization. 
 
Reasoning development 
 A logical prediction from the hypothesis exposed by Green and colleagues (Green et 
al., 2008; Green et al., 2006) would be that, if children's mapping is affected by category 
relations between the source and the target domain in the same way as adults', answer options 
that are categorical matches to the B term would be likely to be selected by children. To our 
knowledge, this prediction has not been tested yet. Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence 
that categories influence children's analogical reasoning in other ways. 
 Goswami & Brown (1990) gave children of 4, 5 and 9 years of age the classical 
A:B::C:? task in a forced-choice manner. The solution alternatives were pictures of the same 
theme or the same category as C, and mere-appearance matches, in addition to the analogical 
solution. Overall children performed well on the task, and younger children more likely 
preferred thematic choices over the other possibilities when they made errors. This might be 
interpreted as a sign of a focus on relational information, even though not the precise relation 
that is similar to the one that is between A and B. Hence, children seem to be first influenced 
by the commonality of thematic category between C and the potential solution. 
 Purser, Thomas, Snoxall, & Mareschal (2009) explored how the development of 
categorization influenced metaphor judgment in children. It is known that categorization 
development starts at the basic level and then continues to the subordinate level (Mervis & 
Crisafi, 1982). They thus hypothesized that this categorization level would influence the types 
of inferences drown by children from metaphorical statements. To do this they asked children 
of 4-5, 7-8, and 9-10 years of age to judge of the validity of an metaphor in the story 
presented. For example, if the main character found an apple and said "Let's play with this 
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apple. This apple is a ball.", children had to rate on a 1-5 scale how valid the metaphor of an 
apple being a ball was. Each metaphor was presented either with a basic level object (e.g., 
ball) or a subordinate level object (e.g., tennis ball). Ratings of basic level metaphors validity 
stayed constant across all age groups, but the validity of subordinate level metaphors 
increased with age, with younger children preferring basic level metaphors ad older preferring 
subordinate metaphors. In addition to this, the rates of subordinate justifications for 
subordinate level metaphor and basic level justifications for basic level metaphors also 
increased with age, when those of non metaphorical justifications and basic level justifications 
for subordinate metaphors decreased. As is evident in the classification of Gentner & Clement 
(1988), at least some metaphors meet the criterion and qualifies as proper analogies in the 
sense of a pure relational structure match. Thus, even though it was not tested in an analogical 
task yet, it might be that children are guided in their ability to draw and understand analogies, 
by the evolving structure of their conceptual system into several levels of categories.  
 The organization of semantic knowledge into categories seems to be an influent factor 
on both adults and children's analogical reasoning. Thus, the development of the conceptual 
system in children is likely to have an impact on the development of analogical reasoning. We 
will refer back to this idea when exposing the knowledge-based account of analogical 
reasoning development. 
 
Language 
 Language is by definition an organization of concepts. Thus, it seems natural that this 
symbolic description of the world could affect the way we reason about it. This topic, 
especially relational language, generated a great amount of studies in analogical reasoning 
literature.  
 
Mature reasoning 
 The functional role of words in analogical reasoning processing has been explored by 
Son, Doumas, & Goldstone (2010). They investigated the reason why words promote 
relational learning and reasoning, hypothesizing that they either were an invitation to compare 
and extract/represent the structure of different instances of the same pattern or that words 
carried semantics about structural aspects. To test these hypotheses they contrasted structural 
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alignment of the stories (matches between the values of the target and distracters in the source 
and target stories, e.g., healthy athletes in the source corresponded to sweet melons in the 
target, and unhealthy athletes to bitter melons) used to teach Signal Detection Theory (SDT), 
and the coherence of the semantics of the relational words and the source story matches to 
these words (i.e., the “target” and “distractor” of the SDT have positive or negative values, 
e.g., the healthy athletes are the “target” (congruent case) or unhealthy athletes are the target 
(incongruent case)). Transfer was more effective when words were used in conjunction with 
alignable structures (i.e., stories with targets being consistent in their valence (positive or 
negative) in both source and target domains). However transfer did not happen or was 
negative (in the case of two structurally non alignable stories) when relational words were 
inconsistent with the valence of the source story (i.e., targets being associated with unhealthy 
and distracter with healthy).  
 This supports the view that the positive relational label effect is due to words' ability to 
be used as handles for alignable situations and not from their semantic overlap with situations. 
Thus words might be considered as objects standing for more complex relational structures in 
cognitive computations, as Clark (1998) hypothesized. Hence words might be a way of 
chunking information, coherent with Halford, Wilson, & Phillips's (1998) view of how 
people's working memory's efficiency is increased. 
  
Reasoning development 
 The positive effect of words on analogical reasoning is not restricted to adults, and 
several studies show similar effect on children. 
 Rattermann & Gentner (Rattermann, Gentner, & DeLoache, 1990; Rattermann & 
Gentner, 1998a; Experiment 2 & 3) showed the effect of relational labels on 3- and 4-year-
olds' performance in a simple mapping task. In this task children had to take into account the 
size relations within the source and target domains to find which object in the latter was the 
equivalent to the one pointed to in the former. Using relational labels (i.e., Daddy, Mommy 
and Baby; Rattermann et al., 1990; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998a; Experiment 2), 3-year-olds 
had higher performances than when not using them, and even outperformed 4-year-olds who 
were not administered the label condition. In their third experiment, Rattermann & Gentner 
(1998a) found similar results using the Daddy/Mommy/Baby labels, and a Big/Little/Tiny 
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labeling of the different objects. This effect was stable in time: the 3-year-olds tested 1 to 4 
month after the training with the label still showed better accuracy than children tested in the 
condition without labels. 
 Kotovsky & Gentner (1996, Experiment 3) tested the effect of labeling on their triad 
mapping task. Children were first trained to use the “even” label for symmetrical triads and 
tested in their ability to categorize the pictures as even or not, and then tested on Cross-
Dimension trials (i.e., in which they had to map the size relations onto color relations between 
the objects composing the triads). Four-year-olds who perform well in the categorization task 
also tend to perform well in the analogical reasoning task, which was confirmed by a χ² 
analysis on over- and below-average children in the two tasks. 
 Loewenstein & Gentner (2005) found similar results of labeling in 3-, 4-, and 5-year-
old children in spatial mapping tasks, with the effect on the two older groups' performance 
only being present with more difficult tasks. Exploring further the effects of the semantics of 
the words they used (either "top/middle/bottom", which conveys a more integrated set of 
relations, or "on/in/under" which conveys only a set of first order relations), they found that 4-
year-olds benefitted more from the more integrated labels. This effect of labeling was also 
robust in time: 3-year-olds tested two days after the first test session were still better in the 
label condition than in the control condition. 
 However the effect of language on analogical reasoning is not specific to the oral 
language and the auditory modality. Evidence by Bandurski & Galkowski (2004) comparing 
deaf children early exposed to sign language and hearing children in their analogical 
reasoning ability on verbal, numerical and geometrical analogy tasks. Children early exposed 
to sign language had performances equivalent to those raised with verbal language from birth. 
Convergent evidence come from Gentner, Ozyürek, Gürcanli, & Goldin-Meadow (2013) who 
tested hearing children and deaf children who were not raised practicing typical sign language 
and invented their own (homesigners). The authors found that homesigners conveyed less 
spatial relations than hearing children, and, when tested in a spatial mapping task like the one 
used by Loewenstein & Gentner (2005) in which one had to find on which level of a shelf an 
object was hidden on the basis of the location of an object on another shelf, homesigners had 
significantly lower scores than hearing children.  
 Words thus seem to allow children, like adults, to encode and focus on the relational 
information, giving a unity to a relational structure, and compute it as a single object. It also 
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appears that this effect of chunking a whole set of relations into a single word is not limited to 
verbal language, but generalizes to any stable kind of description (e.g., official sign language 
and homesigning). 
 
IV.c. Working memory and executive control's involvement in 
analogical reasoning 
 Working memory can be seen as the workspace where information is stored and 
operated on during the solution of a task. The most influential model of working memory is 
Baddeley's (1983) model, which describe it as different sub-systems: the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad involved in the retention of spatially organized information, the phonological loop 
which serves as a verbal information storage, and the executive control which is the system 
that operates transformations on the information stored. Evidence exists that the executive 
control component of working memory is closely related to what is usually referred as 
executive functions (Chevalier, 2010; Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001). 
Executive functions are used by the subject to regulate his thoughts and actions to achieve 
more or less distant goals. The different executive functions usually referred to are inhibition 
(either of information in working memory or behavioral inhibition), cognitive flexibility (the 
ability to shift the attentional focus from one description to another), and working memory 
refreshing (Chevalier, 2010). However the clear classification of executive functions is still 
under debate. Nevertheless a consensus seems to have been reached about executive functions 
being limited, and their development being late in life in comparison to sensory-motor 
functions, changes still being observed through adolescence and early adulthood (Diamond, 
2013; Gathercole, Pickering, Arambel-Liu, & Wearing, 2004).  
 
Working memory capacity, the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial scratch-pad 
 First we will explore the literature about the involvement of working memory 
functioning in analogical reasoning. Working memory can be seen as the "place" where 
representations of the two domains compared will be stored and where operations such as the 
mapping of one domain on the other and the transfer of information from one domain to the 
other will be operated. 
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Mature reasoning 
 (Waltz, Lau, Grewal, & Holyoak, 2000) studied the link between working memory 
capacity and a scene analogy task. In their first experiment, they asked their participants to 
hold a seven digit series while finding the objects that corresponded to the objects of the first 
scene in the second. They found a negative effect of working memory load on the ability of 
their participants to perform this task. Their second experiment tried to disambiguate the 
relative involvement of the central executive and the phonological loop. To interfere with the 
mapping task, they used a random digit generation task (assumed to require the executive 
control subsystem of working memory) in one condition and a simple syllable repetition task 
(requiring only the phonological loop) in another. Both subsystems' overload had an equal 
negative effect on the mapping task. Thus, mapping a domain on another one might require 
both the phonological loop and the executive components of working memory. In both of 
these experiments, they also found that working memory was more loaded by a relational 
mapping task than an object matching task, the former being replaced by the latter in 
conditions of addition of a load on working memory.  
 Morrison, Holyoak, & Truong (2001) also explored the link between the different 
slave systems of working memory (i.e., the visuo-spatial scratch-pad and the phonological 
loop) and analogical reasoning in visual and verbal analogies. Articulatory suppression 
specifically affected participants' performance in the verbal analogy task, when interference 
with the maintenance of visual information in working memory by asking participants to point 
to four dots in a clockwise order selectively disrupted their performance in the visual 
analogical reasoning task. Asking participants to generate a random number between 0 and 9 
disrupted their performance in both task. These results suggest a differential recruitment of 
working memory subsystems depending on the modality of the analogical task. The effect of 
generating a random number on both task was interpreted as this task tapping in the same 
working memory resources as the analogical process per se, i.e. the maintenance of relations 
between the numbers already given (their order) to generate new numbers.  
 Convergent evidence was found by Tohill, Holyoak, & Angeles (2000), basing their 
research on the fact that induced anxiety narrows working memory capacity (Eysenck, 1979), 
thus predicting more object matches and less relational matches in a mapping task when state 
anxiety is induced than when it is not. This prediction was confirmed by empirical data, even 
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when participants were asked to explicitly find relational matches. This result is reinforced by 
a study by Chuderski (2013) showing that when speeded up, participants' working memory 
variance explains most of the variance between participants' performance in two relational 
reasoning task (i.e., Raven Progressive Matrices and A:B::C:? analogies). 
 An interesting link which has been made in the theory of Halford, Wilson, & Phillips 
(1998) between relational complexity and working memory is that people can handle more 
relational information in working memory by chunking meaningful structures into single 
handles (a function that can be achieved by words, see above). This nevertheless leads to the 
inaccessibility of the details of this information. Kubose, Holyoak, & Hummel (2002) used 
this theoretical point to construct a series of experiments exploring further the link between 
mapping and working memory. In their view, mapping is incremental, directional, and thus is 
affected by factors affecting the order of mapping (i.e., the likelihood of chunking 
propositions in a phase set, the features of the groupings that are made, and the selection of an 
analog as the driver of the analogy) due to working memory capacity limits. Their first 
experiment showed the effect of a causal content in the analogs compared (this causal content 
supposed to ease chunking relational structures in working memory) in contrast of a condition 
without causal structure. Both conditions had a hint to group sentences (i.e., a box 
surrounding them), but not the third, control condition. Participants' mapping was more 
accurate in the "causal grouping" condition than in the "non causal grouping" condition. The 
control condition's scores were higher than in the "non causal grouping" condition (where 
sentences not linked causally, hence not easily chunked, were grouped in the box) thus 
showing facilitation due to the grouping of only causally consistent sentences in working 
memory, in accordance with Halford et al.'s (1998) theory. The second experiment 
reproduced these results with semantically richer analogs and contexts. It also showed that 
grouping causally linked sentences facilitates inference in the target by putting higher 
constraints on the matching between roles in source and target domains. The third experiment 
explored the asymmetry in the mapping process due to a higher-level causal structure of the 
driver (explained by constraints on working memory capacity). Indeed, as the LISA theory 
argues (see subsection III.b., this chapter), the limit in working memory capacity imposes 
directionality in the mapping process from a driver to a recipient which only responds to the 
activations in the driver. Thus, a better structured (i.e., causally structured) source might be 
more beneficial for mapping than a better structured target. Data actually showed that 
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mapping was positively affected by the presence of a causal structure in the source, but not in 
the target and was replicated in the fourth experiment with rich semantic stories.  
 Convergent data of working memory capacity limiting adults' analogical reasoning 
comes from Cho, Holyoak, & Cannon (2007) who showed that the relational complexity (i.e., 
the number of relations to be taken into account simultaneously to solve the problem) of the 
trials affected participants reaction times and accuracy in a people pieces analogy task 
(Sternberg, 1977). Similar results were obtained in geometrical analogies (Mulholland, 
Pellegrino, & Glaser, 1980). 
 Working memory capacity seems to limit by the number of relations, the number of 
their arguments, and the possibility to chunk relations, the relational structures that can be 
handled and compared by adults while drawing analogical comparisons. 
 
Reasoning development 
 Working memory capacity increases across development (Gathercole et al., 2004). 
Early indirect evidence suggested that working memory was an inherent limit to analogical 
reasoning in children (Sternberg & Nigro, 1980). A study by Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak 
(2006) explored directly the link between the limitations and development of working 
memory in children and their ability to reason by analogy. They explored this link using 
Halford et al.'s (1998) framework of relational complexity (i.e., the dimensionality and 
number of relations that are relevant at the same time for the solution of a problem). They 
tested 3-to-4-, 6-to-7-, 9-to-11-, and 13-to-14-year-olds in a scene analogy task, in which 
children had to find an entity that was the same part of the pattern in the bottom picture as the 
entity pointed to in the top picture's pattern. The structures of the patterns in terms of relations 
were identical in both pictures. They varied the patterns in terms of the number of relations. 
For example, in one condition, children saw a mouse chased by a cat and a girl chased by a 
boy, and in the other, a dog chasing a cat which itself chased a mouse, and a mother chasing 
the boy who chased the girl. The number of relations affected children's ability to answer 
correctly, especially in the two younger age groups, which suggests a developmental trend 
toward an ability to handle a greater number of relations while reasoning by analogy. 
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 Different amounts of information seem to overload adults' and children's working 
memory capacity when reasoning by analogy. This is consistent with the view of working 
memory capacity and chunking strategies developing from childhood to adulthood. 
 
Executive control component of working memory and executive functions 
 As described above, a link was found between the executive control component of 
working memory and analogical reasoning (Waltz et al., 2000), thus showing the implication 
of executive functions in this ability. One commonly acknowledged executive function is the 
inhibition of information that has entered the working memory or might enter it. The 
following subpart describes evidence of the involvement of this particular executive function 
in analogy-making. 
 
Mature reasoning 
 Chuderski & Chuderska (2007) found correlations between participants' performance 
on a geometrical analogy task with a large set of executive function measuring tasks (i.e., 
assessing updating of the information in working memory, inhibition, task switching, dual-
tasking, changing goals, and interference resolution). The highest correlation values were 
found with the goal monitoring and inhibition tasks. A Confirmatory Factor Analysis leads to 
a very good fit to the data with only taking into account these two executive factors. 
 In a follow-up study, Chuderski & Chuderska (2009) found a correlation between 
scores in a n-back task and in the same geometrical analogy task. They argued this correlation 
was mainly due to the inhibition component of working memory rather than its capacity (both 
assessed by the n-back task) because participants with low and high rates of correct answers 
in the analogy task differed mainly in their number of false alarm rates in the n-back task in a 
forced choice condition, and because the working memory span was not predictive of 
analogical transfer performance. 
 Cho et al.'s (2007) study, using people pieces visual analogies (see above), showed 
that participants reaction time was affected by the number of interfering dimensions (i.e., that 
had not to be taken into account) and that these two factors (i.e., the number of dimensions to 
take into account, and the number of dimensions to inhibit) interacted.  
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 Another study using people pieces analogies, by Viskontas, Morrison, Holyoak, 
Hummel, & Knowlton (2004), assessed young, middle-age, and old adults in their analogical 
reasoning abilities. They similarly varied the number of relations and of interfering 
dimensions and found negative effects of age, level of complexity and level of interference on 
accuracy and reaction times. This suggests a decay in the ability to solve analogical reasoning 
problems linked to working memory capacity and inhibition of interfering information in 
aging and thus, that these process are involved in analogical reasoning. 
 
 Evidence that cognitive flexibility is also involved in adults' analogical reasoning 
come from Barnes & Whitely (1981). In their study, they constructed semantically ill-
structured A:B::C:? forced-choice problems by exchanging the B and C terms of in well-
structured A:B::C:? problems (e.g., deep:shallow::cheap: a) costly, b) wide to 
deep:cheap::shallow: a) costly, b) wide), but also perceptually ill-structured problems (i.e., 
?:C::B:A structures instead of A:B::C:? structures). The last class of problems was produced 
by using both transformations at the same time. Both types of transformations negatively 
affected participants’ reaction times without interacting, but accuracy was only affected by the 
semantically ill-structured problems. This suggests that when problems are ill-structured, an 
additional, restructuring process is necessary to find the solution of the problem. The 
restructuration of the process in a well-structured problem leads to a novel representation, and 
has a cognitive cost (materialized in the increase in reaction time and decrease of accuracy) 
and is most probably through cognitive flexibility which underlies the ability to re-represent 
the problem space into a new, meaningful way leading to its solution. This study is the only 
one to our knowledge to explore the link between cognitive flexibility and analogical 
reasoning in a causal, non-correlative way. 
 All these studies indicate that executive functioning is part and parcel of normal 
analogical reasoning, and that altering this functioning logically impairs the ability of adults 
to draw analogies efficiently. 
 
Reasoning development 
 Developmental studies are critical in the study of the link between executive functions 
and analogical reasoning, as executive functions are known to have a late development 
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(Diamond, 2013). Thus, if these functions are involved in analogy-making, it is likely that 
researchers will observe qualitative differences in the way analogical reasoning operations are 
performed during development. 
 Early evidence of differences in inhibition of information between children with high 
and low performance on analogical reasoning tasks comes from Marr & Sternberg (1986). 
They tested 11- 12- and 13-year-olds in a verbal, forced-choice analogical task. These 
children were divided into two groups: gifted (IQ above average and excellent performances 
at school) and non-gifted (average IQ and performances at school). Gifted children allocated 
less time to irrelevant information when compared to non-gifted children, suggesting better 
inhibition of the irrelevant information in the former than in the latter. 
 Hosenfeld, van der Maas, & van den Boom (1997) tested children aged 6 and 7 in a 
geometrical analogy task in repeated sessions and tracked their developmental trajectories. 
The relational complexity of the trials (i.e., the number of differences to take into account to 
succeed in solving the analogy) was varied between trials. Even though all children improved 
their performances across sessions, they observed different trajectories of development: non-
analogical reasoners who consistently solved the trials by non analogical solutions, analogical 
reasoners who solved most of the trials by analogy even in early stages of the experiment, and 
transitional reasoners who started as non-analogical reasoners and ended as analogical 
reasoners. Doumas, Morrison, & Richland (2009) used the LISA model to simulate these 
results. They achieved the modeling of the three different groups by varying the inhibition 
component of the working memory in LISA. This suggests that the differences observed in 
the ability to solve analogical reasoning tasks by children are explained by this component of 
working memory. 
 The study reported in the working memory section by Richland et al. (2006) also 
explored the ability of children to inhibit an object match distractor. To do this, they varied 
the presence or absence (in which case it was replaced by a perceptually unrelated object) of 
such a distractor. They found an interaction between the condition (presence or absence of the 
distractor) and age showing that younger children (3-to-4- and 6-to-7-year-olds) were more 
disturbed by the presence of an object perceptually similar to the one pointed at in the top 
scene than older children (9-to-11 and 13-to-14 years age). This suggests that the 
development of the inhibition component of executive functions also plays a role in the 
development of analogy-making abilities. 
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 Simms & Gentner (2009) used a similar scene analogy task to test children aged 3 and 
5 in three different conditions: a condition in which there was no distractor, another in which 
the distractor was external to the target relation, and a third one in which the distractor was 
internal to the relation of interest (i.e., cross-mapped). They tested children with relational or 
neutral language. Without relational language, children correctly solved the problems in most 
of the cases when there was no distractor. However in the two other cases, they had 
significantly lower performances. However this effect of distractors was counteracted by the 
use language by the experimenter of relational (e.g., “Do you see this one that’s towing?” 
when a truck towing a car, and a car towing a boat on a trailer were presented). They 
performed at the same level in all three conditions. In addition to this, 5-year-olds were less 
affected than the 3-year-olds by the presence of distractors. In a second experiment, the 
authors explored the link between children's ability in the same analogical task and in an 
inhibition task (i.e., the day night task, in which children have to say day when the 
experimenter points to night, and vice versa). They found a significant negative correlation 
between the two measures in 3-year-olds, no correlation in 4-year-olds, and a positive 
correlation in 5-year-olds, suggesting that the relation between inhibition and analogical 
reasoning ability evolves through time. However the results in the younger group is mitigated 
by their implementation of strategies not directly related to the goal of the Day-Night task 
(e.g., alternating between saying "day" and "night" without taking into account the pictures), 
potentially blurring these results. A similar, positive correlation was obtained between 
inhibition measurement in a day night task and analogical ability measured in a semantic 
A:B::C:? task in 4- and 5-year-olds (Thibaut, French, Vezneva, Gérard, & Glady, 2011). The 
account of children's failure in semantic A:B::C:? task in terms of inhibitory control 
maturation is consistent with eye-movement study of children in this task showing that they 
looked longer at distractors than adults (Thibaut, French, Missault, et al., 2011). 
 Convergent results about the link between inhibition and analogical reasoning, and 
especially the interactive nature between inhibition and the structure of semantic knowledge 
of children comes from Thibaut, French, & Vezneva (2009, 2010). They assessed children's 
(3-to-4 years) ability to solve semantic A:B::C:? problems and varied the number of 
distractors (either 1 or 3) and the association strength (strong or weak association in long term 
memory between A and B, and C and the solution and C and the distractor, resulting in all 
strong or all weak trials). They found a significant interaction between the strength of 
association and the number of distractors associated to C: in trials with strongly associated 
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pairs, children performed well whatever the number of distractors. However in the weak 
association strength trials, the performance dropped in the trials with three distractors. This 
suggests that young children's ability to infer relations when solving analogical problems is 
supported by the association strength. In weak trials, however they can't count on this support, 
and thus the inference of the relations between the different terms of the analogy is more 
cognitively demanding which causes greater interference in the solution of the task when 
there is a greater number of potential relations (i.e., three related-to-C distractors) to inhibit. 
This is suggestive of the dependence of executive functions, inhibition in this precise case, on 
their substrate (i.e., semantic, conceptual content represented in working memory). 
 In addition to the manipulation of factors in relation to executive functions in 
analogical reasoning task, executive functions at an early age is also a good predictor of future 
analogical reasoning development, as is their knowledge about the world (Richland & 
Burchinal, 2012). In this study, they analyzed data about children, collected in early 
elementary school, assessed in their ability along various cognitive dimensions (i.e., executive 
functions, sustained attention, short term memory, and vocabulary knowledge), and then 
tested in their fifteenth year in a verbal analogy task. Significant correlations were found 
between executive function as measured by Tower of Hanoi test, and the more specific 
inhibition component measured by the Day-Night Task and results in verbal analogies, as well 
as vocabulary knowledge.  
 Another study in favor of an interaction between knowledge and executive function is 
a study by Richland, Chan, Morrison, & Au (2010). They compared Chinese and American 
children in the previously described scene analogy task. The basic assumption of this study 
was that Chinese cultural environment was more oriented toward relations than American 
cultural environment, thus favoring their knowledge. Thus cultural conventions might 
facilitate or slow down analogical reasoning development by this means of cultural focus. 
Children from the two different countries did not differ in their ability to solve problems with 
only one relation to be taken into account. However, when attention to two simultaneous 
relations was required, Chinese children outperformed their American counterparts. These 
different patterns were also simulated using the LISA model by varying the inhibition 
component of working memory (Doumas, Morrison, & Richland, 2010; Morrison, Doumas, 
& Richland, 2011). Convergent results were obtained by testing Japanese and American 
children (4 years age) in a triad matching task using sparse and rich objects (Kuwabara & 
Smith, 2012). Children from the United States of America performed as well as Japanese 
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children when the objects were sparsely detailed. However with the rich objects, American 
children performed poorly in comparison to their Japanese counterparts. On the contrary 
children from America had shorter reaction times in an object search task, which is predicted 
by the theoretical point raised above about intercultural differences. 
 
 In this section we have introduced the discussion of the role that executive functions 
could play in normal analogical reasoning and its development. However, as noted by 
Chevalier (2010), executive functions intrinsically depend on the substratum they work on, 
and thus, it is likely that both knowledge about the world and executive functions interact in 
close accordance when reasoning by analogy. Thus the two previous sections are not mutually 
exclusive in their account of how analogical reasoning works and develops, and would better 
be considered as two sides of the same coin. 
 
IV.d. Planning, strategies and metacognitive aspects of analogical 
reasoning 
 Planning, strategy implementation and metacognitive aspects are fundamentally linked 
to executive functions, and are involved in strategy use: they permit to act on the substratum 
of the task to pursue goals which are ordered in time. Thus differences in strategies are likely 
to appear with the maturation of executive functions. Planning and goal management are also 
tightly related to subjects' understanding of the task and its constraints on the solution, 
because this understanding will lead to a strategy rather than another. 
 
Mature reasoning 
 One of the first studies that investigated the different strategies used to solve 
analogical problems is the study of Whitely & Barnes (1979) which used protocol analysis in 
participants' requests for information when solving verbal A:B::C:? problems using unreal 
animals. Because the labels did not correspond to any known animal, participants had to 
request information from the experimenter to correctly solve the analogies. The full set of 
animals' properties was given to the participants at the same time. Overall Whitely & Barnes 
found an important between-subject variability in the strategies: 18% solved the problem 
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directly after encoding, 23% made one confirmation step before answering, 45% requested 
information about the whole stem (i.e., A, B and C) before searching for a solution, only 10% 
asked more information about C before searching for a solution. Other strategies were only 
marginally observed. This suggests individual differences between participants in their ability 
to deal with the amount of information given to them (supported by executive functions and 
working memory capacity) in the task, and to articulate it in a meaningful analogy, leading to 
different strategies.  
 Bethell-Fox, Lohman, & Snow (1984) were the first to address the question of 
participants' strategies in analogical reasoning recording eye-movements data. They 
hypothesized a strategy shift within subjects in simple and difficult geometrical A:B::C:? 
trials, and a difference of strategy between high fluid intelligence and low fluid intelligence 
participants. They found evidence for two different strategies: constructive matching, used in 
easier problems, and more widely by participants with high fluid intelligence, and response 
elimination, used more in harder problems and by participants with low fluid intelligence. 
Constructive matching consists in constructing a full model for the answer on the basis of the 
first three terms of the analogy, and response elimination consists in eliminating the answers 
that do not fit on the basis of partial evidence from the stem of the analogy.  
 Mulholland et al. (1980) also explored their participants’ strategies in a geometrical 
analogy judgment task. In this task, participants first encoded exhaustively the difference 
between A and B, then generated the rules for changing A into B, which was followed by a 
phase of encoding C and D, mapping of the attributes of A:B on C and D, and comparing the 
different operations transforming C into D to those stored in working memory between A and 
B. A answer is given if one of the operations is not present or is not the same as in A and B or 
if all inferred operations correspond to those between A and B. This strategy, different from 
the one postulated by Sternberg (1977; see above) and Whitely & Barnes (1979), is most 
probably the resultant of the task constraints that differ from analogical judgment (in which a 
D term is given and has to be evaluated) to analogical problem solving (in which the D term 
has to be found between different solution options). 
 These studies show that adults can adapt their strategies in response to the limitations 
of their executive functions and working memory. However these different strategies lead to 
correct answer most of the time, which suggests that they understand correctly the constraints 
on the solution of the task, and that these strategies are adapted to these constraints. 
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Reasoning development 
 However, children's knowledge about the constraints of the task and their own 
limitations, and their ability to manage the different goals of analogical reasoning tasks seem 
to be limited at first, and to develop over the years, as the following review demonstrates. 
 One of the earliest positions about children's strategies development in analogical 
reasoning task is a shift from associative to analogical responding due to maturation processes 
(Piaget et al., 1977) and the extent to which children used associative responding was 
negatively correlated with their IQ and achievement (Achenbach, 1970a, 1970b), even in the 
long run (Achenbach, 1971). Associative errors were also negatively correlated with working 
memory capacity (measured by a simple digit span task) and semantic flexibility (measured as 
the ability to find in a list of words the different meanings of a word when in the context of 
words coherent with only one meaning) in 10-to-11-year-olds (Tirre, 1983).  
 Sternberg & Nigro (1980) observed in their children (9-, 12-, 15-, and 18-year-olds) an 
increase in consistency in the use of strategies across trial difficulties, and found differences 
in the models accounting for children's performances with age. First, children's (9 and 12-
year-olds) reasoning tend to be guided by the association strength between the last word of the 
stem of the analogical problem and the first word of the solution option, suggesting an 
incomplete form of analogical reasoning, with an incomplete encoding of the analogical 
problems (possibly linked to a limitation in working memory). Older children and adults (15 
and 18-year-olds) rely more exclusively on their reasoning abilities to relate the analogical 
problem parts and tend to have exhaustive processes, suggesting less limitation from working 
memory capacity in their strategy. Similar reliance on association was observed in older 
children and adults when learning novel domains (Alexander, Murphy, & Kulikowich, 1998).
  
 Even though most of the materials in the preceding studies were semantic, a similar 
trend toward using associated matches were found in geometrical analogies (Alexander, 
Willson, White, & Fuqua, 1987). In this study, children (4-to-5 years of age) who did not 
solve the problems by analogy relied on a hierarchical set of rules to choose their answer: they 
used the similarity (which could be interpreted as perceptual association) between the 
potential answers and the C terms of the problems. Thus, non analogical reasoners tended to 
91 
 
choose the exact match with C, or, if absent from the solution set, an item that was identical to 
the greatest number of dimensions possible, instead of the correct answer. 
 The same bimodality of responding (i.e., similarity or analogical matching) between 
the age of 5 and 11 has been found in an analysis of several sets of data using geometrical 
analogies varying the relational complexity of the transformation from A to B, and was 
interpreted as an indicator of a developmental discontinuity in the way children apprehend 
analogical problem solving (Hosenfeld, van der Maas, & van den Boom, 1997b). This 
transition, indicated by bimodality between subjects of different age, was also shown in 
longitudinal data (Hosenfeld et al., 1997a). Six-to-eight-year-old children were tested in the 
same geometrical analogy task as in Hosenfeld et al. (1997b) with eight sessions on a six-
month period. They identified four indicators of transition between two modes of responding: 
bimodality (i.e., two different strategies of responding between subjects), sudden jump (i.e., 
sudden change of responding within subject), anomalous variance (i.e., increase in variance 
due to a conflict between the two modes of responding near the transition point), and critical 
slowing down (i.e., increase in reaction time due to the conflicting strategies near the 
transition point). Convergent findings indicating a developmental transition around the same 
age was found in simple 2x2 Raven Progressive Matrices task which is another test of 
relational reasoning close to the A:B::C:? task (Siegler & Svetina, 2002).  
 Interestingly, a similar trend from associative to analogical reasoning has been 
observed in adolescents in more complex, third order analogies (i.e., analogies between 
analogies; (Sternberg & Downing, 1982). Samples of 13-, 16-, and 18-year-olds were tested in 
a meta-analogical judgment task. They were presented with two analogies and asked to rate 
on a 1-to-9 scale how analogically related were these analogies (e.g., how analogically related 
were sand:beach::star:galaxy and water:ocean::air:sky). The authors also showed that the 
ability to map one domain on the other (i.e., to observe the similarity between the relations in 
the two domains) was the last to develop in this meta-analogy task, as it was in younger 
children in more simple analogy tasks (Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979). This development of the 
ability to map analogies one on the other and thus extract more complex schemas could lead 
to meta-analogical skills (i.e., the ability to draw analogies about analogies, Burns, 1996). The 
observation of the same development from associative to analogical reasoning at two different 
ages with problems of increasing complexity suggests that the ability to make chunks of 
increasing information is crucial for the ability to judge and use similarity between domains.  
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 Hence, during development, an increase in children's ability to take into account the 
main goal of analogical reasoning (i.e., to compare the two domains on the basis of their 
similarity) and in their understanding of how it is implemented could explain the decrease in 
associative responding. Children's comprehension of the task itself and its constraints was 
shown to be decisive in the ability to solve analogical problems (Goswami et al., 1998). In 
this study, children aged 4 to 5 were tested in A:B::C:? problems using causal transformations 
between both pairs of pictures, and controlled in their knowledge of the relations used. They 
varied the number of relations (either one or two) and the order of the different tasks (single 
relation A:B::C:? task, causal reasoning control task, double relation A:B::C:? task). They 
found a significant effect of the number of relations, mostly due to the poor performances in 
the double relation analogical reasoning task when it was the first task. However, children 
presented first with the single analogy task did not have different performances between the 
single and double relation A:B::C:? task. These results can be explained by the fact that a first 
exposure to the task with simple relations helps them understand the constraints put on 
responding in the A:B::C:? task, even in more complex trials. Therefore, young children's 
associative responding might be explained by their inability to understand the structure of the 
task itself or to keep it active, especially with difficult stimuli. Training them with a simpler 
task might consolidate their representation of the constraints on the solution of the problems. 
These results suggest also that the attentional focus on relation observed in children who are 
trained with a progressive alignment procedure might attend more to relational features 
because of a better understanding of the task constraints. 
 Other evidence showing children's poor understanding of the task constraints have 
been gathered (Cheshire, Ball, & Lewis, 2005). In this study, children (aged 6 to 7) were 
tested over several sessions in different conditions (control, practice only, feedback, self-
explanation of the answer, and self-explanation and feedback) in a simple 2x2 Raven 
Progressive Matrices test. They showed that children both benefitted from the self-
explanation and the feedback condition. However, children in the self-explanation and 
feedback benefited from an additive effect between those two helps. The feedback condition 
was argued to have an effect on children's representation of the constraints of the task on the 
adequate solution, when the self-explanation condition was interpreted as helping children 
maintaining attention toward the goals of the task. This explanation is plausible as children 
have been shown to demonstrate goal neglect in complex tasks (Blaye & Chevalier, 2011; 
Chevalier & Blaye, 2008a; Marcovitch et al., 2010). Thus, children's failure in analogical 
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reasoning task could be due at least in part to a failure to represent correctly the task's goals 
and keep them active throughout their search.  
 Many studies involved children's training in analogical reasoning task. Alexander and 
colleagues (Alexander et al., 1989; Alexander, Haensly, Crimmins-Jeanes, & White, 1986; 
White & Alexander, 1986; see also Tunteler, Pronk, & Resing, 2008; Stevenson, Heiser, & M. 
Resing, 2013) trained children in the different cognitive components of analogical reasoning 
problems (i.e., encoding, inference, mapping, and application; Sternberg, 1977). They found 
improvement in the children observed both in verbal and geometrical A:B::C:? tasks, 
suggesting that a better understanding of the tasks' constraints and goals positively affects 
children's performance.  
 Clues indicating a possible goal neglect in children were observed in children's eye-
movements gathered while they were solving a semantic A:B::C:? task (Thibaut, French, 
Missault, et al., 2011). The authors compared children's (5- and 8-year-olds), adolescents' (14-
year-olds) and adults' visual strategies and found that both children's groups were less likely 
to gather information from A and B than adolescents and adults. This indicates a potential 
neglect of a major subgoal of the task (i.e., finding the AB relation in order to compare it to 
the possible solution's relations to C), which might cause at the basis of children's associative 
strategy: they might focus on the goal of the task that is the most emphasized (i.e., finding 
something that goes with C) without taking into account the constraint that this solution 
should be linked to C in the same way as B is linked to A.  
 
V. Goals and Hypotheses of the Present Dissertation 
 The general goal of this dissertation was to investigate the roles of executive functions 
and goal management in analogical reasoning in different tasks usually used to assess this 
ability. We have reviewed evidence suggesting that executive functions are involved in 
analogical reasoning ability in adults: dual tasking involving a task tapping on the executive 
control component of working memory interferes with analogical reasoning (Waltz et al., 
2000), there is a correlation between executive function abilities and analogical reasoning 
abilities in adults (Chuderski & Chuderska, 2007, 2009), the number of interfering dimensions 
affects negatively reaction times in young and older adults (Cho et al., 2007; Viskontas et al., 
2004), and participants are affected in their performance when they have to restructure the 
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problems presented into a meaningful representation (Barnes & Whitely, 1981). Other 
evidence comes from developmental studies: high IQ children differ in the time spent on 
irrelevant information from average IQ children in the A:B::C:? task (Marr & Sternberg, 
1986), children have difficulty inhibiting distractors while solving analogical problems 
(Richland et al., 2006; Simms & Gentner, 2009; Thibaut, French, Missault, et al., 2011; 
Thibaut et al., 2009, 2010a, 2010b), interindividual and intercultural differences are best 
modeled by varying the inhibition component of working memory in LISA (Doumas et al., 
2009, 2010; Morrison et al., 2011), and executive functioning in childhood predicts accurately 
later analogical reasoning abilities (Richland & Burchinal, 2012) and inhibition is correlated 
with analogical performance in young children (Thibaut, French, Vezneva, et al., 2011). 
Ongoing goals also affect analogical reasoning were also reviewed: Different goals affect the 
result of the mapping process (Spellman & Holyoak, 1996), and the inability to keep active 
the "similarity between relations" goal of the task might explain children's failure in 
analogical reasoning tasks (Brown et al., 1986; Sternberg & Nigro, 1980; Sternberg & Rifkin, 
1979; Thibaut, French, Missault, et al., 2011), training children on the constraints on the 
solution of the task and its goals help them have better performance (Alexander et al., 1989, 
1986; Cheshire et al., 2005; Stevenson, Heiser, & M. Resing, 2013; Tunteler et al., 2008; 
White & Alexander, 1986). All these studies suggest that executive functions and goal 
management are part and parcel of mature analogical reasoning, and that the development of 
these abilities constraint the development of analogical reasoning. However, there are still 
gaps in our comprehension of how executive functions and goal management relate to 
analogical reasoning.  
 
V.a. Visuals strategies in analogical reasoning 
Studies of analogical reasoning using eye-tracking technologies are very limited in 
number. We reviewed in the previous section several experiments which used eye movements 
as a clue of information processing of participants. Bethell-Fox et al. (1984) showed that 
participants used different strategies in difficult and easy trials of a geometrical A:B::C:? task, 
depending on their cognitive resources. Gordon & Moser (2007) studied adult visual 
strategies in the Scene Analogy Task and showed that fixations were longer on the objects 
involved in a relation, and saccades were more frequent between a third object when it was 
also linked by a relation to the other two involved in the goal relation, than when it was not. 
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Thibaut, French, Missault, et al. (2011) showed that children were more focused on the C and 
the solution set than adults, especially at the beginning of the trials. Goals of the present 
dissertation were then to gain insight in the development of visuals strategies in the Scene 
Analogy Task. Comparison of children with adults in this task was not considered by Gordon 
& Moser (2007). Another goal was to compare these two different tasks in the visual 
strategies they elicited both in children and adults. These two different tasks testing analogical 
reasoning were never compared directly, and thus we do not know if they cause the same 
difficulties to and put the same constraints on participants’ reasoning. 
 
V.b. Influence of the goals of the task  
Goal maintenance, the ability to keep a goal active during the solution of a task, is a 
necessary element of the elaboration of a strategy. This competence has been shown to 
develop during childhood (Blaye & Chevalier, 2011; Chevalier & Blaye, 2008b; Marcovitch 
et al., 2010) but goal neglect still happens in adults and has been linked to working memory 
lapses (Duncan, Emslie, & Williams, 1996; Kane & Engle, 2003). As goals of the task 
influence analogical reasoning (Spellman & Holyoak, 1996) as well as the information 
gathered visually (Yarbus, 1967), one of the goals of this dissertation was to investigate the 
interaction between visual strategies and the goals of different tasks used to assess analogical 
reasoning. Indeed, some tasks are more focused on the similarity between the relations, like 
the A:B::C:? task, when other are more focused on the mapping of the elements of the two 
domains, like the scene analogy task (Richland et al., 2006). We hypothesized that the search 
for information in these tasks would be in accord to these instructions: participants would tend 
to relate more the elements of the two domains in the second than in the first task. Most of the 
models are not interested in the fine-grained level of eye movements and it is difficult to make 
predictions from them at this level as these models are not embedded in production systems 
and focus on the mapping process. However, LISA (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997), even though 
not precise about how information is encoded, and the path-mapping theory (Salvucci & 
Anderson, 2001) make predictions about the way participants would gather information: In 
the A:B::C:? task, they would first encode the relation between A and B, then encode the 
relations between C and the solution set one at a time until one meet the criterion of relational 
similarity and if different elements have relational similarity, compare the different relations 
to pick the one that is most similar to the relation between A and B. In the scene analogy task, 
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they would also encode the relational structure of the source domain at first, and then encode 
the structure of the target. However, as the goal is to find the objects that are similar in their 
role in the relations, once the structure is extracted and the goal object in the source defined, 
they would try to relate it with the goal object in the target domain. Thus, an important 
prediction of the path-mapping theory (Salvucci & Anderson, 2001) is that the comparison 
between the two domains in term of mapping is not exhaustive and that when the main goal is 
achieved, the participant will answer without trying to relate other elements of the domains, 
which is at odds with other mapping theories and models which map the entire systems one 
on the other. This prediction would not be made by LISA or other theories presented in 
section III.b. 
 Another prediction from the view that goal affects deeply the analogical reasoning task 
is that, if there is an element in the target domain of the A:B::C:? task that has a relation to C 
that is exactly the same as B has to A, but that the mapping of the elements is inversed 
between the two domains, as the goal is to find a similar relation, participants would neglect 
to check the mapping between the elements of the domains compared. This would be 
predicted by ACME as the goal of the task is materialized by a bias on certain types of match: 
here it could be modeled by a strong bias on the correspondences between relations, which 
would lead to mapping errors at the level of elements. This could also be predicted by the 
path-mapping theory by modifying the goal structure of the task to allow mapping between 
relations uniquely and to trigger a response on the basis of the relational information only. 
However, other models do not take goals into account, and thus would not predict these 
results. 
 
V.c. Children’s goal management in the different tasks 
 As it has been shown that goal maintenance is harder for young children (Blaye & 
Chevalier, 2011; Chevalier & Blaye, 2008b; Marcovitch et al., 2010), we also wanted to test 
children in A:B::C:? and scene analogy tasks similar to those used with adults. Eye-tracking 
methodology has proven beneficial to study this kind of issues in analogical reasoning: it has 
been shown that children did not attend to the A and B pictures to the same extent as adults in 
an A:B::C:? task (Thibaut, French, Missault, et al., 2011). We thus expected to find similar 
differences in the Scene analogy task. It has been shown that children's failure in this task was 
due to relational errors which, we believe, are due to the neglect of one goal of the task: 
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comparing the roles of the elements and maintaining them active for comparison. We 
hypothesized children would only focus on the relational similarity between the two domains 
without aligning the elements in terms of roles, and thus would not exhibit the same visual 
strategies than adults who would explicitly align the elements. The models of development do 
not say much about the importance of the ability of children to maintain goals while reasoning 
by analogy. Nonetheless Goswami's relational primacy account (Goswami, 1991, 1992) states 
that qualitative differences in analogical reasoning might appear through development, 
because of a better comprehension of the constraints on the solution and metacognitive 
processes, for instance. Even though not specific on which aspects are engaged in analogical 
reasoning, the ability to monitor goal achievement during the task can be seen as one (Flavell, 
1979). Thus, monitoring goals would require goals to be maintained in order to evaluate their 
achievement. Strategic aspects are also envisaged by Gentner & Rattermann (1991) in their 
relational shift theory, and, as goals need space in working memory to be kept active, which 
could interfere with the representation of the relational structures of the domains, it can also 
be related to working memory explanations of development (Halford et al., 1998; Richland et 
al., 2006).  
 
V.d. Involvement of executive functions in analogical reasoning 
 Executive functions are crucial in analogical reasoning. The search space view of 
analogical reasoning (Thibaut et al., 2010b) which sets the framework of the work presented 
here states that solving an analogical problem involves navigating through a space of 
possibilities formed by the subject from the semantics of the problems. Executive functions 
are central in this view, as they are the cognitive functions which permit to navigate through 
this search space efficiently and to carry out the strategy chosen by the subject. 
 Thus, we studied the dependence of analogical reasoning on executive functions. It 
was shown that visual strategies are linked to the complexity of the task in analogical 
reasoning in a geometrical task, and that complexity interacts with executive functions as they 
are implied in general intelligence (Bethell-Fox et al., 1984; Kane & Engle, 2003). However 
the complexity of a geometrical task is not comparable to the one of a verbal task: the 
geometrical complexity is clearly defined in terms of the number of transformations that have 
to be kept active in working memory, when the complexity of a verbal task is fuzzier, 
potentially involving more abstract relational concepts in difficult verbal analogical problems. 
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Verbal and geometrical tasks also differ in the saliency of the manipulated dimensions. 
However, as the format of the task is similar, with a forced choice setting, we expected to see 
a shift from a strategy of constructing the solution to a strategy of eliminating irrelevant 
responses, as was observed in previous studies (Bethell-Fox et al., 1984). However potential 
errors could not be attributed to larger working memory requirements in this study, as there 
was only one relation between the source and the target domains to keep active at a time. This 
shift of strategy would thus be due to executive functions' dependence on their substratum, as 
noted by Chevalier (2010). These results would not be predicted by current theories of 
mapping as they do not make differential predictions depending on the ability to clearly infer 
the relations involved of the task: the processes of mapping and transfer are executed on well 
defined relational structures by these models, as they are fed with rigid, handcrafted 
representations which do not allow other inferences than those given to them for the structures 
compared. It is impossible for them to change, for instance, the representation of a boy 
chasing a girl (i.e., mere facts), to a boy playing with a girl (i.e., giving a meaning to these 
facts). Such refining of the relations might appear in humans even though they do not know 
what is the relation used in the target, when using a response elimination strategy, that is not 
having enough constraints on . 
 The late development of executive functions should also affect how children execute 
their strategies and thus their visual patterns when solving the task. They should be more 
distracted by distractors, due to a difficulty to inhibit information relevant to some goals of 
the task but not to the entire set of constraints defining the analogous solution. Another aspect 
of the research presented in this dissertation on executive functions is the study of cognitive 
flexibility. Cognitive flexibility has not yet been explored to the same extent as inhibition in 
analogical reasoning literature, even if it is known that it is involved in adults' ability to solve 
analogical problems, especially when they are ill-structured (Barnes & Whitely, 1981). 
Studies involving children are well suited for the exploration of the interaction between 
cognitive flexibility and analogical reasoning as the ability to shift attention from one 
representational point of view to another develops quite lately (Chevalier & Blaye, 2006; 
Diamond, 2013). Thus, one of the goals of the present dissertation was to investigate how 
limitation of cognitive flexibility in early childhood affects the ability to efficiently reason by 
analogy. Once again, theories of analogical reasoning development do not make specific 
accounts of how visual strategies should be affected by the development of executive 
functions, and to our knowledge, no account of analogical reasoning development has taken 
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into account the ability to flexibly shift from one representation to another when reasoning in 
their description of the phenomenon in children. The only models that are able to simulate 
representational flexibility are Copycat and Tabletop. Thus, by decreasing the temperature of 
the models more rapidly when simulating children than when simulating adults, these models 
could simulate potential lack of flexibility. 
 
V.e. Summary of the goals 
 In summary, the goals of the research presented here are to study the effect of goal 
maintenance and goal neglect, and executive functioning in children's and adults' ability to 
reason by analogy. To do this we used different types of measurement: accuracy of the 
answer, reaction times, but also the visual behavior of our participants, which has not been 
studied to a large extent yet. However we believe that studying visual strategies is relevant for 
achieving these goals, as the precedent review of the literature on eye movements and their 
relation to cognitive and executive processes shows. 
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Chapter II: Visual strategies in scene-
oriented analogical problems 
 
I. Background 
In the present chapter, we wanted to study adults' and children's visual strategies in a 
task commonly used to assess children's analogical reasoning (i.e., the scene analogy task; 
Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006), and to know if the visual strategies of Thibaut, 
French, Missault, Gérard, & Glady (2011) generalized to this task. In the Scene Analogy task, 
participants have to find what plays the same role in the target scene (e.g. the boy who is 
chasing a girl, see Figure 3) as the element that is pointed to in the source scene (e.g., a cat 
chasing a mouse). One of the specificities of this task is to use scenes rather than separated 
pictures as the basis of the analogical comparison and reasoning. Recent evidence suggests 
that grouping objects in meaningful scenes might positively affect attention toward these 
objects and their relations (see Humphreys et al., 2010 for a review). Another specificity is its 
focus in terms of goals on the mapping of one domain on the other. Both these aspects differ 
from the A:B::C:? task. Indeed, the goal of the A:B::C:? task (see Figure 3), given by the 
instructions, is to find a solution related to C as B is related to A, which put a high focus on C 
and what is related to it, especially for children (Thibaut, French, Missault, et al., 2011).  
The scene analogy task has been used by Richland et al. (2006) to show that younger 
children were subject to more relational errors (i.e., choosing an object involved in the correct 
relation but having the wrong role: the girl in Figure 3) and distractor errors (i.e. choosing 
objects which look like the one pointed in the source picture but which do not have the same 
role: the cat in the bottom picture in Figure 3) than older children and adolescents. This was 
interpreted in terms of inhibition capacities in analogical reasoning which develop gradually 
through childhood and adolescence. However, relational errors could be linked to goal neglect 
as one of the goals of the task is to align the roles of two objects involved in a similar relation. 
Another finding of this study is the increased difficulty for children to find the correct answer 
when the relational complexity is increased (i.e., when the number of relations which have to 
be taken into account at the same time increases). For example, children had more difficulties 
to find the correct answer when presented with a dog chasing a cat which was also chasing a 
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mouse, and a mother chasing a boy who was chasing a girl, than in the previous example with 
simply a dog chasing a cat, and a boy chasing a girl. This result was linked to Halford’s 
Relational Complexity theory (Halford et al., 1998; Halford, 1993) which states that the 
development of the ability to handle more and more relationally complex materials in working 
memory is a major factor in children’s cognitive development. However, once again it can be 
interpreted in terms of goal neglect by children, as ternary relations are supposed to be 
available to 5-year-old children in Halford's theory. 
 
Figure 3: Sample materials for the Scene Analogy task (left panel, Richland et al., 2006) and the A:B::C:? task (right 
panel, Thibaut et al. 2010b). Corresponding letters in the two tasks show corresponding roles in the structure of the 
task. For instance, T elements in both tasks are the solutions, B elements are the elements which play the same role as 
T in both tasks, A elements are the element involved in a relation with B, D to Distractors and so on. 
 
Richland et al.’s (2006) study was followed by an eye-tracking experiment with the 
same task by Gordon & Moser (2007). They showed that there were longer fixations on the 
stimuli with an arrow pointing to it in the source scene and its match in the target scene, that 
the frequencies of saccades between the extra objects (the dog and the mother, in our previous 
example, which were present in both low and high relational complexity conditions) and other 
objects within the scene were higher when the extra objects were involved in a relation with 
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the other objects than when they were not, even though it was not paralleled by higher 
fixation durations on these extra objects. Other frequent saccades were between the two 
related objects that constituted the heart of the analogical problems within the source and 
target domains (e.g., the cat and the mouse on one hand, and the boy and the girl on the 
other). These results might be the mark of a task-related bias toward specific information in 
the material (i.e., objects that are involved in relations). 
Another previous study on visual strategies in analogical reasoning is Thibaut, French, 
Missault, et al.'s (2011) study on children's and adults' eye movements during the solution of 
A:B::C:? problems. They found that participants focused mainly on C and the solution when 
looking at overall fixation times. The saccades which were the most frequent were the 
saccades between A and B, and between C and the solution. These saccades between elements 
either in the source or in the target domain can be linked to the encoding of the relations in 
each domain compared in the analogical problem. Another saccade which was frequent was 
the saccade between the solution and the related-to-C distractor, which might be related to the 
comparison of the different elements that are related to C to find the one which has a relation 
to C similar to the one B has to A. Differences between adults and children were found in 
their fixation times on the related-to-C distractor. Children looked longer to these distractors 
than adults, suggesting difficulty for them to inhibit the information coming from these 
stimuli. Another important finding was that children were attracted by the target domain (i.e., 
C and the solution set) already in the first third of the trials, whereas adults spent the first third 
of trials mainly on A and B, looking at C and the target domain only after. This can be 
explained by children's difficulty to maintain the goals of the task. Thus, they might be unable 
to maintain the goal of similarity between the relations of the two domains compared. 
This focus on relations within domains found in both the A:B::C:? and the Scene 
Analogy task, as suggested by the preponderance of saccades between the elements of the 
same domain, is not predicted by the first theories of analogical reasoning (i.e., the Structure 
Mapping Theory and the Multiconstraint Theory). On the contrary, these theories would 
predict a larger focus on the correspondences between the domains, observable by between 
domains saccades (i.e., A to C and B to T saccades) than what was found in the preceding 
studies. The LISA model and the Path-Mapping Theory would predict a focus on the within-
domain relations rather than on the between domain correspondences. However, when LISA 
would only predict that relations related to the goals of the subject would be visually explored 
to a larger extent than those who are not related to the goals of the subject and would achieve 
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a complete mapping of the two domains but no difference between the task in terms of 
patterns of eye movements, the Path-Mapping Theory makes the prediction that only 
correspondences between the domains which are relevant to the goals of the task will be 
considered. Hence, the latter would predict differences in the eye movements of participants 
in the A:B::C:? and the Scene Analogy task. As the goal of the first task is simply to find a 
relation that is similar, it would not predict an alignment between the two domain but simply 
the encoding of the two domains relations, and the comparisons of elements that are related to 
C in terms of the relations they have with C. In the second task, the Path-Mapping Theory 
would predict a specific alignment between the goal elements in the source and the target 
domains (e.g., the cat and the boy). As children are less able to maintain goals than adults, it 
would also be predictable that children would make less eye movement patterns related to the 
goal of the task, i.e., saccades between the two goal objects. 
To test these hypotheses, we designed three experiments. In the first experiment of this 
chapter, we studied the visual strategies of adults and children in the Scene Analogy task, in 
order to reproduce and extend previous results from Gordon and Moser (2007) to children, 
and find if children’s relational errors could be due to goal neglect. Then, in the second 
experiment, we compared these results with an A:B::C:? task, with AB on one hand and C 
and the solution set on the other, put within meaningful scenes to specifically test if the 
different goals of these tasks affected differently visual strategies in adults and children. 
Indeed, the Path-Mapping Theory would make different predictions about the visual strategies 
used in these two tasks, as explained above. The Scene Analogy task should rely more on an 
explicit mapping between the two domains’ goal elements, when the A:B::C:? task should 
not, because enough information to solve the main goal of the task is gathered when the 
source and the different relation in the target domain are encoded and found similar. These 
two tasks were finally compared with a standard presentation of the A:B::C:? task in the third 
experiment. In fact, differences have been shown in participants’ attention toward objects and 
relations when the materials are presented in meaningful scenes or as separated objects 
(Humphreys et al., 2010). Indeed, attention toward relations seems to be greater in the first 
case. Thus, we expected that children would benefit from scene presentations, and that it 
would be visible in their visual strategies. 
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II. Experiment 1: Visual strategy of children and adults in a Scene 
Analogy Task.  
 
II. a. Objectives and Hypotheses 
The objective of this experiment was to observe the visual strategies of children and 
adults in a task commonly used to assess children’s analogical reasoning: the Scene Analogy 
task. This task’s goals are centered on the mapping of the source domain on the target domain 
to find the solution, focusing especially on a “what is like the item pointed to” goal which 
prompts participants to compare the item with an arrow in the source with items in the target. 
We expected visual strategies in children and adults to be coherent with the Path-Mapping 
Theory predictions exposed above, i.e., that participants would focus on within-domain 
relations, and also on the correspondence with the objects specifically linked to the goal of the 
task. We thus hypothesized that this task would elicit a great focus on the item with an arrow 
and the solution, and the comparison between their roles. In addition to this, as children are 
less able to maintain goals and to keep irrelevant information than adults, we also expected 
children to make a lower number of saccades between the two goal objects (the item pointed 
to with an arrow and its correspondent in the target domain, e.g., the cat and the boy of our 
example above) and to show more interest in the distractor looking like the item with an 
arrow, because of lower inhibition abilities. 
Our first hypothesis was a general age effect on behavioral data, with adults finding 
more correct answers than children, and children making more relational errors (i.e. choosing 
the element that is related to the solution) and distractor errors (i.e. choosing the element 
perceptually similar to the item with an arrow) than adults, as Richland et al. (2006) found. 
As the Path-Mapping Theory would predict encoding of an extensive encoding of the 
relational structure between the elements in each domain, we expected a high level of 
saccades between the pointed item (called later B because it is the element playing the same 
role as the target T of the problem in the target domain, as B elements in A:B::C:? problems) 
and the element involved in a relation with it (called A because of this relation to B, as A 
elements in A:B::C:? problems), and of saccades between the solution and the item it interacts 
with (called C because it is involved in a relation with T, as C elements in A:B::C:? problems) 
which are crucial for determining the roles of the item pointed to and the solution.  
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As the task is essentially centered on the mapping of the item with an arrow on 
something in the target domain on the basis of its role, we expected that the item pointed to 
and the solution would be of particular interest for participants (i.e., would be fixated longer 
than other stimuli). We also expected that the saccade between the item with an arrow and the 
solution (BT saccade) would be a strong component of participants’ visual strategies because 
it might be implied in the comparison of the roles of the two stimuli. These patterns are also 
predicted by the Path-Mapping Theory (see section III.b. of chapter I for the details of this 
theory). From a developmental point of view, a possible hypothesis would be that children's 
difficulty to maintain the goals of the task might make them less attentive to this information, 
thus making less BT saccade. 
If the distractors play their role, it should also elicit long fixation times and a great 
number of saccades implying it, especially saccades between the item pointed to and its 
perceptually similar item (BDis saccades) which might be implied in the alignment of these 
elements, and saccades between the solution and the distractor (TDis saccades) which might 
be involved in the comparison of the possible answers. From a developmental point of view, 
as children have lower inhibition ability than adults, we expected that these markers of the 
distractors effect would be found at a higher degree in children than in adults. 
 
II. b. Methods 
 
Participants 
 Participants were 25 6-to-7-year-olds (10 females, 15 males; M=77.5 months; SD=4.6; 
from 72 to 92 months) and 29 adults (25 females, 4 males; M=21 years; SD=4.4; from 17 to 
40), who were students of the University of Burgundy. Participants were naïve to this task, 
they participated voluntarily, and we required parent’s informed consent for children to 
participate to the experiment. 
 
Materials 
 The tasks consisted in 14 trials (3 training and 11 test trials) presented in a random 
order. Each problem was composed of 7 black and white line drawings displayed in two 
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scenes (501x376 pixels) displayed one on the top of the other and both framed in a black 
rectangle (Figure 4). We named these seven pictures after the nomenclature used in the 
previous tasks, based on their relation to the target item and to their roles in the problem 
matching to those in the A:B::C:? task. Thus, in the top scene (i.e., the source scene), there 
was two items (A and B, B playing a role equivalent to the Target’s role in the Target scene). 
The remaining 5 pictures (i.e., C which was in a relation to the Target similar to the one 
between A and B, T which was the correct answer, a distractor Dis; and 2 Unrelated objects U 
which were not related to the problem) were presented in the bottom scene (i.e., the Target 
scene). Each scene was presented with a minimal context (i.e. horizon line, floor and walls 
joins).  
 
Figure 4: Sample materials from Experiment 1 
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These pictures were previously used by Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak (2006). They 
chose the distractors to be perceptually related to the B stimulus which was the center of the 
task’s instructions as the main goal is to find something that plays the same role in the target 
scene as the B stimulus plays in the source scene. An arrow pointed to B to indicate to 
participants which stimulus in the source scene had to be matched in to a stimulus in the target 
scene. The U stimuli were parts of the scene’s context (i.e., houses, trees, etc.) thus providing 
“ecological” validity to these stimuli. The scenes were slightly modified from the original 
ones to match the number of distractors and to provide suitable analysis of participants’ 
scanpaths (i.e., we spaced each stimulus to provide distinct areas of interest). 
We presented these problems on a Tobii T120 eye-tracker (resolution: 1024x768). E-
prime software (version 2.8.0.22) was used to construct the experiment, itself embedded in a 
Tobii Studio (version 2.1.12) eye movement recording procedure. Data were analyzed using 
Statistica 8 software. 
 
Procedure 
 The experiment took place in a quiet room in children’s schools or in an experimental 
box at the University of Burgundy for adult participants. Participants were tested individually. 
In order to avoid any difficulty due to a poor recognition or a lack of knowledge of the 
stimuli, we presented each picture individually and asked participants to name the objects 
which were represented. When they were unable to name one stimulus, they were asked if 
they knew how it was used or where it could be found. After this first phase, the eye-tracker 
was calibrated using a Tobii Studio built-in calibration procedure. 
 After this calibration procedure, the analogical reasoning task took place. During the 
first training trial, participants were instructed as follows: “In each problem, there are two 
scenes in which the same thing happens. Can you see why the same thing happens?” In case 
of error (i.e., answer not based on the similarity between the actions performed in each scene, 
for instance, the distractor error), the experimenter gave the correct answer. After this, the 
experimenter continued: “Can you see the arrow pointing at this thing [B]? This means you 
have to find in the bottom picture [pointing at it] which thing plays the same role as this one 
[B] in the top picture.” The experimenter explained what role meant as “doing the same 
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thing” or “being in the same position”. Participants were asked to justify their answer, basing 
their justification on the role played by the B and T pictures. When it was correct, the 
experimenter gave a positive feedback. Otherwise, he gave the correct answer and 
justification based on the roles of B and T, and explained the task again. Feedbacks were 
given in all training trials as explained above. Instructions and feedback were not prvided in 
the test phase of the experiment. 
 The third phase of the experiment was a second control task. Participants had to give 
the relation holding between all the A:B pairs, and all the CT pairs used in the experiment, 
one by one. This was done to remove from the analyses all the trials that were failed because 
of an absence of knowledge/recognition of the relation composing the problems from 
analyses.  
  
II. c. Results 
 Overall, less than 1% of the stimuli were not recognized. One trial was excluded for 
the analyses because the relation used to compose the analogy was not known by 20% of 
participants. Apart from this particular trial, only one trial in one participant's data was 
removed from subsequent analysis because of an absence of knowledge of at least one 
relation composing the problem. Ten trials were also removed from analyses because reaction 
times were not recorded due to an absence of mouse click of the experimenter. These trials 
were included in the score analysis but not in the reaction time and eye movement analyses. In 
addition, 15% of the trials were removed because more than 50% of the eye-tracking data 
were missing. These trials were included in the score and reaction time analyses but not in the 
eye movement analysis. This resulted in two 6-to-7-year-olds not having data and thus 
excluded from this analysis. 
Behavioral data 
We first compared the two age groups performance in the analogy task using a two-
tailed independent t-test (see Figure 5, top left panel), testing our hypothesis that children 
would have lower response accuracy than adults. It indeed revealed a significant difference in 
scores (t(52)=4.4; p<.001; η²p=.270) with better performance by adults than children.  
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 We also analyzed patterns of errors (Figure 5, top right and bottom left panels), and 
especially relational and distractor errors, predicting higher rates of these errors in children 
than in adults. We ran a two-tailed independent t-test to compare the number of relational 
errors (i.e., choosing the other element involved in the relation of the target picture instead of 
the correct one) in the two groups. It revealed a significantly larger number of these errors in 
children than in adults (t(52)=3.1; p=.003; η²p=.156). The same analysis was run on the 
distractor errors. It revealed the same pattern of results (t(52)=2.7; p=.008; η²p=.126), thus 
confirming both our hypotheses about number of errors, suggesting children had difficulty to 
inhibit the information coming from the distractor, and to maintain the goal of role 
comparison in the relations. 
 
 
Figure 5: Mean response accuracy (upper left panel, maximum = 1), number of Relational (upper right panel) and 
Distractor (lower left panel) errors, and reaction times (lower right panel) by participant in 6-to-7-year-olds and 
adults in the Scene Analogy task (error bars represent SEM). 
 
 Finally, to determine which type of data we should use for eye movement analyses 
(i.e., absolute values or percentage), we analyzed reaction times in the two groups (Figure 5, 
bottom right panel). A two-tailed independent t-test revealed a significant difference between 
the two groups (t(52)=11.1; p<.001; η²p=.703) with longer reaction times for children than for 
0,0 
0,2 
0,4 
0,6 
0,8 
1,0 
1,2 
6-7-y.-o. Adults 
M
ea
n
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 
A
cc
u
ra
cy
 
0,0 
0,2 
0,4 
0,6 
0,8 
1,0 
1,2 
1,4 
1,6 
6-7-y.-o. Adults 
M
ea
n
 N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
R
el
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
E
rr
o
rs
 
-0,4 
-0,2 
0,0 
0,2 
0,4 
0,6 
0,8 
1,0 
1,2 
1,4 
6-7-y.-o. Adults 
M
ea
n
 N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
D
is
tr
a
ct
o
r 
E
rr
o
rs
 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
6-7-y.-o. Adults 
M
ea
n
 R
ea
ct
io
n
 T
im
e 
(s
) 
111 
 
adults. We thus used percentage of total fixation time and of total number of saccades in the 
eye movement analyses. 
 
Visual strategies in the Scene Analogy task 
 Because of longer reaction times in children than in adults, we scaled eye-movement 
data to make them comparable between age groups by using percentage of total fixation and 
percentage of total number of saccades as dependent variables instead of absolute times of 
fixation and number of saccades. 
 First, we analyzed the percentages of fixation of each stimulus in the two age groups, 
running a two-way mixed ANOVA with Age (6-to-7-year-olds, adults) as a between-subject 
factor and Type of Stimulus (A, B, C, T(arget), Dis(tractor, perceptual), U(nrelated 
distractors)) as a within-subject factor (see Figure 6), expecting longer fixations on B and T 
due to the goal of the task, and longer fixation percentage on Dis in children than in adults. It 
revealed a significant main effect of Type of Stimulus (F(5,250)=324.9;p<.001; η²p=.867) and 
a significant interaction between Type of Stimulus and Age (F(5,250)=26.1; p<.001; 
η²p=.343). 
 Planned comparisons confirmed that mean rates of fixation of B and T were higher 
than mean rates of other stimuli (respectively: F(1,50)=203.9; p<.001; η²p=.803; 
F(1,50)=337.7; p<.001; η²p=.871). This confirmed our hypothesis that the focus of attention of 
this task would be the goal objects (i.e., the object with an arrows pointing to it and the one 
having the same role in the target domain). Overall, Dis was not looked at a high rate. Its 
mean fixation rate was significantly lower than the mean rate of fixation of other stimuli 
(planned comparison: F(1,50)=490.9; p<.001; η²p=.908). The distractor thus did not seem to 
play its role of distractor, i.e. it did not catch participants' attention. The planned comparison 
between adults' and children's fixation of Dis was significant (F(1,50)=13.9; p<.001; 
η²p=.218), confirming our hypothesis about longer fixation of Dis in children than in adults. 
 We were also interested in the rates of saccades, especially the rates of inter-domain 
mapping of corresponding elements (AC and BT saccades), the first predicted not to be 
frequent, when the second would be more frequent because of its link to the goals. We also 
wanted to compare intra-domain saccades (i.e., AB and CT saccades) with other types of 
saccades, and predicted a higher rate of them than other types of saccades. BDis saccades 
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were also of interest as they might be related to children's inability to inhibit the irrelevant 
information from the distractor, and thus predictive of distractor errors, more numerous in this 
age group. We thus analyzed participants’ percentage of saccades between pairs of stimuli 
(Figure 7) with a two-way mixed-ANOVA design with Transition (AB, AC, AT, ADis, AU, 
BC, BT, BDis, BU, CT, CDis, CU, TDis, TU, DisU) as a within-subject factor and Age (6-to-
7-year-olds, adults) as a between-subject factor. We found a significant main effect of 
Transition (F(14,700)=144.3; p<.001; η²p=.743) and a significant interaction between Age and 
Transition (F(14, 700)=13.6; p<.001; η²p=.214). 
 
 
Figure 6: Mean Percentage of fixation of each stimulus in 6-to-7-year-olds and adults (error bars represent SEM). 
 
 Planned comparisons confirmed that mean percentage of AB, BT, and CT saccades 
were higher than mean percentage of other saccades (respectively: F(1,50)=240.7; p<.001; 
η²p=.828; F(1,50)=57.1; p<.001; η²p=.533; F(1,50)=239.9; p<.001; η²p=.828) suggesting that 
these saccades were important in participants' strategies. AC saccades were not frequent: their 
frequency was lower than the mean frequency of other saccades (F(1,50)=213.1; p<.001; 
η²p=.810). These results, taken together, confirm the prediction of the Path-Mapping Theory. 
However, the BT saccade rate was significantly lower in children than in adults 
(F(1,50)=43.5; p<.001; η²p=.465), confirming that children made less saccades related to the 
main goal of the task. Overall, there were less BDis saccades than other saccades 
(F(1,50)=57.1; p<.001; η²p=.533). This is coherent with the low fixation of Dis found in the 
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previous analysis on percentages of fixation and further suggests that the distractor did not 
catch participants' attention. The rates of BDis saccades did not differ between adults and 
children (F(1,50)=2.5; p=.123; η²p=.048), which is not coherent with the difference expected. 
 
 
Figure 7: Mean Percentage of each type of saccade in 6-to-7-year-olds and adults while solving Scene Analogy 
problems (Error bars represent SEM). 
 
II. d. Discussion 
 The Path-Mapping Theory makes predictions about the eye movement patterns in the 
Scene Analogy task. It predicts that participants would focus more on the goal objects of the 
task (i.e., B and T), would make within domains saccades to encode the relations relative to 
each domain compared, and between the two objects corresponding in terms of roles which 
are at the center of the main goal of the task. As children experience difficulty maintaining 
goals over time (Marcovitch et al., 2010), we expected that these types of comparison would 
be less present in them than in adults, and as they make more distractor errors (Richland et al., 
2006), we predicted more fixations on the perceptually-related-to-B distractor as well as more 
saccades involving B and this distractor in children than in adults, suggesting a lower ability 
to inhibit irrelevant information when solving an analogical reasoning task. 
 The present results bear out the prediction made by the Path-Mapping Theory about 
visual strategies in the Scene Analogy task. Participants focused on the stimuli that were 
relevant to the specific goals of the task (i.e., B and T), and made more saccades between 
these two elements and those linked to them by a relation in the source and the target pictures 
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(i.e., AB, and CT saccades). These intra-domain saccades might be related to participants 
trying to find the roles of the different stimuli taking part in the relation represented in the 
scenes. These roles might be kept active in working memory, and actively compared and 
aligned by the participants by making BT saccades. The other fixation times and number of 
saccades were comparatively low, meaning they were not particularly informative to 
participants while solving the problems (Deubel & Schneider, 1996; He & Kowler, 1992). 
Note that the Path-Mapping Theory is the only theory predicting a mixed pattern of rates of 
saccades in this task (i.e., high rates of within-domain saccades to encode the relations, and 
high rates of between-domain saccades linked to the goal of the task). Other theories would 
predict either more within-domain or more between-domain saccades. 
 Even though our analysis differed from those used by Gordon & Moser (2007), we 
also found a great amount of fixation on goal objects (i.e., B and T) and the elements which 
were related to them (i.e., A and C), and a high rate of saccades between these objects. 
However, due to differences in the analyses used, we cannot compare their results about the 
saccades between the object with an arrow in the source and the corresponding item (in terms 
of role) in the target with our data. It is possible that these authors overlooked the importance 
of this type of saccade, as they mainly focused on intra-domain saccades and did not report 
the values of BT saccades. These authors also reported greater fixation density on distractor 
object than on a control object perceptually dissimilar to B, which suggests that even adults 
paid attention to these distractors. Even if they did not compare it directly to the fixation times 
of objects implicated in the relation, the fixation time of the distractor is close to the one 
observed in objects involved in relations with goal objects. This was not found in our results, 
which can be explained by the shift of instructions (“what play the same role as the object 
pointed at?”), theirs (“what is like the object pointed at?”) being ambiguous about the type of 
similarity which had to be considered (perceptual or role similarity).  
 There were two types of errors in this task — namely, relational and perceptual 
distractor errors. Children made both at a higher rate than adults. These results concur with 
previous results obtained by Richland et al. (2006), although our children’s response accuracy 
in this study were 10% higher than in theirs. The higher rates of errors in children than in 
adults were observed along with longer looking times on perceptually-similar-to-B distractors, 
and lower rate of BT saccade. Thus, children's relational errors might result from the low 
number of saccades between B and T, because this saccade might be involved, as explained 
above, in the alignment of the two elements based on their roles, and in the comparison of 
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these roles. This might also be crucial for evaluating the accuracy of the answer chosen before 
giving it. Therefore, children seem to overlook the comparison and judgment of role similarity 
of their answer with the role of the stimulus pointed to in the source scene. This might have 
led them to give answers only on the basis of the relation inferred through CT saccades but 
not on the basis of the roles of the actors taking part in this relation, leading to relational 
errors. These results can be explained in the framework of goal maintenance. Children, 
experiencing difficulty to maintain the goal of the task might forget to make the comparisons 
that are relevant to this goal, i.e., comparisons between B and T. 
 Children also made more distractor errors than adults. This effect of distractors on the 
performance of children was accompanied by longer looks at distractors. Nevertheless, other 
saccades involving the distractor were not more frequent than in adults. However, although 
children spent more time looking at the distractor than adults, this stimulus was looked at to a 
low extent when compared to other stimuli. This can be related to the fact that 65% of the 
distracting errors were made by only 3 children. Hence, it is possible that these 3 children did 
not understand the task. Most children did not focus on perceptually-similar-to-B distractors. 
The fact that these distractors did not capture children’s attention can explain why our young 
participants performed better than Richland et al.’s (2006) participants of the same age. This 
increased response accuracy might be due to our change of instructions which rendered the 
task clearer and thus excluded the perceptual distractor as a potential answer. Indeed, we 
asked participants to find the thing which “played the same role as the one with an arrow 
pointing at it”, when Richland et al. asked “who is like the stimulus with an arrow”. The term 
“like” is ambiguous regarding the type of comparison which is expected (i.e., perceptual or 
role-based), and, consequently, could lead to a greater number of similar-to-B distractor 
errors. 
 The present results indeed suggest that participants have a specific visual strategy in 
the Scene Analogy task which might be due to specific goals of this task, and that children’s 
relational errors might be due to a neglect of the main goal, i.e., comparing the picture pointed 
to with the solution they want to give in terms of roles. It might be that a difference exist 
between visual strategies in this task and in the A:B::C:? task (Thibaut, French, Missault, et 
al., 2011). Experiment 2 of this chapter is dedicated to the direct comparison of these two 
tasks. 
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III. Experiment 2: Comparison of visual strategies in scene analogy 
and a scene-oriented A:B::C:? tasks 
 
III.a. Objectives and Hypotheses 
Differences in visual strategies between the A:B::C:? tasks (Thibaut, French, Missault, 
et al., 2011) and the Scene Analogy task (Experiment 1, this chapter) could not be directly 
tested with the previous setting. In the present experiment, the objective was to reproduce 
results from Thibaut et al. (2011), and to compare the Scene Analogy task and the A:B::C:? 
task directly. We expected that the focus of tasks in terms of goals might elicit different visual 
strategies and processes to solve them, with the Scene Analogy task having more mapping 
requirements, especially between the two goal objects, when the A:B::C:? task should elicit 
exclusively relation encoding and comparison within domains. 
 The Path-Mapping Theory seems to best explain results from Experiment 1, and is 
also compatible with results obtained by Thibaut, French, Missault, et al. (2011). This model 
predicts that participants in both tasks would make within-domain comparisons (i.e., AB and 
CT saccades) to find the relations in each domain. However, it also predicts different rates of 
BT saccades in each task, but a low rate of AC saccades in both cases, in contrast to the 
Structure Mapping Theory, the Multiconstraint Theory, and LISA. The Within-Context 
A:B::C:? task should thus elicit less BT saccades than the Scene Analogy task, because of the 
latter's goals being focused on the correspondences between B and T in terms of roles, but not 
the former's. Another predicted difference between the two tasks is the rate of fixation of B 
and C. The Scene Analogy task should elicit more fixations on B than other stimuli, and the 
A:B::C:? task should elicit more fixations on C. Thus, participants should look longer at C in 
the A:B::C:? task than in the Scene Analogy task, and vice versa for B, because of the 
difference of focus of the goals of the task on these elements. 
 As a consequence of maturation of goal maintenance abilities, children should display 
less BT saccades than adults in the Scene Analogy task, and less AB saccades and fixations 
on A and B than adults in the A:B::C:? task, as previously shown (Experiment 1, Thibaut, 
French, Missault, et al., 2011). Indeed, children seemed to neglect the goal of similarity 
between the relations between A and B, and C and T in the A:B::C:? task, focusing to a large 
extent on the target domain (C and the solution set) in this study. Children should also display 
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more relational errors than adults in the Scene Analogy task, this type of error being 
potentially due to the neglect of the alignment of B and T and the comparison between their 
roles. 
 
Figure 8: Example of a standard A:B::C:? problem (left panel) transformed in a Within-Context A:B::C:? trial (right 
panel). 
 
 As the distractor did not seem to catch attention in the Scene Analogy task, probably 
due to its irrelevance to the goal of the task in the Scene Analogy task, we expected a 
difference in the number of distractor errors between the two tasks. We also expected the 
percentage of fixations to the distractor in the A:B::C:? task to be greater than in the Scene 
Analogy task.  
Regarding the development of executive function and their involvement in analogical 
reasoning, and especially inhibition, we expected higher rates of distractor errors and lower 
scores in children when compared to adults in the Within-Context A:B::C:?. These higher 
error rates and lower scores in children can be attributed to immature inhibition capacities. 
Hence, they should make greater efforts to inhibit the information coming from the distractors 
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and eventually fail to inhibit this information. Thus, distractors should be fixated longer, and 
CDis saccades should be more frequent in children than in adults in the Within-Context 
A:B::C:? task due to the maturation of inhibition.  
To test these hypotheses, we used an Age (6-to-7-year-olds, adults) x Task (Scene 
Analogy, Within-Context A:B::C:? task) design with Age as a between-subject factor, and 
Task as a within-subject factor. Thus, each participant was tested in both tasks. We recorded 
participants’ scores, reaction times and eye movements. To minimize differences in the 
presentation of the two tasks, we therefore constructed a variant of the A:B::C:? task which 
we called the Within-Context A:B::C:? task (see Figure 8). In this task, we put A and B in one 
scene, and C and the solution set in another, presented in the same way as the Scene Analogy 
task. The Within-Context task was composed of trials from Thibaut et al. (2011), but put 
within a minimal scene. Thus, the instructions and what had to be done in this task were very 
similar to the instructions and goal of the standard A:B::C:? task except contextual cues and 
arrangement of stimuli. To make explicit which element was the C term, it had an arrow 
pointing to it. Notice that both tasks should be equally difficult because the trials we use in 
both tasks are equally complex (i.e., they imply one relation in each domain, and one 
distractor). 
 
III.b. Methods 
 
Participants 
 Twenty-five 6-to-7-year-olds (17 females, 8 males; M=75.8 months; SD = 3.5; from 
69 to 82 months) and 25 adults (18 females, 7 males; M=20 years; SD=1.6; from 17 to 24 
years) took part in this experiment. Adults were students at the University of Burgundy. All 
participants were naïve to this task and participated voluntarily. Parent’s informed consent 
was required for children to participate to the experiment. 
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Materials 
 The task consisted in 16 trials (both 3 training and 5 test trials in the Scene Analogy 
and the Within-Context A:B::C:? tasks; see Figure 9) each composed of two scenes presented 
one above the other. The order of the two tasks was counterbalanced, and participants were 
assigned to one of the two possible orders randomly. Both sets of trials were constituted of 
two scenes (501x376 pixels each) containing 7 black and white line drawings (corresponding 
to A, B, C, T, Dis and 2 U, as explained above) and framed with a black rectangle. The top 
scene contained the A and B pictures, and the remaining ones were in the bottom scene. The 
only difference in the general presentation of the two tasks was that an arrow pointed to the B 
stimulus in the Scene Analogy task, but to the C stimulus in the Within-Context A:B::C:? 
task. The Scene Analogy trials were chosen among Experiment 1’s trials, and those from the 
Within-Context A:B::C:? task were taken from Thibaut et al.'s (2011). The different pictures 
were put together in two scenes as explained above, and a minimal context was given 
(horizon lines and wall and floor joins).  
 These trials were presented on a Tobii T120 eye-tracker (resolution: 1024x768) by 
means of an E-Prime software (version 2.8.0.22) embedded in a Tobii Studio (version 2.1.12) 
eye-movement recording procedure. Statistical analyses were done using Statistica 8 software.  
 
Procedure 
 Test sessions took place in a quiet room in children’s schools or in an experimental 
box at the University of Burgundy for adults. Each participant was tested individually.  
 First participants’ recognition of the different stimuli used in the trials was assessed. 
Each picture was presented individually and participants were asked to give its name. If they 
were unable to do so, they were asked say how it was used or where it could be found. If they 
still could not give an answer, the experimenter gave the name and a short explanation of 
what was the object. An eye-tracker calibration procedure followed this first phase. 
 Then participants were tested in the analogical reasoning task. The procedure for the 
Scene Analogy task was the same as the one presented in Experiment 1. In the Within-
Context A:B::C:? task, participants were shown the two scenes and were given the following 
instructions during the first training trial: “Here are two pictures [pointing to A and B]. They 
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go together well. Can you see why these two [A and B] go together?” Once the participant 
had given a relation linking A and B, the experimenter confirmed it (if it was correct) or 
corrected it (in case of an irrelevant relation for the solution of the problem) and continued: 
“OK! Do you see this one [pointing to C]? What you have to do is to find in these four 
pictures [pointing to the solution set] the one that goes with this one [C] in the same way as 
this one [B] goes with this one [A]. So, if these two [A and B] go together because [giving the 
relation between A and B], which one goes with this one [C] in the same way?” When 
participants had given an answer, the experimenter asked them to justify their answer and 
gave a feedback. In case of an error and/or justification, the trial was explained in terms of the 
relations linking A and B on one side, and C and T on the other. Instructions were repeated 
(with feedback) during the second training trial if the first trial was failed. Instruction and 
feedback were not given during test trials. Eye-tracking data was recorded when the 
presentation of the problem started and stopped when an answer was given. 
 
Figure 9: Sample material from the Scene Analogy task (left panel) and the Within-Context A:B::C:? task (right 
panel). Letters are included to specify roles of the elements, but were not presented to participants. 
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 A third phase aimed at assessing participants’ knowledge of the relation used to 
construct the analogical problems. To do that, we presented each AB and CT pair individually 
and asked participants to give the relation linking the two pictures. 
 
III.c. Results 
Overall, less than 1% of the stimuli were not recognized by participants. One of the 
five test trials in the Scene Analogy Task was not recognized by 20% of the participants, 
therefore we removed it from further analysis. Otherwise, 4 trials were removed in 
individuals' data due to an absence of knowledge of the relations composing them. Nine trials 
were removed from Reaction time and eye-tracking analyses due to an absence of recording 
of participants’ reaction times, due to the fact that the experimenter did not press the mouse 
button at the end of the trial. Seven percent of the trials were removed from the eye-
movement analysis because of more than 50% of missing data. This resulted in one adult not 
having data. 
 
Behavioral data 
 To test one prediction of the executive function maturation view about the 
development of analogical reasoning, we analyzed response accuracies using a two-way 
mixed ANOVA with Age (6-to-7-year-olds, adults) as a between-subject factor and Task 
(Within-Context A:B::C:?, Scene Analogy) as a within-subject factor (see Figure 10). It 
revealed a significant main effect of Age (F(1,48)=25.3: p<.001; η²p=.345) with adults’ 
response accuracy higher than children’s. The effect of Task and the interaction between the 
two factors were not significant. This confirms partly our hypothesis about the maturation of 
inhibition being involved in the development of analogical reasoning, as this predicts lower 
scores in children than in adults. 
 To test this hypothesis further, we then compared children’s and adults’ mean number 
of distractor errors using the same ANOVA design (Figure 11). It revealed significant main 
effects of Age (F(1,48)=13.9; p<.001; η²p=.225) and of Task (F(1,48)=11.9; p=.001; 
η²p=.198). However the interaction between Age and Task was not significant. Thus, children 
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made more distractor errors than adults, and more distractor errors were made in the Within-
Context A:B::C:? task than in the Scene Analogy task. This suggests that inhibiting the 
distractor information is harder for children than in adults, and that distractors in the A:B::C:? 
task caught more attention than in the Scene Analogy task respectively. 
 In relation to the development of goal maintenance, we compared the number of 
relational errors (i.e., choosing the element involved in the relation of the target domain but 
playing the wrong role in this relation; Figure 11) in children and adults, this type of error 
being specific to the Scene Analogy task, using a two-sample independent t-test. Children 
made significantly more relational errors than adults (t(48)=3.5; p=.001; η²p=.201), which 
suggests that children had greater difficulty maintaining the main goal of the Scene analogy 
task, resulting in more alignment errors. 
 
 
Figure 10: Mean Response Accuracy of children and adults in the Within-Context A:B::C:? and Scene Analogy tasks 
(Error bars represent SEM). 
 
 Finally, we analyzed children’s and adults’ reaction times with the same ANOVA 
design as presented above (Figure 12). There was a significant main effect of Age 
(F(1,48)=141.5; p<.001; η²p=.747), but neither the effect of Task, nor the interaction between 
Age and Task were significant. This confirmed that children had longer reaction times when 
compared to adults’, and thus that percentage of fixation and saccades were more 
recommended than absolute values for eye movement analyses. 
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Figure 11: Mean numbers of distractor errors made by children and adults in each task (left panel) and of relational 
errors in the Scene Analogy task (right panel; error bars represent SEM). 
 
 
Figure 12: Mean reaction time for children and adults in the two tasks (error bars represent SEM). 
 
Visual strategies 
 To test our predictions about the goals of the task affecting fixations of B, C and Dis, 
as well as inhibition development affecting distractor fixation and goal maintenance 
development affecting fixations on A and B, we analyzed patterns of fixation in the Within-
Context A:B::C:? and the Scene Analogy tasks using a three-way mixed ANOVA with Age 
(6-to-7-year-olds, adults) as a between-subject factor, and with Type of Stimulus (A, B, C, T, 
Dis) and Task (Within-Context A:B::C:?, Scene Analogy) as within-subject factors (Figure 
13). This analysis showed a significant interaction between the Type of Stimulus and Task 
(F(4,188)=52.7; p<.001; η²p=.528), but no triple interaction between Type of Stimulus, Task, 
and Age. 
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 We ran planned comparisons analyses on these data. Concerning fixations on B and C, 
it revealed that C was fixated more than the mean fixation of other types of stimuli in the 
Within-Context A:B::C:? task (F(1,47)=37.9; p<.001; η²p=.446), and that B was fixated longer 
than the mean rate of fixation of other stimuli (F(1,47)=104.9; p<.001; η²p=.691). The rate of 
fixation on B was also higher in the Scene Analogy task than in the Within-Context A:B::C:? 
task (F(1,47)=133.5; p<.001; η²p=.740), and the reverse pattern for C (F(1,47)=48.4; p<.001; 
η²p=.507), as predicted. Thus, goals affected differentially attention toward these stimuli in the 
two tasks. There was also a significant difference between fixations of Dis in the two tasks 
(F(1,47)=9.4; p=.004; η²p=.167). This confirms that the distractor caught the attention of 
participants in the Within-Context A:B::C:? task more than in the Scene Analogy task, in 
which it was not related to the goals of the task. In relation to our prediction about differences 
of fixation on Dis at different developmental times, a significant difference was found 
between overall fixations on Dis between children and adults (F(1,47)=17.5; p<.001; 
η²p=.271), and between Dis fixations in children and adults in the A:B::C:? task specifically 
(F(1,47)=8.3; p=.006; η²p=.150), which confirmed a developmental trend toward a better 
inhibition of the information from the distractor. In relation to our prediction about fixations 
on A and B between age groups in the A:B::C:? task, planned comparisons did not reveal any 
significant difference between age groups in their fixations of A (F(1,47)=.6; p=.442; 
η²p=.013) or B (F(1,47)=.4; p=.507; η²p=.008). Thus, part of previous differences between 
adults and children in the A:B::C:? task was not reproduced.  
 Next, we tested our predictions about AB and CT being preferred over AC and BT 
saccades by participants, and tasks' goals modulating BT and CDis saccades differentially, 
about age modulating the rate of BT saccades in the Scene Analogy task and of AB saccades 
in the Within-Context A:B::C:? task, because of a difficulty for children to maintain the main 
goal of these tasks. We also tested our predictions about the developmental trend toward a 
better inhibition of saccades involving the distractor (i.e., CDis saccades) in the Within-
Context A:B::C:? task. We thus examined the above-mentioned saccades (Figure 14, top 
panel), using a three-way mixed ANOVA with Age (6-to-7-year-olds, adults) as a between-
subject factor, and Transition (AB, AC, BT, CT, CDis) and Task (Scene Analogy, Within-
Context A:B::C:?) as within-subject factors. This ANOVA showed a significant interaction 
between Task and Transition (F(4,188)=21.5; p<.001; η²p=.313), and between Task, 
Transition, and Age (F(4,188)=4.1; p=.003; η²p=.080). 
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Figure 13: Children’s and adults’ mean percentage of fixation of each stimulus in the Within-Context A:B::C:? task 
(upper panel) and in the Scene Analogy task (lower panel) (error bars represent SEM). 
 
 Planned comparisons showed that AB and CT saccades were preferred over AC and 
BT saccades in the Within-Context A:B::C:? task (F(1,47)=741.1; p<.001; η²p=.940), and in 
the Scene Analogy Task (F(1,47)=95.0; p<.001; η²p=.669). A difference in the rate of BT 
saccades existed between the two tasks (F(1,47)=63.8; p<.001; η²p=.576) and between the two 
age groups in the Scene Analogy task (F(1,47)=14.6; p<.001; η²p=.237), but not between AB 
saccades between children and adults in the Within-Context A:B::C:? task (F(1,47)=2.0; 
p=.160; η²p=.041). These results confirmed that the goals of the task modulated the rate of BT 
saccades, and that maintaining the main goal of the task was more difficult for children, at 
least in the Scene Analogy task. The difference between rates of CDis saccades in children 
and adults in the Within-Context A:B::C:? task was not significant, thus contradicting our 
prediction of a higher rate of CDis saccades in children than in adults in this task due to lower 
inhibition abilities in the younger group than in the older. 
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Figure 14: Children’s and adults' mean percentage of each saccade in the Within-Context A:B::C:? (upper panel) and 
the Scene Analogy (lower panel) tasks (error bars represent SEM). 
 
III.d. Discussion 
 Our hypotheses for this experiment were a difference between the goals of the two 
tasks compared affecting visual strategies of participants, and the developmental differences 
in the ability to maintain goal provoking fewer eye movement patterns linked to the goals of 
the task and more relational errors in children in comparison to adults. We also hypothesized 
that distractors would be harder to inhibit in the A:B::C:? task, due to the relevance of the 
distractors to the main goal of this task, than in the Scene Analogy task in which the 
distractors were not relevant, even partly, to the goals. Finally we hypothesized a 
developmental trend toward a better inhibition of distractor information. 
 The results we obtained suggest that the two tasks, although both testing analogical 
reasoning, might not be equivalent in terms of strategies and processes involved in their 
solution. The difference between the two tasks compared in terms of goals was confirmed by 
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our results, showing that visual strategies differed between the Scene Analogy task and the 
Within-Context A:B::C:? task. Indeed the first one elicited globally more fixations on B, and 
more saccades between B and T, the two goal objects of this task. On the contrary, the 
A:B::C:? task elicited more C fixations in participants. These results indeed suggest that 
participants adapted their visual strategies to the different goals of the tasks in terms of 
emphasized constraints on the solution. These differences between tasks are successfully 
predicted by the Path-Mapping Theory. 
 Our predictions concerning the maturation of goal maintenance being involved in the 
development of analogical reasoning were partially borne out. Indeed, we observed fewer eye 
movement patterns related to goals, i.e., saccade between the item with an arrow and its 
corresponding element in terms of roles in the target domain, and more relational errors in 
children than in adults in the Scene Analogy task. However the prediction concerning goal 
maintenance development in the A:B::C:? task (i.e., lower AB saccades rate and A and B 
fixation percentages in children than in adults) were not found. These results are different 
from those obtained by Thibaut et al. (2011; see also Thibaut & French, submitted). These 
differences can be explained in several ways. A plausible explanation could be that the fact of 
seeing different tasks made children more aware of the necessity of the relational similarity 
between the two domains compared. A second hypothesis could be that the presentation of the 
problems in scenes influenced positively their attention toward relational information in both 
domains. Indeed, presentation of scenes might induce participants to be more focused on 
relations between elements than when presented in separated frames (Humphreys et al., 
2010). This might explain the decrease in contrast between the two age groups, with children 
being more adult-like in their visual strategy when using scenes than when using separated 
pictures. 
 
Concerning our hypothesis of a difference between distractors' ability to catch 
participants attention, the results show that the distractor is less distracting in the Scene 
Analogy task than in the A:B::C:? task, which is supported by lower distractor error rates, 
lower fixation of Dis and lower number of saccades involving Dis (i.e., CDis and TDis) in the 
former than in the latter. This can easily be explained by the framework explained above, as 
the distractor, even though resembling the B picture, obviously do not play the same role in 
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the target domain as its twin picture in the source domain. Thus, the effect of distractors in the 
analogical tasks might be due to their relation with the main goal of the tasks.  
Finally, in relation to our hypothesis that inhibition maturation might at least partly 
explain analogical reasoning development, we indeed observed predicted differences between 
the two age groups. Children were more prone to make distractor errors than adults, and had 
lower performances in the A:B::C:? task than adults. They also looked longer at distractors 
than adults overall. However, our prediction of children making more CDis saccades than 
adults in the A:B::C:? task was not confirmed. These results suggest that children's attention 
was more attracted by distractors than adult's, and thus failed to inhibit to give it as an answer, 
which resulted in more errors from them than from adults. 
As some differences observed between adults and children, previously observed by 
Thibaut et al. (2011), were not observed in our results, we decided to test the hypothesis we 
envisaged for this difference in results (i.e., that the mode of presentation of the A:B::C:? task 
might influence positively children's analogical reasoning by making them focus more on the 
relational information). To achieve this goal, in the next Experiment, we compared the two 
tasks presented in this chapter with the Standard A:B::C:? task with separated elements. 
 
IV. Experiment 3: Comparison of visual strategies elicited by scene 
analogy, scene-oriented A:B::C:? and standard A:B::C:? task 
 
IV.a. Objectives and hypotheses 
 The objectives of this experiment were articulated around five axes: differences in 
goal specificity between tasks, developmental differences in the ability to maintain these 
goals, difference in the relevance of distractors to the goal of the tasks, developmental 
differences in inhibition abilities, and differences between tasks due to the presentation format 
(i.e., elements presented in scenes or separated). It was also designed to reproduce the results 
obtained by Thibaut et al. (2011) in the exact same task they used (i.e., an A:B::C:? task 
presented with separate elements), and compare them to the scene-oriented tasks we used in 
the previous experiments of the present chapter. The precedent experiment suggested 
differences between these two tasks (i.e., the Within-Context A:B::C:? and Scene Analogy 
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tasks) and the task used by Thibaut et al. (2011). These differences might be explained by the 
presentation of stimuli in scenes, as it has been shown that this presentation format enhances 
attention toward relational information between the elements composing the scenes 
(Humphreys et al., 2010). This change in attention might be reflected by the visual strategies 
used by participants (and especially in the saccades between objects within domains), but also 
by participants’ behavioral data (i.e., response accuracy and error rates), as these types of 
problems might be simpler than Standard A:B::C:? trials. Indeed, this attention toward 
relations intrinsically triggered by the presentation of the problems as scenes might help 
children resolve analogical reasoning problems, as this cognitive ability basically rely on 
relational comparison and integration (Gentner, 1983). 
 Relative to the first axis, i.e., differences of goals between the Scene Analogy and 
A:B::C:? tasks, we expected to reproduce results from Experiment 2 of this chapter (higher 
rates of fixation of B in the Scene Analogy and higher rates of fixation of C in the Within-
Context A:B::C:? task, as well as a significant difference between these tasks in the rates of 
fixation of these two stimuli, and a higher rate of AB and CT than AC and BT saccades in 
both tasks, and of BT saccades in the Scene Analogy task than in the A:B::C:? task). We also 
expected that these differences generalized to the comparison between the Scene Analogy 
task with the Standard A:B::C:? task which shared the same goals as the Within-Context 
A:B::C:? task. Thus, we expected higher rates of fixation of B in the Scene Analogy task than 
in the Standard A:B::C:? task, and the reverse pattern for C. We also expected BT saccades to 
be more numerous in the Scene Analogy task than in the Standard A:B::C:? task. 
 The second axis postulates a developmental trend toward a better ability to maintain 
goals of the task as a factor in analogical reasoning development. Thus, we also expected to 
reproduce the results specific to this hypothesis found in Experiment 1 and 2. We should find 
a greater number of relational errors in children than in adults in the Scene Analogy task, the 
only one to allow this kind of errors. We should also observe a difference in the number of BT 
saccades, which are used to align and compare the roles of the goal objects in the Scene 
Analogy task, and reproduce results from Thibaut, French, Missault, et al. (2011) relative to 
this developmental hypothesis, i.e., lower rates of fixation of A and B, and lower rates of 
saccades between these pictures in children than in adults in the Standard A:B::C:? task. 
 Relative to the power of distractors to catch attention in the different tasks, in link to 
their relation to the goals of the task, we expected that related-to-C distractors would catch 
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participants' attention more, and that distractor errors would be more frequent, in the Within-
Context A:B::C:? task than in the Scene Analogy task, as observed in Experiment 2. We 
expected these differences to be observed between the Standard A:B::C:? and the Scene 
Analogy task too, as the goals of the two types of A:B::C:? tasks are the same. 
 The fourth axis predicted developmental differences in the ability to inhibit 
information from distractors. Thus, the previously observed differences in response accuracy 
and number of distractor errors between adults and children should be observed again, along 
with the differences in overall fixation rate of distractors, as well as in the specific Within-
Context A:B::C:? task. This difference between adults and children fixations should also be 
found in the Standard A:B::C:? task, as related-to-C distractors should efficiently catch 
participants' attention. 
 As mentioned above, the presentation of the elements composing the domains 
compared (in scenes or separated) might influence participants' visual strategies, as scenes 
elicit attentional focus toward relations over objects (Humphreys et al., 2010). Hence, we 
expected more intra-domain saccades in the two scene-oriented tasks (i.e., the Scene Analogy 
task and the Within-Context A:B::C:? task) than in the Standard A::B:C:? task. As this 
attention toward relations is crucial when reasoning by analogy, we hypothesized that children 
would have better scores in the two scene-oriented tasks than in the Standard A:B::C:? task 
too. The corollary would be that they would make less distractor errors in the Within-Context 
A:B::C:? task than in the Standard A:B::C:? task. 
 To achieve these goals, we used an Age (6-7-year-olds, Adults) x Task (Scene 
Analogy, Standard A:B::C:?, Within-Context A:B::C:?) design, with Age as a between-
subject factor and Task as a within-subject factor. The Scene Analogy task was a replication 
of the tasks of the two previous experiments with a slight difference due. We used related-to-
C distractors, which made the distractors equivalent to the distractors in the two other tasks. 
Response accuracy, reaction times and eye movements were recorded. 
 
IV.b. Methods 
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Participants 
Subjects were 20 adults (14 females, 6 males; mean age=20.4 years; SD=2.21; range: 
from 17 to 27 years), University of Burgundy student and 26 6-to-7-year-olds (16 females, 10 
males; mean age=79.5 months; SD=3.6; range: from 73 to 84 months). For children, parents’ 
informed consent was required. Adults and children participated voluntarily to the task. 
 
Materials 
Three tasks, each composed of three training trials and four experimental trials, 
constituted the experiment (see Figure 15). The first task was a scene analogy problem task, 
the second a standard A:B::C:? task and the third an A:B::C:? task with the items composing 
the problems put within a context. Each problem of each task was composed of 7 black and 
white line drawings. The tasks were presented sequentially and their order was 
counterbalanced: the 6 possible orders were used uniformly across subjects. The order of the 
trials within each task was random. 
In the Scene Analogy task (Figure 15a), the pictures were based on materials from 
Experiment 1 except for the distractor that was chosen to be semantically (and not 
perceptually) related to one member of the relation in the bottom picture, and were presented 
in the same way as in Experiment 1. 
In the Standard A:B::C:? trials, the A, B, C drawings were presented at the top along 
with a black empty square symbolizing the place where the solution should go. The four 
remaining pictures (T, Dis and two U) were presented at the bottom of the screen (Figure 
15b). The size of each picture was 200x195 pixels. The reason the pictures were not totally 
aligned in two rows was that we wanted to minimize the overlap of different saccades of 
participant’s eyes between the different pictures. Each Picture was presented in a black frame 
and an eighth black frame was presented at the right end of the superior half of the screen to 
symbolize were the answer should go. 
The Within-Context A:B::C:? task was constituted of pictures used in Experiment 2. 
These pictures were presented in the same way as the previous experiment. 
The tasks were displayed on a Tobii T120 eye-tracker with a 1024x768 screen 
resolution using an E-Prime software (version 2.8.0.22) embedded in a Tobii Studio (version 
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2.1.12) procedure to record participants’ scanpaths. Statistics were executed with the help of 
Statistica 8. 
 
 
Figure 15: Presentation of the three tasks used for this experiment: a) scene analogy task, b) standard A:B::C:? task, 
c) Within-Context A:B::C:? task. 
 
Procedure 
Children were tested in a quiet room in their schools and adults in an experimental box 
at the University of Burgundy. Participants were tested one at the time.  
The controls were carried out in the same way as the controls in the previous 
experiment. The first tasks was administered in the same way as the Scene Analogy Task in 
Experiment 2.The Standard and Within-Context A:B::C:? tasks were administered as the 
Within-Context A:B::C:? task in Experiment 2 of this chapter.  
 
IV.c. Results 
 Overall, more than 99% of the stimuli were recognized in the first phase of the 
procedure. We excluded for further analysis 1% of the trials because of a lack of knowledge 
of the relation in either of the two domains composing the analogical problems. Fifteen 
percent of the trials were excluded of the eye-tracking analysis because of more than 50% of 
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the eye movement data missing. It resulted in 3 6-to-7-year-olds not having any data in one 
task. They were excluded of the statistical analyses implying these tasks. 
 
Behavioral results 
To test predicted differences between the scene-oriented tasks and the Standard 
A:B::C:? task and between adults and children, we ran a two-way mixed-ANOVA on 
response accuracy with Age (6-to-7-year-old; Adults) as a between-subject factor, and Type 
of Task (Scene Analogy, Standard A:B::C:?, Within-Context A:B::C:?) as within-subject 
factor (Figure 16). It showed significant main effects of Age (F(1,44)=44.3; p<.001; 
η²p=.502), of Type of Task (F(2,88)=7.201; p=.001; η²p=.141), and a significant interaction 
between these two factors (F(2,88)=7.6; p<.001; η²p=.148). The main effect of age showing 
that children had lower performances than adults partly confirms our hypothesis of a 
development of inhibition and goal management contributing to the development of 
analogical reasoning. A planned comparison confirmed that scene-oriented problems were 
better resolved than the Standard A:B::C:? problems (F(1,44)=33.3; p<.001; η²p=.431), which 
is coherent with our hypothesis that presenting problems in scenes might help children to 
solve analogical reasoning problems. 
 
 
Figure 16: Mean Response Accuracy of children and adults in the three tasks (Error bars indicate SEM). 
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distractors differing in their relation to goals would catch participants' attention differently, 
we also ran the above-mentioned ANOVA design on the Number of Distractor Errors (Figure 
17). This analysis revealed significant main effects of Age (F(1,44)=37.9; p<.001; η²p=.463) 
and Task (F(2,88)=17.1, p<.001; η²p=.280), and a significant interaction between the two 
factors (F(2,88)=16.6; p<.001; η²p=.274). The main effect of Age is coherent with our 
hypothesis of inhibition development affecting the development of analogical reasoning. 
Planned comparisons between Scene Analogy distractor error rates and the two other tasks 
confirmed that the rate of these errors was lower in the former than in the two A:B::C:? tasks 
(F(1,44)=26.6; p<.001; η²p=.377). This confirmed that the distractor was less salient for 
participants in the Scene Analogy task than in the two other tasks. We also compared the 
Within-Context and the Standard A:B::C:? task. It confirmed that distractor errors were less 
frequent in the former than in the latter (F(1,44)=11.8; p=.001; η²p=.211), which was coherent 
with the difference between presentations we hypothesized. 
 
 
Figure 17: Mean Number of Distractor errors in adults and children (Error bars represent SEM). 
 
To test our hypothesis about goal maintenance development partly, we analyzed the 
difference in number of relational errors between children and adults in the Scene Analogy 
task, running a two-sample independent t-test (Figure 18). It revealed a significant difference, 
with greater number of relational errors in children than in adults (t(44)=2.3; p=.027; 
η²p=.106). 
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Figure 18: Mean Number of Relational errors in children and adults (Error bars represent SEM). 
 
We ran the same ANOVA analysis on reaction times (see also Figure 19). It revealed a 
significant effect of Age (F(1,44)=44.3; p<.001; η²p=.502). Neither Type of Task 
(F(2,88)=.668; p=.515; η²p=.015) nor the interaction between Age and Type of Task 
(F(2,88)=.468; p=.628; η²p=.011) reached significance. Due to the main effect of age, we used 
percentage of total fixation and of total number of saccades as measure of eye movements 
subsequently. 
 
 
Figure 19: Mean reaction time of children and adults in the task 
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Visual Strategies 
 Regarding our hypotheses about fixations being influenced by the goal specificity of 
the tasks, the relevance to the goals of the distractors, the ability to maintain goals, and 
inhibition abilities, we analyzed fixation durations of the stimuli, running a two-way mixed 
ANOVA with Age (6-to-7-year-olds, adults) as a between-subject factor, and Type of 
Stimulus (A, B, C, T, Dis) and Task (Scene Analogy, Standard A:B::C:?, Within-Context 
A:B::C:?) as within-subject factors (Figure 20). There was significant interactions between 
Age and Type of Stimulus (F(4,164)=7.6; p<.001; η²p=.156), between Task and Type of 
Stimulus (F(8,328)=17.1; p<.001; η²p=.294) but not between the three factors (F(8,328)=1.9; 
p=.063; η²p=.044). 
 We tested our assumptions about task specificity in terms of goals with planned 
comparisons between rates of fixation of B and C, and between these stimuli and the others 
within each task. These comparisons confirmed that B was fixated ore than the other stimuli 
in the Scene Analogy task (F(1,41)=79.6; p<.001; η²p=.660), and C in the Standard and the 
Within-Context A:B::C:? task (respectively: F(1,41)=12.0; p=.001; η²p=.226; F(1,41)=8.1; 
p=.007; η²p=.165). and that B was fixated longer in the Scene Analogy task than in the two 
A:B::C:? tasks (F(1,41)=63.9; p<.001; η²p=.609), but did not show that C was fixated longer 
in A:B::C:? tasks than in the Scene Analogy task (F(1,41)=2.86; p<.010; η²p=.065). 
Concerning the power of distractors, we compared the fixation rate of distractors in the two 
A:B::C:? tasks to this rate in the Scene Analogy task. Planned comparisons confirmed that 
distractor was fixated more in the two A:B::C:? tasks than in the Scene Analogy task 
(F(1,41)=130.5; p<.001; η²p=.761). We also tested our hypothesis about the role of the 
development of inhibition in analogical reasoning development. Dis was generally looked 
longer by children than adults (F(1,41)=18.5; p<.001; η²p=.311), and especially in the two 
A:B::C:? tasks (F(1,41)=18.2; p<.001; η²p=.307). In relation of our hypothesis of goal 
maintenance development in analogical reasoning, we tested the difference between the rate 
of fixation of A and B between children and adults in the Standard A:B::C:? task. It revealed 
that A was not looked at significantly longer in adults than in children (F(1,41)=1.1; p=.306; 
η²p=.026) but that B was (F(1,41)=5.9; p=.020; η²p=.126).  
To test the predictions of the influence of the different factors mentioned on saccades in the 
different task, we then turned to the analysis of saccades (Figure 21). First, we examined 
saccade  patterns  using  a  two-way  mixed  ANOVA with Age (6-to-7-year-olds, Adults) as a 
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Figure 20: Mean percentage of fixation of each stimulus in children and adults in the Scene Analogy (upper panel), 
the Standard A:B::C:? (middle panel), and the Within-Context A:B::C:? (lower panel) tasks (Error bars indicate 
SEM). 
 
between-subject factor, and Transition (AB, AC, BT, CT, CDis, TDis, TU, DisU) and Task 
(Scene Analogy, Standard A:B::C:?, Within-Context A:B::C:?) as within-subject factors. It 
revealed a significant interaction between Transition and Task (F(14,574)=39.2; p<.001; 
η²p=.489), and between the three factors (F(14,574)=1.8; p=.035; η²p=.042).  
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We first tested our hypothesis about the rates of AB and CT saccades being greater than 
the rates of AC and BT saccades in the three tasks. It was confirmed in the three tasks (Scene 
Analogy: F(1,41)=560; p<.001; η²p=.932; Standard A:B::C:?: F(1,41)=305.1; p<.001; 
η²p=.882; Within-Context A:B::C:?: F(1,41)=272.4; p<.001; η²p=.869).We then tested our 
hypothesis about the specificity of BT saccades in the Scene Analogy task with a planned 
comparison. It revealed a significantly higher rate of BT saccades in the Scene Analogy task 
than in the two A:B::C:? tasks (F(1,41)=34.5; p<.001; η²p=.457). We also tested the 
hypothesis about goal maintenance development with the AB saccades in the Standard 
A:B::C:? task, and BT saccades in the Scene Analogy task. It revealed no significant 
difference between the rates of AB saccades between adults and children in the Standard 
A:B::C:? task (F(1,41)=.5; p=.467; η²p=.012) but a higher rate of BT saccades in adults than 
in children in the Scene Analogy task (F(1,41)=8.1; p=.007; η²p=.165), thus partially 
confirming our hypothesis. We also tested the hypothesis of more frequent intra-domain 
saccades in the scene-oriented tasks than in the Standard A:B::C:? task. Planned comparison 
revealed significantly more intra-domain saccades in the scene-oriented tasks than in the 
separated format (F(1,41)=24.3; p<.001; η²p=.372), thus confirming our hypothesis. 
 
IV.d. Discussion 
 The study of visual strategies and behavioral data in the three different tasks used was 
designed to several hypotheses. First we wanted to know if the presentation of problems in 
scenes could help participants, and especially children to focus on the relational information, 
and thus improve their performances in such problems. We also furthered our explorations of 
the relation between tasks goals and visual strategies, and the influence of the development of 
the ability to maintain goals on analogical reasoning, as well as the link between the 
efficiency of distractors and their relations to the goals of the task. In addition to this, we also 
studied the link between the development of inhibition abilities and analogical reasoning.  
 The results of the previous experiments concerning the goal specificity of analogical 
reasoning tasks were reproduced fairly well and extended to the Standard A:B::C:? task. The 
Scene Analogy task led participants to focus more on B than the two A:B::C:? tasks, and 
generated more BT saccades, saccades related to the main goal of the task. However the 
greater focus on C in the two A:B::C:? tasks than in the Scene Analogy task was not 
reproduced. These results suggest that indeed the two types of analogical reasoning tasks 
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differ in their goals and that participants adapt their strategies to these different goals. This is 
predicted only by the Path-Mapping Theory as explained above. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Mean Percentage of each saccade in the Scene Analogy (upper panel), Standard A:B::C:? (middle panel), 
and Within-Context A:B::C:? (lower panel) task (Error bars represent SEM). 
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 The results linked to the development of goal maintenance abilities were not 
conclusive in the Standard A:B::C:? task. We did not reproduce previous findings observed 
by Thibaut, French, Missault et al. (2011) about children's lower consideration of the AB pair 
in comparison to adults. This experiment eliminates the possibility of these differences 
between our observations and theirs to be due to differences in the presentations of the task, as 
this possibility was left open by the precedent experiment. This could be that using different 
tasks enhanced children's understanding of the constraints on the solution and the usefulness 
of the AB pair in finding the solution. This hypothesis remains to be tested. However, the 
results about the development of goal maintenance previously observed in the Scene Analogy 
task were observed again: children made more relational errors than adults, and made less BT 
saccades than them. 
 The findings about the link between the power of distractors and their link to the goals 
of the task were extended to the Standard A:B::C:? task. The distractors were chosen more 
often, and were fixated longer in the two A:B::C:? tasks than in the Scene Analogy task. 
Inhibition abilities seemed to modulate analogical reasoning. Children made more distractor 
errors, had lower scores, and fixated the distractors longer than adults, especially in the tasks 
were the distractors played their role. The change of distractors for related-to-C distractors in 
the Scene Analogy task has lowered the difference between children and adults in terms of 
distractor fixations and errors, as in scores. This can be explained easily by the explicit focus 
of tasks in terms of similarity of the roles of B and the solution. Even though the distractors 
were semantically related to C, they were not related in roles. Thus, one would predict giving 
an obvious role of the distractors in the scene, like Richland and collaborators (2006) did with 
the addition of a distractor that was related to C with the opposite relation, might lead to more 
distractor errors in this kind of task. We show in chapter III that even adults are distracted by 
this kind of “opposite-relation” distractors in an A:B::C:? task. However, Richland et al.’s 
study (2006), due to the ambiguity of the mapping intrinsic to the task cannot disambiguate 
errors of mapping (i.e. what we called relational errors) from distractor errors due to the more 
sustained attention of children on something that has a role played in the target domain, 
whatever this role is. The presence of this kind of errors in adults even when the mapping is 
obvious (see chapter III) might be an indirect argument in favor of a distractive effect due to 
the presence of an element having a role, even though irrelevant, in the target domain. 
However this prediction would be easy to test directly in children with an equivalent scene 
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analogy task, with distractors playing an irrelevant role in relation with C, and asks the 
question of what makes a distractor more distractive in analogical reasoning tasks. 
 Finally, concerning the differences between scene-oriented problems and problems 
displaying elements in separate frames, the first seemed to elicit more intra-domain saccades 
which is coherent with the view that scenes increase attention toward relations. The predicted 
interactions of response accuracy and of number of distractor errors between the within-
context and standard A:B::C:? task was also present. Thus, the within-context task, although 
equivalent in terms of instructions and focus, might alleviate some difficulty related to the 
presence of distractors, by the presentation in scene. This might be due to the scene enhancing 
attention toward relational information (Humphreys et al., 2010).  
 
V. General discussion 
 One important finding of this chapter is the fact that we observed a difference between 
the ability of children to answer correctly the scene-oriented problems and problems with 
separated elements. This finding was related to a higher number of comparisons between the 
objects of the same domain in the eye-tracking data. We explain this observation by recent 
findings showing that displaying objects in meaningful scenes makes participants focus more 
on the relations between the objects (see Humphreys et al. (2010) for a review). These 
findings can be explained by the fact that meaningful scenes orient attention toward relations. 
This attentional effect can lower the cost of encoding the target domain relations, and 
decreases the interference of the main goal of the task (i.e., finding what goes with C) with 
this encoding process (Blaye, Glady, & Thibaut, 2013). 
 In these three experiments, we observed reliable findings concerning the visual 
strategies used to solve the three tasks we gave to our participants. The A:B::C:? tasks were 
solved with a majority of AB and CT saccades which are likely to be attempts by the 
participants to encode the relations between these terms (Thibaut, French, Missault, et al., 
2011, see also Thibaut and French (submitted)). These relational extractions were common 
with the scene analogy task. However, specific to the proportional A:B::C:? task (either in the 
classic or the within-context format) is the comparison of the different options that are related 
to C (i.e., T and Dis). The extensive comparison of these objects might be related to the goal 
of this specific task: finding something that is related to C. In chapter V, we show that the 
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emphasis of the instructions on this goal affects younger children's ability to address the task 
correctly. What makes the distractor really attractive for the eye, especially for children, is its 
connection to this goal of the task (Yarbus, 1967). We saw that the effect of a distractor that is 
irrelevant to the goal of the task vanishes in the results of the scene analogy task. 
 In the Scene Analogy task, we did not find a need for participant to compare 
extensively any other pair of objects than C and T in the target domain scene. This result is 
accentuated by the low level of selection of distractors in this task. Hence, distractors did not 
have any distracting effect. This can once again be related to the emphasis of the task's 
instructions. In this task, participants were instructed to find what played the same role in the 
target picture as the one pointed at in the base picture. However, the distractors did not play 
any role in relations in the pictures: they were either semantically related to the action of 
interest for the analogical comparison, or perceptually similar to the object that was pointed at 
in the source picture, but were not actors of a relation. We would thus predict that a distractor 
being implicated in another action, thus having a role, even though not the same as the 
solution of the problem, would be of more interest, and/or might be chosen more often, at 
least by young children.  
 The effect of tasks goals might also be related to the difference we observed between 
the scores of children in our experiments and those in Richland et al.'s (2006) study. In their 
study, in the comparable condition (i.e., one relation, one distractor) 6-to-7-year-olds had 
fairly low scores (65%), when ours had between 75 and 85% of correct answers, depending 
on the experiment. Richland et al. (2006) observed also a great number of object matches in 
this age group, what we did not observe in our sample. These differences can possibly be 
explained by the vagueness of the instructions used: children had to find what was the same 
part of the pattern in the bottom picture as the one pointed to in the top picture. These 
instructions do not provide any clue that what has to be chosen is an object corresponding in 
terms of role, making the perceptual match a plausible answer.  
 Another interesting finding in this task was the difference in the percentages of 
saccades between B and T between children and adults. This saccade is directly related to the 
main goal of the task (i.e., finding what plays the same role in the two pictures) because it 
allows participants to compare the roles of these two objects in a direct manner. The 
observation that children rely less on this comparison in their reasoning is better apprehended 
when related to their greater number of relational errors when compared to adults: children 
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might make more relational errors because they do not explicitly align the different role-fillers 
but only compare the relations in their similarity. Another interesting fact is that the alignment 
process is not exhaustive but merely focused on the tasks goals: even adult participants do not 
map A on C in this task. This is predicted by Salvucci & Anderson's (2001) Path-Mapping 
Theory in which goals affect the actions done with the material. These experiments show that 
this goal constraint on mapping is visible even in the perceptual, information gathering 
process of participants solving an analogical reasoning task. However, all the theories and 
models of analogical reasoning but the Path-Mapping Theory predict that the mapping is the 
more exhaustive it can be (that is, an analogy maker maximizes the number of object 
correspondences between the source and the target). The results in this chapter and the 
following one argues against this view, and clearly shows that participants attend to and 
evaluate extensively only subparts of the mapping between the two structures to be compared, 
subparts that are central to the task's goal while solving the task. The Path-Mapping Theory 
(Salvucci & Anderson, 2001) is the only one to our knowledge to allow a partial mapping 
between the source and the target in response of specific goals of the task.  
 The effect of task's goals on the behavior of children and their tendency to make less 
BT saccades makes the interpretation of the relational errors in Richland et al.'s (2006) study 
equivocal. The finding that children made more relational errors could at least partly be 
attributed to different, non exclusive factors other than the simple working memory load 
argued by the authors. For instance, it could be attributed to a lack of inhibitory process 
efficiency, making an attractive distractor that is related to the goal of the task (i.e., that plays 
any role in the bottom picture) difficult to overcome and cope with, or, even if children have 
enough working memory to process ternary relations, to a difficulty to align and/or to check 
the correspondences between the two sets. 
 Another recurrent finding in the experiments presented in this chapter was the 
difference in the effect of the distractor between children and adults in A:B::C:? tasks. 
Children paid systematically more attention to the distractor than adults, resulting in it being 
chosen more often by children than adults. In our view, this is linked to the maturation of 
executive functions, and especially inhibition, being involved in the development of 
analogical reasoning. Indeed, executive functions have been shown to develop through 
childhood and adolescence (see Diamond, 2013 for a review), and are determinant in 
participants ability to solve problems, as they have to navigate through a search space of 
different possibilities to find the correct solution (Thibaut et al., 2010a, 2010b). They permit 
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participants to examine the different possibilities of the search space efficiently and not to 
remain stuck in the consideration of a tempting but irrelevant answer (i.e., the distractor), and 
to change their representation of the problem in case of an impasse being reached (i.e., the 
exhaustion of all solution possibilities in the search space without finding a satisfying 
answer). 
 In conclusion, the results presented in this chapter allows us to argue that different 
goals lead to different strategies for gathering information, and that goal is central to this 
process (see Spellman & Holyoak (1996) for convergent findings). The A:B::C:? task is 
clearly focused on the comparison of two relations in terms of similarity, which lead 
participants to only extract the relational information (AB and CT saccades), and compare the 
different possibilities in terms of that relational similarity. In any case, participants do not 
check the mapping between the two domains' objects explicitly in the A:B::C:? task. On the 
contrary, the scene analogy task is more focused on the mapping of a particular object in the 
source domain on a particular one in the target domain. This results in the explicit evaluation 
of the alignment between these two objects by adults, but not children, which explains their 
relational errors. However task instructions are not the sole factor to affect participants’ 
information gathering: we showed that the presentation of stimuli in scenes affect the 
attention children pay to relations, especially in the target scene. This might affect their ability 
to reason by analogy by a better encoding and comparison of the complete relational 
information, this information being crucial to perform the task. These results are coherent 
with the demonstration by other authors of the ability of the presentation of the task to affect 
the way participants solved it (Keane et al., 1994). These experiments also show two strong 
factors in the development of analogical reasoning: the development of the ability to maintain 
goal while solving a task, and the ability to inhibit information irrelevant to these goals. The 
next chapter will show that even if these capabilities are more efficient in adults, they are still 
an important factor in their ability to reason by analogy.  
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Chapter III: Adult's visual strategies in 
complex A:B::C:? problems 
 
I. Background 
 This chapter is composed of two experiments. Their goal was to assess the robustness 
of adults' visual strategies observed in the preceding chapter in the A:B::C:? task when the 
difficulty of the problems is greater than that of problems designed for children. The main 
goal was to manipulate the difficulty of the analogy and to assess the consequences of this 
manipulation on the search organization. This was a way to test the robustness of the 
predictions of the models confirmed in chapter II (i.e., more within- than between-domains 
saccades, focus on the goal objects). Indeed, it could be argued that easy analogies can be 
easily solved by projection of inferences from the first pair and that more difficult analogies 
would involve more back and forth movements. First, we tested a general factor of difficulty 
as assessed during pretests of the materials (Experiment 1) then we manipulated the semantic 
and perceptual structures of the problems (Experiment 2). 
 Bethell-Fox et al. (1984) showed that the difficulty of the task was found to influence 
visual strategies in a geometrical A:B::C:? task (see Figure 22), especially in participants with 
lower fluid intelligence. They observed that these participants tended to have an approach less 
based on the construction of an hypothesis for the solution, but consisting in eliminating 
answers that were not plausible. In addition to this, difficult items elicited more looks back to 
A and B, to spend more time on the stem of the problem longer before giving a first look to 
alternatives, and to look at these alternatives more often than in simple ones. The response-
elimination strategy (i.e., eliminating each answer option one after the other by finding if it 
does not fit one of the different relations which have to be taken into account to determine the 
solution) observed in these trials seems to be due to participants looking for the solution they 
constructed before looking at the solution set, but not finding it in the solution set. Another 
interesting finding is that when looking first to the correct answer, participants tended to look 
at a lower number of alternatives than when it was an incorrect answer that was first looked 
at. The same was observed in ambiguous items, i.e., items in which the most obvious solution 
was not present in the alternatives. 
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 Our task was a semantic, verbal analogy task, and thus, differences could be expected 
in the patterns of fixations and saccades due to differences between geometric and verbal 
analogies. Indeed, geometric analogies can have several objects serving as A terms and B 
terms, which have to be taken into account at the same time, when our verbal analogies only 
had one word corresponding to each term of the analogy. Thus, these differences of 
numerosity, and the related relational complexity (in the sense of Halford et al. 1998) might 
influence differentially the visual strategies of participants. Indeed the complexity of our task 
could not be attributed to relational complexity as the number of relations between A and B 
and C and T was kept constant (i.e., one relation). However, we expected similar findings 
(i.e., more encoding of the AB pair and more comparisons between the different answer 
options), but due to different reasons than the load in working memory. The differences 
observed in the different types of trials should be due to the interaction between executive 
functions and the representations they work on, as the difficulty here is to represent clearly 
and distinguishably the relation meaning between the pairs of objects to allow a correct 
discrimination of the possible answers, rather than to keep active all relations between the 
different terms at the same time, which might explain why participants would go back on the 
A and B terms more often when the relations are more numerous. As we manipulated the 
difficulty, we expected more returns to A and B after seeing the solution set in difficult trials 
than in easy trials, because the relation between A and B would not be clear without seeing 
the solution set. 
 
Figure 22: Sample materials from Bethell-Fox et al., 1984. 
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 The second experiment used a different type of distractors: opposite-relation 
distractors (i.e., distractors that have the same relation to C as A has to B, instead of B to A). 
The studies presented in chapter II showed that children made relational errors (i.e., mapping 
errors), and that goal influenced what information was treated by participants in analogical 
reasoning tasks. However, relational errors were not possible so far in the A:B::C:? task, 
because of the absence of such a possibility in the answer options proposed in the solution set. 
As the goal of the A:B::C:? task is more focused on the similarity between the relations than 
on the mapping of the objects themselves, and as the resolution of other mapping tasks are 
influenced by their structure (i.e., the order of presentation of stimuli) and goals (i.e., the 
purpose of the mapping; Keane et al., 1994; Spellman & Holyoak, 1996), it seemed 
reasonable that this kind of distractors might elicit more errors than a simple related-to-C 
distractor. Indeed, the results described in the preceding chapter suggest that the A:B::C:? task 
elicit few saccades attributable to a mapping between the two domain's elements, contrary to 
the more mapping-based scene analogy task. Thus, the mapping of the different terms of the 
analogies in terms of roles in the similar relations seems not to be explicitly constructed and 
evaluated in the A:B::C:? task. Only the similarity between the relations inferred between the 
solution and C and between A and B seem to be evaluated. Another possible explanation of 
the absence of saccades associated with mapping one domain on the other could be that the 
mapping is implicitly given by the structure of the task and that participants rely on this 
structure, which would not lead to more errors in this case. In this second experiment, we also 
manipulated the direction of the task (i.e., presented from left to right; A:B::C:?, or from right 
to left, ?:C::B:A). This was done because this manipulation was showed effective in 
increasing the cognitive load of the task (Barnes & Whitely, 1981). We thus hypothesized that 
participants resources being already taken in the restructuration of the problem, less resources 
could be spent in the inhibition of such distractors, and thus that there would be more errors 
with the opposite-relation distractor than the simple related-to-C distractor. 
 
II. Experiment 1: Effect of difficulty on visual strategies in the 
A:B::C:? task 
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II. a. Objectives and Hypotheses 
 The objective of the present experiment was to test whether adults’ strategies would be 
modified by the difficulty of the analogical problems. So far, we only tested adults with 
analogies designed for children. As mentioned above, difficult problems might have an 
impact on participants' visual strategies used by participants (Bethell-Fox et al., 1984). For 
this reason, we compared Easy and Difficult conditions in a within-subject design. Easy trials 
were trials in which the relation between A and B, and C and T was obvious. An example of 
Easy trials is cow:milk::hen:?. In this example, adults do not have any difficulty to find that 
cows produce milk, and then to find that the solution in the different choices in the solution 
set is egg, as hens produce them. Difficult trials were designed not to be as straightforward as 
the Easy trials. Indeed, the relation between A and B was less obvious than in the former type 
of trials. The following problem is an example of Difficult trial: violence:activity::gloom:?. 
The relation between violence and activity (i.e., violence is a negative type of activity) is far 
from being obvious, and thus the solution (mood) would be more difficult to find. 
 We expected the previously observed high rates of C fixation due to the goal of the 
task emphasizing this term, and, because of the Path-Mapping Theory convincingly predicting 
what kind of visual patterns would be found in analogical reasoning tasks, and of previously 
observed results in the A:B::C:? task, greater rates of AB and CT saccades in comparison to 
AC and BT saccades. 
 In order to confirm our assumptions about the difficulty of the trials, in addition to 
Difficult trials being rated more difficult than Easy trials in pretests, Difficult trials should 
also elicit lower scores, more distractor errors, and longer reaction times than Easy trials. 
 We hypothesized that participants would engage differently their inhibition in these 
different types of trials. Indeed, as the relation is harder to define clearly, at least at first sight, 
we expected that participants would have longer fixations on the distractor overall in the 
Difficult than in the easy trials, and would make more CDis saccades, which are related to the 
encoding of the relation between these terms. These patterns of eye-movements would be 
related to a difficulty to engage inhibition against the information from the distractor in the 
difficult trials as this engagement is dependent on the recognition of a solution as irrelevant. 
This recognition might be harder with less clearly represented relations than with obvious 
relations. 
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 Our second prediction is that participants will have to re-represent the AB pair after 
seeing the solution set in Difficult trials, but not in the Easy trials, making use of cognitive 
flexibility. Thus, we shall have overall longer fixation times on A and B, and more AB 
saccades in Difficult trials than in Easy ones. As the process of flexibility has an inherent 
dynamic nature, we should also observe differences over time. A and B fixations and AB 
saccades should be greater after participants saw the different answer options and compared 
them. This higher interest in A and B, and their relation could not be attributed to the 
refreshing of a great number of relations, as it was the case in the study by Bethell-Fox et al. 
(1984), because we used verbal analogies, thus limiting to one the number of relations 
between A and B which had to be taken into account at the same time to solve the problems. 
 
II. b. Methods 
 
Participants 
 Participants were 20 adults (6 males, 14 females; M=23.8 years; SD=4.2; from 17 to 
35 years) who were students at the University of Burgundy. Participants were naïve to the 
task and participated voluntarily.  
 
Materials 
 The task consisted in 22 trials (2 training trials and 20 test trials) of a verbal A:B::C:? 
task. The test trials were divided in two conditions: 10 were Difficult trials, and 10 were Easy 
trials. The 2 training trials were displayed before the 20 test trials, and the order of 
presentation was random. 
Each trial was composed of eight words written in black ink on a white background, 
corresponding to the A, B, and C terms of the analogical problems, and 5 potential solutions. 
The solution set was composed of the Target (T), 2 related-to-C distractors (Dis), and 2 
unrelated distractors (U). Each word was presented in a black frame (220x220 pixels). The A, 
B and C terms were presented in a row at the top of the screen along with an empty black 
frame were the solution should go, and the 5 words composing the solution set were displayed 
in a row at the bottom of the screen.  
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The difficulty was assessed by 12 students at the University of Burgundy. They were 
asked to solve the different problems and to evaluate on a 1-7 scale how difficult they found 
the solution of the problem was. Difficult trials were rated significantly higher (M=3.9; 
SD=.4; from 3.5 to 4.6) than Easy trials (M=1.2; SD=.1; from 1.1 to 1.3; two-sample related t-
test: t(22)=23.2; p<.001; η²p=.961). 
The task was presented on a Tobii T120 eye-tracker (resolution: 1024x768) with an E-
Prime (version 2.8.0.22) experiment embedded in a Tobii Studio (version 2.1.12) procedure to 
record participants’ eye-movements. Data were analyzed using a Statistica 8 software. 
 
Procedure 
 The procedure used for the explanation and administration of the A:B::C:? task was 
identical to the one used in Experiment 3 of Chapter II, with an additional sentence by the 
experimenter, stating that participants should be careful about the match between the elements 
of the two domains. 
 
II. c. Results 
 
Behavioral data 
 To control the ability of our trials to be more or less difficult for participants, we 
analyzed behavioral data with bilateral paired t-tests. These analyses showed differences 
between Difficult and Easy trials (Figure 23). Difficult problems were solved correctly less 
often than Easy problems (t(19)=4.9; p<.001; η²p=.558) and all errors were distractor errors. 
In addition to this, the former were solved more slowly than the latter (t(19)=9.92; p<.001; 
η²p=.838). This confirms that Difficult trials were harder for our participants to solve than 
Easy trials, and suggested that the engagement of inhibition was harder in the Difficult trials. 
We subsequently used percentage of total fixation time and percentage of total number of 
fixations because of the difference in reaction times between the two conditions. 
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Eye movement analysis 
 Overall, two trials were not used for further analysis because of the number of missing 
points being superior to 50%. Due to the difference of reaction times between Difficult and 
Easy trials, we used percentage of total looking times and of total number of saccades for 
comparisons. 
  
 
Figure 23: Mean Response Accuracy and Reaction Times in easy and difficult trials (error bars represent SEM). 
 
Whole trial analysis 
 To further our analysis of the fixation patterns in Easy and Difficult trials, we ran a 
two-way repeated-measure ANOVA with Type of Stimulus (A, B, C, T, Dis) and Condition 
(Difficult, Easy) as within subject factors (Figure 24). The interaction between Condition and 
Type of Stimulus was significant (F(4,76)=27.8; p<.001; η²p=.594). Planned comparisons did 
not show that the mean fixation percentage of C was greater than the mean percentage of 
fixation of the other stimuli (F(1,19)=1.2; p=.295; η²p=.059). The analyses of the difference 
between the percentage of fixation in Easy and Difficult trials showed no significant 
difference for A (F(1,19)=2.1; p=.161; η²p=.100) and for B (F(1,19)=.0; p=.861; η²p=.0), but 
showed a significant difference for Dis (F(1,19)=25.5; p<.001; η²p=.573). These results 
partially confirmed our hypothesis about engagement of inhibition being more difficult in 
difficult trials, but invalidate our hypothesis about re-representation being needed for difficult 
trials. However, differences in the dynamics of the process might have been masked by a 
whole trial analyses. We will come back further to this hypothesis in the analyses between the 
different slices of the trials below. 
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Figure 24: Mean percentage of fixation of each Type of Stimulus in easy and difficult trials (error bars represent 
SEM). 
 
 To test our assumptions about participants' greater interest in the distractor and the AB 
pair in Difficult than in Easy trials and of the preponderance of within- rather than between-
domain saccades, we analyzed the saccades executed between the different pairs of pictures of 
the problem (Figure 25). We thus ran a two-way repeated-measure ANOVA with Transitions 
(AB, AC, BT, CT, CDis) and Condition (Easy, Difficult) as within subject factors. This 
revealed a significant interaction between Transition and Condition (F(4,76)=4.5; p=.002; 
η²p=.192). Planned comparisons revealed significantly higher mean rates of AB and CT 
saccades than AC and BT saccades (F(1,19)=693.8; p<.001; η²p=.973). It also revealed a 
significantly higher percentage of CDis saccades in the Difficult trials than in the Easy trials 
(F(1,19)=32.2; p<.001; η²p=.629) confirming more attention was allocated to distractors in the 
first than in the second, but no significant difference between the percentages of AB saccades 
in the two conditions. This last result, once again, can be due to these differences being only 
observable in the dynamics of the visual strategies. 
 
Division of trials into slices 
 The mean time to solve Difficult trials was approximately three times longer than the 
mean time for solving Easy trials. Thus, participants might simply reiterate their procedure to 
solve the problem several times when the trials were more difficult, or, as we expected, 
differences in the repartition of key saccades and fixations (i.e. AB saccades, A and B 
fixations) could be different over time, in case of re-representation of the AB pair after the 
participants had observed the potential solutions. To test these hypotheses, we divided all 
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trials in three equal slices (i.e., 1/3 of the total length of the trial), to observe differences in the 
dynamics of Easy and Difficult trials. 
 
 
Figure 25: Mean percentage of saccades in easy and difficult trials (error bars represent SEM). 
  
 A three-way repeated measure ANOVA was used, with Type of Stimulus (A, B, T, 
Dis, U), Condition (Easy, Difficult) and Slice (first, middle, and last) as within-subject 
factors, was used to assess the evolution of fixations on the distractors and the source domain 
(Figure 26). It revealed a significant interaction between these three factors (F(8,152)=25.3; 
p<.001; η²p=.571). Planned comparison showed that the solution set (T, Dis, and U) was 
fixated longer in the first slice of the Difficult trials than in the first of Easy trials 
(F(1,19)=71.5; p<.001; η²p=.790), thus confirming that participants already looked at the 
solution set in the first third of the trials, which would trigger the re-fixation of A and B by 
participants, in our view. A was also fixated longer in the middle (F(1,19)=40.6; p<.001; 
η²p=.681), and the last slice (F(1,19)=8.8; p=.008; η²p=.317). B was not fixated longer in the 
Difficult than in the Easy trials in the middle slice (F(1,19)=2.8; p=.109; η²p=.128), but was in 
the last slice (F(1,19)=7.1; p=.016; η²p=.272). This confirms that the A and B pairs were of 
greater interest even at the end of Difficult trials, suggesting that participants tried to re-
represent this pair. 
  To find further evidence of this re-representation of the AB pair, we also analyzed the 
AB, TDis, TU, and DisU saccades for differences across slices and conditions (Figure 27), 
using a three-way repeated-measure ANOVA with Transition (AB, TDis, TU, DisU), Slice 
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(first, middle, last), and Condition (Easy, Difficult) as within-subject factors. There was a 
significant interaction between the Type of Saccade, Condition and Slice (F(6,114)=15.1; 
p<.001; η²p=.443). Planned comparisons confirmed a greater number of saccades between the 
solution set words in the first slice (F(1,19)=60.1; p<.001; η²p=.760), thus confirming that 
participants looked at the solution set as soon as the first slice in Difficult trials. The AB 
saccade was more frequent in the Difficult than in the Easy trials in the middle (F(1,19)=11.4; 
p=.003; η²p=.375) and the last slice (F(1,19)=8.3; p=.010; η²p=.304), which confirmed that the 
AB pair was of greater interest to participants in the middle and the end of Difficult trials 
more than in Easy trials. This suggests further, as the previous results obtained on fixation 
percentages of A and B, that participants tried to re-represent the relation between A and B 
after looking at the solution set.  
 
 
Figure 26: Mean percentage of fixation of each Type of Stimulus in first middle and last slice in easy and difficult 
trials (error bars represent SEM). 
 
II. d. Discussion 
 Our hypotheses were that adults would have more difficulty to engage their inhibition 
against distractors in the case of difficult than of easy trials, because the relation between A 
and B which should constrain what kind of answer could be plausible would be harder to 
represent in a clear manner, and thus could not be used to constrain efficiently the response at 
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Figure 27: Mean percentage of each type of saccade in each slice in easy and difficult trials (error bars represent 
SEM). 
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first sight. Hence, participants should re-represent the source domain after seeing that the 
answer available could not be distinguished in their ability to fit the task's criterion for 
response. We also expected the same results as in the previous chapter in the A:B::C:? task to 
be found, i.e., more within- than between-domain saccades and a higher percentage of fixation 
on the C term of the problems, as would be predicted by the Path-Mapping Theory.  
 Indeed, we found the same results in the A:B::C:? task as those found in adults in the 
previous chapter, concerning the within- and between-domain saccades: AB and CT saccades 
were more important in participants' visual search of information than were AC and BT 
saccades. Once again, AB and CT saccades are most likely related to the inference of the 
relation between the pictures compared. However, the higher interest in C was not confirmed 
again. This might be due to difficult trials making participants have a more evenly distributed 
attention in terms of stimuli. Therefore, the previously observed higher attentional focus on C 
might be due to the simplicity of the trials used, which might have favored a type of strategy 
that resulted in longer fixations on C (i.e., a response construction as observed by Bethell-Fox 
et al., 1984). Indeed, the inference of what could be the solution (i.e., what is related to C in 
the same way as B is related to A) might have led to longer fixations on C, when a response-
elimination strategy might lead to a more distributed attention. 
 One of the difficulties encountered by participants in difficult trials is the presence of 
distractors, as their increased looking rates on Dis and frequency of CDis saccades seem to 
suggest. This is the kind of results observed with children in the same task (see chapter II). 
This suggests that adults, even though they knew the constraints on the solution of analogical 
problems, considered this solution as a possibility or that it was difficult to discard distractors 
in difficult trials. A possible interpretation of the difficulty of the trials is that it is due to a 
lesser imageability of the relations between the words, hence the representation of this 
relation being less constraining on the solution as the category activated for the solution was 
larger. Indeed the semantic system seems to be differentially activated at different levels of 
imageability (Sabsevitz, Medler, Seidenberg, & Binder, 2005). Thus, it might be that at equal 
executive functioning, less imageable concepts are harder to manipulate than more concrete 
ones, causing higher interference from distractors. However, as this study did not manipulate 
this factor directly, further studies should investigate the role of imageability in analogical 
reasoning. 
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 The time course of information gathering was also interesting, especially between the 
different types of trials. Participants seem to already evaluate the possible solutions in the first 
slice in difficult trials, and thus are less focused on the source pair of the analogy in this slice. 
Participants focus to the solution space during the first third of the trial in difficult trials is 
confirmed by their higher rate of fixation on T, Dis, and U in this slice, when compared to the 
first slice of easy trials. In the middle slice, participants made more saccades between A and 
B, which suggests that they made more returns on the source domain than in the easy trials, as 
was already observed by Bethell-Fox et al. (1984). This can be interpreted as participants 
trying to re-represent the relation between A and B after the test of their first hypothesis about 
this relation and the failure of finding a corresponding answer in the solution set. These 
results seem to indicate a difference between the search for the solution in the easy and 
difficult trials. In the difficult trials, participants do not simply reiterate the same strategy 
again and again, but adapt their strategy to their current knowledge of the problem. However, 
a response elimination is likely to have been used in difficult trials because there are some 
saccades in the solution set as soon as the first slice. Hypothesis testing and response 
elimination strategies are not consistent with Sternberg's (1977) description of encoding and 
inference as exhaustive processes. Indeed, when the difficulty to infer a relation increase, 
participants progressively refine their representation by looking at A and B again even after 
having looked at the alternatives. This suggests that these processes are not exhaustive, but 
have to be refined over time. Thus, the representation of C and the possible solutions play a 
role in the representation of the source pair, at least in difficult trials. 
 To conclude, the difficulty of these verbal trials seem to be a difficulty of representing 
the relation between A and B in a relevant manner for the task at hand, this resulting in a too 
lowly constrained representation of what would be the solution of the problems in the first 
attempt to solve them. This leads to the re-representation of the AB relation more narrowly 
with subsequent saccades between these pictures. However, the visual search is not a pure 
reiteration of the same strategy several times, but seems to adapt simultaneously to the 
representation participants make of the problem. 
 
III. Experiment 2: Effect of an oppositely related-to-C distractor 
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III.a. Objectives and Hypotheses 
 The objective of this experiment was to test the effect of a related-to-C distractor 
which had a relation with C opposite to the relation B had with A (i.e., A and the distractor, 
and B and C, played the same role in the relation, but not A and C, and B and the distractor, as 
would be expected with a correct answer). This kind of distractors should lead to errors 
similar to the relational errors of children tested in the scene analogy task, even in adults, 
because of the A:B::C:? task's goal being focused on the similarity of the relations compared 
rather than on the roles played in these relations by the different elements constituting the 
problems. Indeed, errors implicating cross mappings (i.e., opposite-relation distractors) should 
remain unnoticed, because the relation is still similar even though the roles of the different 
object do not correspond, leading to a strong bias toward this kind of response, this bias being 
difficultly inhibited. Thus, we hypothesized that this type of distractor should lead to more 
errors in adults than simply related-to-C distractors (called other-relation distractors later) 
which do not share similarity in their relation to C with the relation between A and B. At the 
level of eye movements, we expected longer fixations on the opposite-relation than the simple 
other-relation distractors with which adults cope relatively easily. There should also be more 
CDis saccades, this saccade being linked to the encoding and inference of the relation 
between C and the distractor. 
 Results from Bethell-Fox et al. (1984) suggest that this augmentation of error could be 
due to a bypass of an evaluation of the response and of its comparison with other potential 
answers (i.e., a lower number of alternatives watched when the first alternative which is 
looked at is the correct solution) triggered by a high semantic similarity between the relations. 
Participants' reaction times should hence be faster: the answer looking appropriate, 
participants would not have to search for other responses. However, if the increase of wrong 
answers is due to a lack of inhibition of a prepotent answer, we would expect longer reaction 
times. Also, if the hypothesis about a lack of evaluation process is correct, there should be less 
saccades associated to evaluation of responses (TDis, TU, and DisU saccades) than in the 
other condition, when the inhibitory account would predict a higher rate of these saccades 
because of more comparisons between the two types of saccades.  
 We also manipulated another type of cognitive cost in this task: the order of 
presentation of the terms (i.e., A:B::C:? or ?:C::B:A, the latter being more demanding in terms 
of cognitive resources than the former; Barnes & Whitely, 1981). We thus made the 
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hypothesis that the order of presentation of the words would make participants engage 
cognitive resources in the restructuration of the task. Cognitive resources being limited, they 
would have less resources to engage in the inhibition of distractors. Thus, we expected an 
interaction between the presentation of the task (left-to-right, or right-to-left) and the type of 
distractor, the opposite-relation distractors needing more resources than the simple other-
relation distractors to be inhibited. This should cause scores being lower in the right-to-left 
with the former than with the latter distractors. In the right-to-left condition, at the level of 
eye-tracking data, we should also observe longer fixations on the distractors, and more 
saccades between C and Dis with the opposite-relation distractor than with the simple other-
relation distractor. 
 Therefore, the experiment had a two within-subject factor design with Presentation 
(left-to-right, right-to-left) and Type of distractors (Related-to-C, Opposite-Relation) as 
factors. We recorded participants eye movements, responses and reaction times. 
 
III.b. Methods 
 
Participants 
 Participants were 27 adults (2 males, 25 females; M=19.3 years; SD=1.1; from 17 to 
21). They were students at the University of Burgundy, participated willingly and were naive 
to the task. They were allocated randomly to one of the four versions of the task described 
below. 
 
Materials 
 This verbal A:B::C:? task consisted in 22 trials: 2 training trials and 20 test trials. Half 
the trials (i.e. 1 training and 10 test trials) were presented with the direction of the A:B::C:? 
trials being from left to right (Left-to-Right condition), that is with A in the leftmost position, 
and the other half being presented with the A, B and C in the reverse order (i.e., with A in the 
rightmost position; Right-to-Left condition). Half the test trials in each of the above-
mentioned conditions were presented with other-relation distractors that were semantically 
related to C (Semantic condition). The other half were trials with a distractor that were related 
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to C with the opposite relation that the one used in the AB pair (Opposite condition). For 
example if A was “cave” and B “bear” (with the relation “lives in” linking them), and C was 
“dog”, then the Target was “flea” and the distractor “doghouse”, dogs being where fleas live 
and not where doghouses live. The distractors in the training trials were semantic distractors. 
Four versions of the task were designed following a Latin square: the trials being presented in 
the Left-to-Right with Related-to-C distractor condition in the first version were presented in 
the Left-to-Right with Inversely Related distractors condition in the second, in the Right-to-
Left with Related-to-C distractor in the third, and in the Right-to-Left with Inversely Related 
distractors in the fourth. The same was done for the remaining three conditions of each 
version. The order of the trials was random. 
 Each trial was composed of 8 words written with a black ink on a white background 
and framed in a black rectangle (220x220 pixels). These pictures corresponded to the A, B, C, 
T, Dis and 3 U terms of the problem. The A, B, and C terms were displayed in a row at the 
top of the screen along with a fourth empty black square represented the location of the 
potential solution. The remaining pictures were presented in a row at the bottom of the screen. 
 The task was presented on a Tobii T120 eye-tracker (resolution: 1024x768) with the 
help of an E-prime (version 2.8.0.22) experiment embedded in a Tobii Studio (version 2.1.12) 
procedure for eye movements recording. Statistical analyses were ran with a Statistica 8 
software. 
 
Procedure 
 The procedure for testing participants in the A:B::C:? task was identical to the one 
used in chapter II Experiment 3. 
  
III.c. Results 
 
Behavioral data 
 To test our hypothesis about the link between inhibition engagement and goals of the 
task and the ability of changing increased the cognitive load of the task to interact with this 
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engagement, we first ran a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA on Response Accuracies of 
participants with Type of distractor (Related-to-C, Inversely Related) and Presentation (Left-
to-Right, Right-to-Left) as within-subject factors (Figure 28, left panel). Only the main effect 
of Distractor was significant (F(1,26)=58.6; p<.001; η²p=.693), but not the effect of 
Presentation (F(1,26)=2.2; p=.148; η²p=.079), nor the interaction between the two factors 
(F(1,26)=1.1; p=.295; η²p=.042). Planned comparison between the response accuracies in the 
trials with opposite-relation distractors in the Right-to-Left and Left-to-Right condition 
showed no significant difference (F(1,26)=3.4; p<.075; η²p=.117), thus invalidating our 
prediction of a higher distractor effect of opposite-relation distractors than simple other-
relation distractors in the most costly of the two presentation conditions, and an influence of 
the global cognitive cost of the task on the inhibition of the distractor. Note that all errors 
were due to the selection of distractors, either opposite-relation or other-relation distractors 
depending on the condition. 
 
 
Figure 28: Mean Response Accuracy and Reaction Time in trials with Related-to-C and Inversely Related distractors 
in Left-to-Right and Right-to-Left presentation (error bars represent SEM). 
 
 The same analysis was run on participants' reaction times (Figure 28, right panel) to 
test the bypassing of the evaluation process, and the same significant main effect of Type of 
distractor (F(1,26)=20.4; p<.001; η²p=.439) was found, suggesting that some cognitive 
process was bypassed with opposite-relation distractors. 
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Eye movement data 
 A participant had to be discarded from further analyses because his/her data were not 
recorded at all. Apart from this subject, only 7 trials had more than 50% data missing, and 
were discarded from analyses. 
 To test our different predictions about higher rates of fixation on C than on other 
stimuli, and about percentages of fixation of Dis depending of the type of distractor and the 
type of presentation we also ran a three-way repeated-measure ANOVA with Type of 
Stimulus (A, B, C, T, Dis), Presentation (Left-to-Right, Right-to-Left) and Type of Distractor 
(Related-to-C, Inversely Related) as within-subject factors (Figure 29). It revealed a 
significant main effect of Type of Stimulus (F(4,100)=31.2; p<.001; η²p=.555), and a 
significant interaction between Type of Distractor and Type of Stimulus (F(4,100)=15.0; 
p<.001; η²p=.376), but not between the three factors (F(4,100)=0.3; p=.856; η²p=.013). 
Planned comparisons revealed that opposite-relation distractors were overall fixated more 
than other-relation distractors (F(1,25)=18.8; p<.001; η²p=.429), suggesting that less inhibition 
was engaged against these distractors than with simple other-relation distractors. There was 
no difference between the Right-to-Left and Left-to-Right Presentation conditions 
(F(1,25)=.6; p=.461; η²p=.022), which further invalidates our hypothesis about an influence of 
the cognitive cost of the task related to its presentation on the inhibition process. It also 
revealed that the mean percentage of fixation of C was greater than the mean fixation 
percentage of other stimuli (F(1,25)=8;5; p=.007; η²p=.254), even though it was not the 
greatest fixation percentage (i.e., B).  
 We also analyzed the percentages of saccades with a three-way repeated-measure 
ANOVA with Transition (AB, AC, BT, CT, CDis, TDis, TU, DisU), Type of Distractor 
(Related-to-C, Inversely Related), and Presentation (Left-to-Right, Right-to-Left) as within-
subject factors (Figure 30), to assess the presence of predicted results about percentages of 
CDis saccades in the different distractor conditions, and especially in the more costly Right-
to-Left presentation condition, as well as to test our hypothesis about evaluation between 
solution being bypassed with opposite-relation distractor. This analysis revealed a main effect 
of Transition (F(7,175)=459.7; p<.001; η²p=.947), a significant interaction between Type of 
Distractor and Transition (F(7,175)=71.7; p<.001; η²p=.741), and between the three factors 
(F(7,175)=4.13; p<.001; η²p=.142). Planned comparisons confirmed that the mean rate of AB 
and  CT  saccades  was greater  than the mean  rate of AC and  BT  saccades (F(1,25)=1377.5; 
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Figure 29: Mean Percentage of Fixation of each Type of Stimulus in trials with Related-to-C and Inversely Related 
distractors in Left-to-Right and Right-to-Left presentation (error bars represent SEM). 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Mean Percentage of each type of saccade in trials with Related-to-C and Inversely Related distractors in 
Left-to-Right and Right-to-Left presentation (error bars represent SEM). 
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p<.001; η²p=.982), replicating previous findings about the preponderance of within-domain 
saccades in participants strategies in the A:B::C:? task. However, there was neither a 
significantly greater percentage of CDis saccades when the opposite-relation distractor was 
present than when the other-relation distractor was present (F(1,25)=1.4; p=.256; η²p=.053) 
nor a significant difference between the percentages of CDis saccades between types of 
distractors in the right to left presentation of the problems (F(1,25)=1.0; p=.339; η²p=.037), 
which infirmed our hypothesis about inhibition engagement differences between these two 
conditions. There was also significantly less saccades between solution options (TDis, TU, 
and DisU saccades) in the problems with opposite-relation distractors than with other-relation 
distractors (F(1,25)=46.6; p<.001; η²p=.651), which suggests that the process responsible for 
the evaluation of the solution and its comparison to other potential solution is bypassed with 
the opposite-relation distractor.  
 
III.d. Discussion 
 The present experiment tested our hypotheses about opposite-relation distractors 
making participants engage less inhibition against them than simple other-relation distractors, 
because of their link to the main goal of the task, and the modulation of this engagement of 
inhibition by cognitive costs due to the restructuration of the problems presented. We also 
hypothesized that participants would tend to make less comparisons between the different 
solution options suggesting a bypass of the evaluation process, due to the apparent relevance 
of the relation between the opposite-relation distractor and C to the task (i.e., its semantic 
similarity with the relation between A and B). The higher distractor effect of opposite-relation 
distractors due to the semantic similarity of the relation they elicited with the relevant relation 
was confirmed by lower response accuracy and longer fixations on these stimuli in this 
condition than with usual other-relation distractors. Indeed, opposite-relation distractors were 
chosen in nearly 60% of the trials. However, the frequencies of CDis saccades did not differ 
with on type of distractor of the other. This might be explained by the fact that distractor were 
easy to inhibit in the case of other-relation distractors, and that the relation was evident and 
that participants did not try to inhibit the distractor in the case of opposite-relation distractors, 
both provoking a low rate of CDis saccades. Our hypothesis about the interaction of the costs 
of the presentation of the task with the inhibition of the distractor was invalidated. There was 
no differences between the left-to-right and right-to-left presentations of the task either in the 
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response accuracy of the participants, or in the fixation and saccades associated with the 
distractors. There was evidence that the evaluation process was bypassed: reaction times, and 
percentage of saccades associated with the comparison of the different answers were lower 
with the opposite-relation distractors than with the other-relation distractors. 
 Behavioral as well as eye movement observations suggest that the two types of 
distractors studied in this experiment differ in their impact on analogical reasoning: lower 
performance, lower reaction times, longer rates of fixation on Dis and a decrease in the 
number of solution comparisons were observed in the case of opposite-relation distractors 
when compared to the condition involving distractors related to C by any relation. This 
difference of effect might be due to high semantic similarity between the relations between, 
on one hand, A and B, and, on the other, C and the opposite-relation distractor. This semantic 
similarity is the constraint stressed by the task for achieving its main goal, i.e., finding 
something that has a similar relation to C as B has to A, however it does not take into account 
the constraint (emphasized here by the instructions given by the experimenter) to also control 
for the role equivalences of the elements in the relations. Thus, choosing the opposite-relation 
distractor is equivalent to a cross-mapping in terms of role confusion, even though it is not 
due to perceptual similarity (Gentner & Toupin, 1985). We argue that the strength of these 
distractors is due to their presence evoking a relation that is highly similar to the one searched 
for by participants, thus being very salient because of its link to the main goal of the task. We 
also argue that its efficiency to make people give the wrong answer is due to this similarity. 
Hence, participants overlook the process of evaluating the mapping resulting from the 
selection of this solution. Indeed, participants had lower reaction times and made lower rates 
of saccades inside the solution set to compare answers in this condition than in the other, 
simpler condition, which suggests such process bypassing. Thus, it seems likely that the 
opposite-relation distractors were not seen as errors due to the semantic similarity between 
their relation to C and the relation between A and B, thus preventing participants to engage 
inhibition against this type of answer.  
 Hence it seems that the A:B::C:? task, due to its focus on the relational similarity 
instead of emphasizing the similarity between roles of the different elements in the two 
domains compared, implicitly relaxes the constraint participants should put on the matching 
roles between elements of the two domains. This is coherent with previous experiments by 
Spellman & Holyoak (1996) showing that the goals the participants were given influenced 
their analogical reasoning, and with the theoretical accounts of Holyoak & Thagard (1989) 
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which models the effect of such pragmatic constraints on mapping, and of Salvucci & 
Anderson (2001) which integrate mapping into pragmatic constraint of problem solving tasks 
in the ACT-R architecture, thus making action rules be triggered as soon as the conditions to 
trigger them are met. In this latter model, the present results would be easily modeled using a 
similarity criterion between the relations triggering the model's answering. The LISA model 
uses inhibition as a basic feature of its processes. However, it does not define any a priori 
relation between inhibition and goals of the task, even though goals might influence inhibition 
engagement by affecting the frequency of activation of relations relevant for the goals in 
working memory, thus leading to differential patterns of inhibition between elements of the 
domains compared. 
 We also expected an interaction between the type of distractor and the direction of the 
presentation of the problems (i.e., from left to right or the reverse) because of the limitation of 
cognitive resources. Indeed, if a right-to-left presentation is more costly in terms of these 
resources (Barnes & Whitely, 1981), other cognitively demanding processes like engaging 
inhibition against irrelevant information should be less efficient. We did not find any result 
coherent with this view. The response accuracy of participants and the percentages of 
fixations of Dis and of saccades involving this distractor were the same in the right-to-left 
presentation condition when there was a higher cost of finding a distractor irrelevant (i.e., 
opposite-distractor relation) than when it was less costly (i.e., other-relation distractors).  
 
IV. General discussion 
 Whenever the main characteristics of the visual strategies used in A:B::C:? problems 
by adults remain stable (i.e., more within- than between domain saccades, focus on C), 
difference arose between the different conditions of these two studies. When the inference of 
the relation between A and B is more difficult, they seem to re-encode several times this 
relation, after trying to eliminate some solutions from the solution set. This could be linked to 
the imageability of the relational concept linking the two pairs in the problem: less imageable 
relations could lead to a difficulty to activate a proper role category for the solution of the 
problem, analogical reasoning tasks having been shown to automatically activate category 
representations of the elements in the domains compared (Green, Fugelsang, Kraemer, & 
Dunbar, 2008; Green, Fugelsang, & Dunbar, 2006), which would explain the use by 
participants of a response elimination strategy even without an overload of working memory, 
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as was observed by Bethell-Fox et al. (1984). Thus a difficulty to interpret the relation 
increased the number of controls of the results of the analogical reasoning processes, as can 
be seen in the increase in reaction time in the difficult condition in comparison to the easy one 
in Experiment I. However, some manipulations might bypass the evaluation process of the 
products of analogical reasoning, as the second experiment seems to suggest. This bypassing 
of the evaluation process seems to be triggered by the similarity conveyed between the 
relations by opposite-relation distractors and C on one hand, and between A and B on the 
other. Indeed the main goal of the task being to find the object that has the same relation to C 
as B has to A, the similarity of the relation activated by this lure might trigger answering 
before any evaluation process has been run, because of the obviousness of this similarity. This 
bypassing of evaluation processes is further suggested by faster reaction times in the condition 
with opposite-relation distractors in comparison to the condition with simple other-relation 
distractors. This type of error can be related to the same goal neglect of children performing 
the scene analogy task, even though this task specifically focus on this aspect (see chapter II).  
 Thus, the inherent goal of the A:B::C:? task (see chapter II) might accentuate certain 
constraints on the similarity of relations leading participants to longer processing of the 
problem (Experiment I) or, to the contrary, to overlook certain constraints on the solution, like 
the mapping between the different elements of the two domains constituting the problem. This 
shows, like the results presented in chapter II, how the goals emphasized by the task influence 
the way people apprehend its solution, which is coherent with theoretical accounts of 
analogical reasoning focusing on pragmatics (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Salvucci & 
Anderson, 2001). However models of mapping have difficulties integrating problems linked 
to the inference of relations, because of the preconstruction by experimenter of the relational 
structures and, in certain cases, their similarity ratings.  
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Chapter IV: A new method for classifying 
scanpath
1
 
 
I. Background 
Humans rely heavily on vision for virtually every task they do (e.g. categorization, 
spatial orientation, problem solving, etc.) and it remains a privileged way of acquiring 
information about the environment. In the case of problem solving, what information is 
sought and how this search is organized through time to come to a solution for the problem 
(i.e. visual strategies) may help researchers understand which solving strategies are used. 
Attention and gaze-fixation are highly correlated, especially for complex stimuli (Deubel & 
Schneider, 1996; He & Kowler, 1992) and the fixation time for a given object is correlated 
with its informativeness in a scene (Nodine, Carmody, & Kundel, 1978). This argues in favor 
of studying eye-movements as indicators of the application of a specific strategy through 
control of attention. 
Eye-tracking data, especially if they involve scanpaths — i.e., the complete visual 
trajectory of a participant’s eye movements during the task — are often complex and hard to 
analyze. For this reason scanpath information is often reduced to static information about the 
participant’s gaze times at specified locations. This simplification, while certainly easier to 
analyze, generally fails to fully capture the temporal aspects of the data involved in visual 
strategies. Even when an attempt is made to take into account temporal aspects of the data, it 
is often difficult to compare two scanpaths because, in general, they differ in length and 
complexity. Jarodzka et al. (2010) have developed a method that is able to compare any two 
scanpaths. As the Jarodzka et al. algorithm plays a key role in the analysis that follows, we 
will describe our variant of this algorithm in some detail below. We combined this scanpath-
comparison algorithm with multidimensional scaling and a neural-network classifier to 
demonstrate that children’s analogy-making strategies, as reflected in their visual search 
patterns across three different problems, are measurably different from those of adults. 
                                                     
1
 This chapter was published as Glady, Y., Thibaut, J. P., & French, R. M. Visual Strategies in Analogical Reasoning 
Development: A New Method for Classifying Scanpaths. Proceedings of the 35
th
 Annual Meeting of the Cognitive 
Science Society  (pp. 2398-2403). 
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We are not the first to use eye-tracking technology to study analogy making, but this 
type of analysis is, nonetheless, still in its infancy. Eye-tracking techniques were first used by 
Bethell-Fox, Lohman, & Snow (1984) to study strategies when reasoning by analogy. They 
found strategic differences in adults with high or low fluid intelligence when solving 
geometric A:B::C:? problems. More recently, Gordon & Moser (2007) investigated adults’ 
strategies in scene analogy problems. Thibaut, French, Missault, Gérard, & Glady (2011) also 
used an eye-tracker to examine infants’ gaze locations and item-to-item saccades during an 
analogy task. However, all of these studies focused on what information was searched for by 
participants as they attempted to solve the analogy problem.  
None of this research compared participants’ global scanpaths. In other words, 
previous eye-tracking studies have focused on local aspects of participants’ scanpaths as a 
means of revealing part of the dynamics of visual search in doing analogy problems. By 
contrast, in the present study we will use participants’ global scanpaths in our attempt to 
respond to the question of whether children have different visual search strategies than adults 
when solving visual analogy problems. Woods et al. (2013) showed that the organization of 
search in visual-attention tasks becomes less variable over the course of development. 
Because the tasks we used rely on visual attention, we expected children to have more 
variable scanpaths than adults. 
 
II. Methods 
 
II. a. Participants 
Subjects were 20 adults (14 females, 6 males; mean age=20;5 years; SD=2.21; range: 
17 to 27), students at the University of Burgundy and naïve to analogical reasoning tasks and 
26 6-year-olds (16 females, 10 males; mean age= 79.5 months; SD=3.6; range: 73 to 84). For 
children participating in this experiment, parents’ informed consent was required from their 
parents. 
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II. b. Materials 
Three tasks, each composed of three training trials and four experimental trials, 
constituted the experiment (see Figure 31). The first task was a scene analogy problem task, 
the second a standard A:B::C:? task and the third an A:B::C:? task with the items composing 
the problems put within a context. Each problem of each task was composed of 7 black and 
white line drawings. 
In the scene analogy problems, the top scene was composed of two elements depicting 
a binary semantic relation (e.g. a cat chasing a mouse). One of these two elements had an 
arrow pointing to it. The bottom scene was composed of five drawings: the two elements 
depicting the same relation as in the top picture (e.g. a boy chasing a girl), a distractor item, 
and two elements that were consistent with the scene but that had no salient relation with the 
elements of the relation. These pictures (501x376 pxs) were based on Richland et al., (2006) 
except for the distractor that was chosen not to be perceptually, only semantically, related to 
one member of the relation in the bottom picture. 
In the standard A:B::C:? trials, the A, B, C drawings were presented in the top row along with 
a black empty square symbolizing the location of the solution. The four remaining pictures 
(the Target, a Related-to-C Distractor, and two Unrelated Distractors) were presented in a row 
at the bottom of the screen. The size of each picture was 200x195 pxs. The A:B::C:? task 
within context was constituted of two scenes (501x376 pxs). The top picture was composed of 
two black and white line drawings with a relation between them (e.g. a wolf and meat, with 
the wolf looking at the meat) with a contextual cue (e.g. a horizontal line for the horizon or 
the lines of the joining walls and floor for a room). The bottom picture was composed of the 
five remaining drawings: the C term, the Target, the Related-to-C Distractor and the two 
Unrelated Distractors. This task differed from the first task in that it was the C term that was 
pointed at with an arrow, and not one of the elements constituting the source relation. It 
differed from the second task because of the different pictures constituting the problems being 
grouped in two scenes, but equivalent to the standard A:B::C:? task in other respects. 
The materials of the last two tasks were based on materials previously used by Thibaut 
et al. (2011). The four trials of each task were two trials with weak association strengths 
between A and B, C and T, and C and Dis, and two with strong association strengths in order 
to equilibrate this factor. 
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Figure 31: Presentation of the three tasks used for this experiment: a) scene analogy task, b) standard A:B::C:? task, 
c) scene-oriented A:B::C:? task 
 
The tasks were displayed on a Tobii T120 eye-tracker device with a 1024x768 screen 
resolution. 
 
II. c. Procedure 
Appropriate controls were carried out to ensure that the participants knew what the 
items in each of the problems were and that they understood the instructions. In the first task, 
they were asked to point to the element in the bottom scene that played the same role as the 
one which had an arrow pointing to it in the top scene. The two others tasks were 
administered as in Thibaut et al. (2011). Eye-tracking data was gathered from moment of the 
initial presentation of the problem to the moment a choice of one of the answers was made. 
The participant’s scanpath for a particular problem consisted of a record of his/her gaze-
fixation points taken every 8ms. 
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II. d. Data Analysis 
 
The goal of this analysis is to compare the sets of children’s and adults’ scanpaths and 
to show that there are quantifiable differences in the two. To do this we use a combination of 
(a variant of) Jarodzka et al.’s (2010) scanpath-comparison algorithm, multidimensional 
scaling and a neural-net classifier. As the latter two techniques are well known, we will not 
discuss them at length. However, the Jarodzka et al. algorithm is relatively recent and requires 
explanation.  
 
 
Figure 32: Simplification of a scanpath 
 
Jarodzka et al. (2010) scanpath-comparison algorithm 
The algorithm is designed to determine the similarity of any two scanpaths. It consists 
of two phases, a simplification phase and a comparison phase. A scanpath is considered to be 
made up of a series of “saccade vectors,” i.e., a connected series of vectors whose endpoints 
correspond to coordinates of successive gaze points (Figure 32a). First, the scanpath is 
simplified by combining into a single vector two consecutive saccade vectors if: 
i) their combined length does not exceed 200 pixels in amplitude (i.e., each is very 
small) and 
ii) they are nearly in straight line (i.e., the angle between them is between 2.62 and 
3.67rad).  
In other words if a saccade vector is very small or very linear with respect to its 
predecessor in the scanpath, the two vectors are combined (Figure 32b). 
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Once each of the two scanpaths has been simplified, they can be compared. We begin 
by giving an intuitive explanation of how this is done. Assume, for example, there are two 
simplified scanpaths, S1 and S2 made up of 3 and saccade vectors, respectively. In other 
words, S1 = {u1, u2, u3} and S2 = {v1, v2, v3, v4}. Note that these saccade vectors are ordered in 
time. For example, in S1, the saccade vector u1 is followed by u2, which is followed by u3. To 
compare S1 and S2, we need two scanpaths of the same length. To achieve this, we will 
"stretch" each scanpath by adding immediate repetitions of saccade vectors, so that they both 
have the same length. Our goal is to find the two stretched scanpaths, SS1 and SS2 that are as 
similar as possible with respect to the chosen metric (orientation, length, etc.). This similarity 
will be the measure of the distance between S1 and S2. 
 
Figure 33: Saccade-vector difference table (a): Each of the saccade vectors from each of the two scanpaths are 
compared based on the chosen metric. (b) The comparison of each pair of stretched scanpaths corresponds to a 
traverse of the table from the upper-left to the lower-right corner of the saccade-vector difference matrix (the only 
directions of movement permitted are down, right and diagonally down-and-right). We find the path that produces 
the lowest total difference value and this value is the similarity measure assigned to S1 and S2 
 
The easiest way to illustrate this stretching is by means of a saccade-vector difference 
table for the two scanpaths, S1 and S2, defined above. 
A saccade-vector difference matrix is first created (Figure 33a). Each of the saccade-
vectors making up one of the scanpaths S1 is compared to each of the saccade-vectors of the 
other scanpath S2, according to a metric, generally, vector magnitude or orientation (length in 
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our study). Once this table is constructed, we consider all paths through the table that begin 
with the comparison of the first saccade vectors in both scanpaths (i.e., cell (1, 1) of the table, 
(u1, v1)) and end with a comparison of the final saccade vectors in each scanpath (i.e., cell 
(3, 4) of the table, (u3, v4)) and always move to the right, down, or diagonally down-and-
right. Three examples of paths through the matrix are illustrated in Figure 33b. Each path 
through the table corresponds to the comparison of two specific stretched scanpaths. For 
example, the uppermost path shown corresponds to a comparison between SS1 = {u1, u1, u1, 
u2, u2, u3} and SS2 = {v1, v2, v3, v3, v4, v4}. This path corresponds to the sum of the values in 
the cells (1,1), (1,2), (1,3), (2,3), (2,4), (3,4) of the saccade-vector difference matrix. When all 
of these paths through the matrix are considered, the path which has the smallest value (i.e. 
the smallest cumulative sum of comparisons) is selected. This path corresponds to the two 
stretched scanpaths that are the most similar. This value, normalized by the number of 
comparisons done, is the similarity measure assigned to the comparison of scanpaths S1 and 
S2.  
Note that the algorithm as described here differs from Jarodzka et al. (2010) in that it 
does not rely on the more complex Dijkstra (1959) tree-search algorithm. Instead, we 
constructed a matrix, cell by cell, with the lowest cumulative sum of comparisons possible for 
each cell while taking into account the constraints put on the comparisons of the two 
scanpaths (navigate rightward, downward, or diagonally downward and to the right). In our 
example, the final distance value between S1 and S2 is the cumulative sum in C(3,4) 
normalized by the number of steps taken through the matrix. This algorithm was 
computationally less complex for identical results. 
 
The Jarodzka et al. (2010)/MDS/MLP algorithm applied to scanpaths of analogy problems 
We only compared the scanpaths from strictly identical problems, but not different 
trials from the same task. Thus, when we were comparing an adult scanpath and a child's 
scanpath, the disposition of the items in the problem they were solving was identical. 
In this way, for a given set of isomorphic problems (i.e., where all of the items were in 
identical places on the screen), we computed the differences between all pairs of scanpaths. In 
other words, if there were S1 to Sn scanpaths from children and A1 to Am scanpaths from 
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adults on the same set of isomorphic problems, we computed the similarity of all pairwise 
comparisons of scanpaths Si versus Sj, Si versus Aj, and Ai versus Aj for all i and j. 
Once we had calculated the mean differences between scanpaths generated by each 
participant in each task, we used Multidimensional Scaling to obtain the coordinates on a 2D 
map that best preserved the distance between scanpaths. As can be seen in Figure 34, for each 
of the three tasks, the scanpaths clustered according to participant type (Adult or Children). 
We verified this clustering using a 3-layered perceptron (MLP) with a bias node on the input 
and hidden layers (5 hidden units, learning rate = 0.05, momentum = 0.9) with the coordinates 
of each scanpath on the MDS map translated into bipolar values and concatenated on input. 
We used a Leave-One-Out cross-validation technique to test the robustness of the 
classification. Leave-One-Out cross-validation is a standard technique in machine learning 
whereby the classifier (in this case a neural network) is trained on all items but one. Once 
training is complete, the classifier is tested on the item that had been left out to see whether or 
not it is classified correctly.  
 
III. Results 
Using the method of analysis described above, we did a pairwise comparison of all 
scanpaths generated by adults and children on isomorphic analogy problems. We then 
conducted a multi-dimensional scaling analysis of this data, which produced the location-map 
clusters shown in Figure 34. These points are a 2D representation that best reflects the 
distances between the scanpaths. The crosses correspond to children's scanpaths; the circles 
correspond to adults' scanpaths. 
The Jarodzka et al. (2010) method along with Multidimensional Scaling led to a 2D 
location map that best represented the relative distances between the set of scanpaths, as 
calculated by the Jarodzka et al. algorithm (Figure 34). A three-layered feedforward 
backpropagation network (MLP) with a Leave-One-Out cross-validation method, was used to 
test the robustness of a classification of the points representing the two groups (i.e. children 
and adults). For the scene analogy and A:B::C:? tasks (Figure 31a and b), the network 
classified 74% of the participants correctly based on their scanpath (70% of the 20 adults and 
78% of the 23 children for both tasks). For the real-world A:B::C:? task, the network 
classified 72% of the subjects correctly (65% of the adults and 78% of the children). This was  
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Figure 34: Location-map of an MDS analysis of the relative differences among participants for the scene analogy task 
(a), the standard A:B::C:? task (b), and the scene-oriented A:B::C:? task (c). 
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significantly above chance (50%) for each task (binomial test: Z=14.89; p<.001 for the first 
and second; Z=14.30; p<.001 for the third). Intuitively, this result can be seen in Figure 34. 
The adult group tends to be more homogenous than the children as the crosses (children’s 
scanpaths) are more scattered than the circles (adults’ scanpaths), and this is reflected in the 
high degree of accurate classification of the MLP. 
 
IV. General discussion 
The present study addressed the following question in a novel manner: Do children 
and adults have different visual strategies in analogical reasoning tasks? To answer this, we 
used an eye-tracking methodology whose data were analyzed by a combination of the 
Jarodzka et al. (2010) scanpath-comparison algorithm, the transformation of this data into a 
2D location map using multidimensional scaling, and, finally, a quantitative adult/child 
classification by means of a feedforward backpropagation network. The neural-net 
classification was done by training the network on the scanpath data for all but one 
participant. Once the network was trained, it was tested on the one scanpath that was left out 
of the training set. This was done for each participant’s scanpath data and the result was 
scored according to whether the network classified the test scanpath correctly or not. The 
results obtained with this method agree with previous results from Thibaut et al. 2011 who 
also showed, by analyzing item gaze times and the number of saccades between items that 
adults and children differed in their search strategies in the standard A:B::C:? analogy task. 
The present work, using an approach based on individuals’ entire scanpaths, also extends this 
previous work to scene analogy problems and scene-oriented A:B::C:? problems. This 
scanpath analysis showed, among other things, that children’s scanpaths were more variable 
than those of adults in the three tasks. These differences support the hypothesis of the key role 
of executive functions in analogy making because the lower variability of adults’ scanpaths is 
indicative of them applying, through control of attention, a previously adopted plan for 
solving analogy problems (Woods et al., 2013) 
The scanpath analysis presented in this paper provides a means of studying various 
search strategies in analogy making. The technique presented in this paper overcomes thorny 
problem of comparison of scanpaths of different lengths and allows to take into account the 
dynamic features of search, which are largely missed in other, more static eye-tracking 
approaches based on item fixation times. It could also be used, for example, to confirm 
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differences in analogy-making strategies observed in adults in Bethell-Fox et al. (1984) and to 
classify participants based on their scanpath data (i.e., “elimination strategies” for participants 
with low fluid intelligence and “constructive matching strategies” for participants with high 
fluid intelligence). This method is, of course, not limited to studies of analogy-making, and 
could be used with any other type of problems whose crucial information for its solution 
could be presented on a screen. 
To conclude, the method of scanpath analysis presented in this paper provides a new 
tool to analyze the dynamic aspects of search strategies in a wide variety of experimental 
contexts. As shown by the results, this method is sensitive to global differences between 
scanpaths and is useful to discriminate clusters of strategies. In this paper it has been used to 
show that children’s and adults’ differ in their variability while solving analogical reasoning 
problems, suggesting the involvement of executive functions in such tasks. However, to fully 
understand the causes of these differences, it is inevitable to use local information. Thus, it 
should be used in combination of other existing methods, in particular, Area-of-Interest 
methods that provide information on what information is sought and how long it is watched 
(informativeness of stimuli), since this information is not captured by the Jarodzka et al. 
method. On the other hand, Area-of-Interest methods give limited information about the 
dynamic progression of search, something which is captured when full scanpath information 
is used. In short, the Jarodzka et al. (2010), combined with an MDS analysis and a classifier 
(backpropagation networks, Support Vector Machines, etc.), provides a potentially far-
reaching tool for analyzing participants’ dynamic strategies in various problem-solving 
contexts. 
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Chapter V: Cognitive flexibility 
involvement in children’s analogical 
reasoning
2
 
 
I. Background 
In the present experiments, we show that a preliminary interpretation of an AB relation 
influences the way a subsequent A:B::C:? problem will be solved. We discuss these results in 
terms of inhibition and flexibility, two executive function components potentially involved in 
analogical reasoning which thus might be implicated in the solution of A:B::C:? problems 
(see Richland et al., 2006; Thibaut et al., 2010a, 2010b). 
Consider a simple A:B::C:? analogy: bird:nest::dog:?. To find the solution among a set 
of possibilities, one has to encode the terms of the analogy, to analyze both sides of the 
problem (i.e., A and B on one side; C and the solution set on the other), thereby constituting a 
set of potential relations unifying the two pairs compared. This will give an interpretation of 
the AB pair that is a semantic relation connecting bird with nest. One might also align bird 
with dog (Markman & Gentner, 1993), while keeping in mind that the relation between bird 
and nest should also hold between dog and the solution item. While searching for an 
interpretation of the pairs, especially when no relation comes immediately to mind, or when 
no common unifying relation immediately pops out, working memory is needed to keep the 
representations of the pairs active in order to compare them. In many cases it is also necessary 
to inhibit salient relations that make no sense in the context of the analogy at hand and/or to 
be flexible when new relations must be found (Morrison et al., 2004; Richland et al., 2006; 
Thibaut, French, Vezneva, et al., 2011; Thibaut et al., 2010b; Waltz et al., 2000). For 
example, if a relevant relation is found for AB (e.g. “the bird sleeps/lives in the nest”, with the 
solution being “doghouse”), one can look for an item that will satisfy the same “sleeps/lives 
in” relation, such as doghouse, based on the mapping of bird to dog and the equivalence of 
relations in the source and the target, to complete the second pair. 
                                                     
2
 Parts of this chapter were published as Glady, Y., Thibaut, J. P., French, R. M., & Blaye, A. Explaining children’s 
failure in analogy making tasks: A problem of focus of attention?. Proceedings of the 34
th
 Annual Meeting of the 
Cognitive Science Meeting. and submitted as a journal article. 
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The comparison between the two domains can also involve re-representation (Gentner, 
1983). Representations of the source and target domains and their mapping can change over 
time to increase the consistency of the overall correspondence of the two domains. To 
illustrate how cognitive flexibility (i.e. the ability to shift from one representation of a 
stimulus to another) might be involved in analogical problem solving, suppose in the previous 
example that the initial representation of the source had been “the bird builds its nest.” 
However, since dogs do not build anything, this first representation of the source domain 
bird:nest must be re-represented (i.e. shifted) as “the bird sleeps in the nest”, since when bird 
is mapped to dog, nothing can be found to fit the build relation. This flexible representation of 
the domains constituting an analogy is part and parcel of analogical reasoning (Gentner & 
Kurtz, 2006b; Kokinov, Bliznashki, Kosev, & Hristova, 2007). However, the re-
representation process, we believe, has cognitive costs in the sense that it is sometimes 
strategic (one has to understand the need to revise an initial representation and then find 
another interpretation of the pairs). Executive functions (inhibition and flexibility) are, 
therefore, required in analogical reasoning. The experiments presented in this chapter 
investigate the consequences of re-representation.  
If inhibition and cognitive flexibility are involved in analogical reasoning, as argued 
above, a procedure focusing children’s attention on and anchoring their representation of the 
AB pair might negatively affect their performance. This could occur, for example, when 
children first focus on a relation that will make no sense in the analogy. They might get 
“stuck” on this first representation and, because of their lack of cognitive flexibility, they 
might fail to re-represent the AB pair and find the relation allowing a consistent analogical 
mapping. Thus, using stimuli with an additional, irrelevant interpretation for AB should lead 
to poorer performance compared to a case in which there is no such a priori incorrect 
interpretation of AB or in which the correct relation is given at the onset of the task. 
Experiments 1 and 3 presented in this chapter were designed to test the role of cognitive 
flexibility while reasoning by analogy, and Experiment 2 to create a procedure that alleviated 
extraneous cognitive costs of the A:B::C:? task and to help them focus on their AB 
interpretation.  
 
II. Experiment 1: Re-representation in analogical problems 
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II. a. Objectives and hypotheses 
This first study was designed to assess children’s ability to use prior information 
efficiently to solve a subsequent A:B::C:? problem, that is to use prior representation of part 
of the problem if it is relevant or to shift it if necessary (cognitive flexibility being one core 
executive function). To test their ability to re-represent the problem space, they were given an 
irrelevant relation for the solution of the A:B::C:? task before being shown the problems (Re-
representation condition). In another condition (Facilitation condition), they were given the 
relevant relation prior to the problem to assess the possible benefits of having information a 
priori. To do so, we used two supplementary pairs of pictures. We compared these conditions 
to a third one in which empty frames were shown before the analogical problems (Analogy 
condition), that is without induction of any relation prior to the problems. The number of 
distractors (one) was kept constant throughout all these conditions and the AB pairs were 
chosen to have two different relations possible between A and B to allow it to be interpreted 
with the relevant or the irrelevant relation given before the A:B::C:? problems.  
The experiment thus followed an Age (5-to-6-year-olds, 7-to-8-year-olds) x Condition 
(Analogy, Facilitation, Re-representation) design with the Condition being a within-subject 
factor. We measured response accuracy and reaction times. 
We hypothesized that Re-representation trials would need more cognitive flexibility 
than Analogy trials, and that Facilitation trials would require less cognitive demands to 
children than the others types of trials, because crucial information was given before the 
problem being displayed. Thus, our predictions were that younger children would have lower 
performances than older children, that the Re-representation in which children would be given 
an irrelevant relation to solve the problem would lead to lower performance than the Analogy 
condition in which no relation was given, and that the Analogy would lead itself to lower 
performance than the Facilitation condition in which the correct relation was given. We 
expected that the Reaction times would follow the same trend, with faster response in 
Facilitation trials, and slower response in Re-representation trials when compared to the 
Analogy condition, and overall slower answer for the 5-to-6-year-olds than for the 7-to-8-
year-olds. As development of cognitive flexibility has been shown in preschoolers and older 
children in the literature (Chevalier & Blaye, 2006), we also expected a significant interaction 
between Age and Condition within those two dependant variables, with a lower effect of the 
Re-representation trials in 7-to-8-year-olds children than in 5-to-6-year-olds. 
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II. b. Methods 
 
Participants 
 Twenty 5-to-6-year-olds (12 males, 8 females; M=70.5 months; SD=3.2; from 66 to 
75 months) and 20 7-to-8-year-olds (10 males, 10 females; M=93.3 months; SD=5.3; from 79 
to 101 months) participated to this study. Participants were allocated to any of the three 
versions of the task in equivalent group sizes and randomly. All of them were naïve to the 
task. Children’s participation was submitted to parents’ informed consent and children 
participated voluntarily.  
 
Materials 
 The task consisted in 12 A:B::C:? trials: 3 training trials at the beginning and 9 test 
trials following them. Each participant was tested in the 3 different conditions (i.e., Analogy, 
Facilitation, and Re-representation conditions). There was 1 training trial, and 3 test trials for 
each condition. The 3 training trials on one side, and the 9 test trials on the other, were 
presented randomly, with training trials at the beginning of the task. 
Three versions of the tasks were designed (A, B and C), following a Latin square: the 
trials in the Analogy condition in version A became Re-representation trials in version B and 
Facilitation trials in version C. The same was done with the others conditions resulting in 
every trial being presented in the three conditions across versions. This allowed us to control 
eventual item effects. 
The AB pairs were chosen to have two potential and distinct relations linking them. 
For example, the pair “snowy landscape:sun” contains the “melted by” and “lit by” relations. 
The relation between A and B being equivocal, the participants had to search information 
from C and the solution set in order to interpret correctly the AB pair and chose the correct 
answer. 
 Every trial of the Analogy condition was built out of 7 black and white photographs 
(220x220 pixels; embedded in a black frame) corresponding to the A, B, C, T, one Dis and 
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two U terms of the analogical problems. A, B and C, and a black empty frame were displayed 
at the top of the screen in a row. The solution set (T, Dis and 2 U) was displayed in a row at 
the bottom of the screen.  
 Facilitation and Re-representation trials were preceded by two pairs of black and white 
photographs screen (220x220 pixels; each appearing in a black frame) in a row at the top of 
the screen, A1:B1 and A2:B2, which were linked to the A:B::C:? problem of either of this 
manner: in the Facilitation condition, the pairs preceding the analogical problem were linked 
by the same relation as the relevant relation for solving the problem and completing the C:? 
pair, or, in the Re-representation condition, the pairs preceding the A:B::C:? problems were 
linked by the relation that also linked the AB pair but that was not relevant for the solution of 
the problem and the completion of the C:? pair. Following the same example than above, the 
“snowy landscape:sun::desk:?” problem was preceded by “street:street lamp” and 
“tent:flashlight” in the Facilitation condition (the relation being “lit by”), and by 
“sugar:coffee” and “butter:pan” (the relation being “melted by”) in the Re-representation 
condition. In the Analogy condition, the problems were preceded by empty black frames. The 
pairs preceding the problems were displayed two by two in order to make participants 
compare them and transfer the relation inferred in one pair to the other (see Figure 35 for a 
schema of the problems in the three conditions). The presentation of A1:B1 and A2:B2, and 
of A2:B2 and AB was followed by the A:B::C:? problems, presented exactly in the same way 
as in the Analogy condition. 
The task was displayed using the E-Prime software (version 2.8.0.22) on a 17” élo 
1715L touch screen (resolution: 1024x768) in order to record participants’ answers and 
reaction times. Data were analyzed with Statistica 8. 
Procedure 
The experiment took place in a quiet room in children’s schools and participants were 
tested one at a time.  
Participants’ recognition of the pictures used for constructing the problems was first assessed 
to insure that failure was not due to an inability to recognize some pictures. Each picture was 
presented alone and participants were asked to name it. In case they were not able to give a 
proper label, the experimenter noted the failure to give a name to the object and children were 
asked  if  they  knew  how  it  was  used  or  where  they  could  find  it.  If  they could not, the  
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Figure 35: Presentation of the problems in the three conditions. a) Facilitation condition. b) Re-representation 
condition. c) Analogy condition (D=Distractors; N=Unrelated). 
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experimenter noted it and gave them the name of the object on the picture and a short 
description of what it was/how it was used. 
After this first phase, the analogical reasoning task was presented on the touch screen. 
During the training phase, subjects faced the 3 different conditions through the three training 
trials. During the Facilitation and Re-representation trials, participants had five seconds to 
give the relation between the A1:B1 and A2:B2 pairs. In the case of an incorrect answer or of 
an absence of answer within 5 seconds, the relation linking A1:B1 and A2:B2 were given by 
the experimenter using the same formulation for both pairs in order to emphasize that they 
were identical. If the participant gave the correct relations linking the pairs, the experimenter 
confirmed these relations by using the same label for the two relations on the screen. After 
this, the experimenter made the A2:B2 and AB (the pair constituting the first part of the 
problem) pairs appear on the screen and the same procedure was applied as with the A1:B1 
and A2:B2 pairs. The A:B::C:? task was explained as described in Chapter II. Participants had 
to press on the answer they wanted to give and were instructed to do so as soon as they had 
found the correct answer. Then they were asked to justify why they had chosen this answer. 
In a third phase, participants knowledge of the relations between all the AB and CT 
pairs used in the task was assessed by presenting them individually to exclude the trials that 
were failed because participants did not know these relations, thus keeping only the trials 
failed because children could not reason by analogy. If children gave the relation between AB 
which was irrelevant for the solution of the problem, they were asked if another relation 
linking the two pictures existed. 
 
II. c. Results 
More than 98% of the individual pictures were recognized during the first phase of the 
procedure. Fourteen out of 360 trials (3.8%) were removed because of the lack of knowledge 
of the relation linking at least one of the two pairs constituting the A:B::C:? problems. 
Thirteen were trials from the 5-to-6-year-olds group, 1 from the 7-to-8-year-old group. 
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Performance scores were analyzed using a two-way mixed-ANOVA with Age (5-to-6-
year-olds, 7-to-8-year-olds) as a between subject factor, and Condition (Analogy, Facilitation, 
Re-representation) as a within subject factor (see Figure 36). The only significant effect was a 
main effect of Age (F(1,37)=42.8; p<.001; η²p=.54). There was no main effect of Condition 
(albeit there was a trend toward significance; F(2,74)=2.8; p=.07; η²p=.07) or interaction 
between Condition and Age (F(2,74)=.6; p=.55; η²p=.02).  
 
Figure 36: Performance scores according to the age of the participants and the condition (F: Facilitation condition, A: 
Analogy condition, R: Re-representation condition; error bars represent SEM). 
 
Reaction times were also analyzed using an ANOVA design equivalent to the one 
used with Performance Scores (see Figure 37). It revealed no significant main effect, either of 
Age (F(1,37)=.5; p=.50; η²p=.01), or of Condition (F(2,74)=2.3; p=.11; η²p=.06), but there was 
a trend toward a significant interaction between the two factors (F(2,74)=2.4, p=.09, η²p=.06). 
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Figure 37: Reaction times of 5-to-6-year-olds and 7-to-8-year-olds in the three conditions (F: Facilitation condition, A: 
Analogy condition, R: Re-representation condition; error bars represent SEM). 
 
 However, when analyzed separately, Condition appeared to modify 7-to-8-year-olds’ 
reaction times. A Tukey HSD post-hoc analysis run on 7-to-8-year-olds data alone showed a 
significantly faster response in the Facilitation condition (p=.005) than in the Analogy 
condition, and a significantly slower response in the Re-representation condition than in the 
Facilitation condition (p=.024), but no difference between Re-representation and Analogy 
trials (p=.824), as can be seen on Figure 37. 
 
II. d. Discussion 
The only hypothesis that was confirmed by our results was that older children would 
outperform younger ones. However, the trend toward significance of the interaction between 
Age and Condition and the fact that 7-to-8-year-olds reaction times were significantly 
affected by the condition when tested post hoc suggests that older children where indeed 
affected in their search for a solution by the induction of a relevant relation (faster answers) 
before the problem was presented. This result might not have appeared in scores because 
older children had near-ceiling performance, revealing the task was indeed too simple for 
them whatever the condition was. Results obtained in 5-to-6-year-olds showed absolutely no 
effect of the condition on the scores or the reaction times.  
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This discrepancy between younger and older children might be explained by two, 
related hypotheses. First, the intrinsic complexity of the task in terms of sub-goals might have 
prevented 5-to-6-year-olds to understand fully that they had to, and in what terms they should, 
relate the first (induction of a relevant or irrelevant relation) and the second phase (solving the 
A:B::C:? problem) of the task because of low executive functions resulting in difficulties in 
planning the task and making relations between subgoals (Diamond, 2013). Thibaut, French, 
Missault, Gérard, & Glady (2011) observed similar difficulties of preschoolers with a simpler 
task: they had difficulties even integrating one pair to their search of what went with C in the 
standard A:B::C:? problems. Second, the relation might not have been salient enough to cause 
any problem to young children. Thus, once the first phase ended, the induced relation was 
forgotten and never reactivated because of its low saliency. Another related problem was the 
small number of training trials in general, and particularly in the facilitation phase, that might 
have prevented children from seeing the potential benefits of using the relation induced for 
the solution of the next phase of the task. The next experiment presents a procedure designed 
to alleviate the cognitive load of the A:B::C:? task in terms of goal maintenance. This 
procedure was used in the third experiment of this chapter which addressed the question of the 
involvement of cognitive flexibility in children's analogical reasoning, and with a salient 
competing relation. 
 
III. Experiment 2: Effect of seeing AB before the remaining 
pictures of the problem 
 
III.a. Objectives and hypotheses 
Starting from the empirical observation that children do not spend as much time as 
adolescents and adults on the AB pair (Thibaut, French, Missault, et al., 2011), this 
experiment assessed a new procedure’s ability to help children overcome their tendency not to 
search for crucial AB information. This procedure was designed to help children integrate the 
relation between A and B in their search for the analogical solution by countering their 
tendency to engage in the main goal of the task (i.e. finding something that is related to C), 
thereby overlooking this crucial subgoal. 
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We compared two groups of 5-to-6-year-olds in a between-participants design with 
Procedure (Standard, AB-first) as a between-subject factor. In the Standard procedure, all the 
stimuli appeared on the screen simultaneously. By contrast, in the AB-first procedure the A 
and B pictures appeared before C and the four possible solutions. In addition, in the latter 
procedure, the relation between the A and B pictures had to be verbalized before the 
remaining pictures appeared on the screen. We only measured children’s scores in these two 
conditions. 
We hypothesized that this procedure would help them to integrate A and B with the 
other stimuli involved in the task (C and the solution set), thus predicting that this procedure 
would elicit better performance than the Standard one.  
 
III.b. Methods 
 
Participants 
Participants were 52 5-to-6-year-old children (mean age=67.6 months; SD=4.8; range: 
58 to 77 months). Parental informed consent was required for the children to participate to the 
experiment and children were willing to participate to the experiment. All of them were naïve 
to the A:B::C:? task. 
 Participants were allocated randomly to two groups that were tested with the different 
procedures: 26 children were tested in the Standard Procedure (13 males, 13 females; mean 
age=67.9 months; SD=4.6; range: 58 to 75 months) and 26 children were tested in an AB-first 
Procedure (16 males, 10 females; mean age=67.2 months; SD=5.0; range: 59 to 77 months).  
 
Materials 
Materials for the two groups were identical and consisted of a set of 14 trials of an 
A:B::C:? task: 2 training trials, followed by 12 experimental trials presented randomly. Seven 
black-and-white drawings (240x240 pixels) constituted each trial, namely the A, B and C 
items, the T, one Dis, and two U, presented in a black frame. Training and test trials were 
presented in the same manner. 
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In the standard condition, the A, B and C pictures were presented in a row at the top of 
the presentation screen along with an empty black square where the answer would go. The 
four potentials answers were presented in a row at the bottom of the presentation screen.  
In the AB-first condition, the AB pair was displayed alone on the screen (where they 
usually appeared in the A:B::C:? problems) until the participant verbalized a relation linking 
A and B. After participants’ verbalization, all the stimuli were displayed as in the Standard 
condition.  
The association strength between the pairs constituting the analogies was controlled. Six 
of the experimental trials consisted of weakly associated AB, CT and CDis pairs of pictures, 
the remaining six trials were made up of strongly associated pairs. Thus, the Related-to-C 
Distractor and the Target were selected to be equally associated with the C term. The strength 
of association was assessed by 13 students of the University of Burgundy who were asked to 
rate on a 1-to-7 scale, 1 being the lowest and 7 the highest, how much seeing one picture of 
the pair made them think of the other member of this pair. Experimenters gave explicit 
indications to students not to rate whether any relation between the two pictures existed, but if 
the two pictures were associated in their mind. The weakly associated items had a mean 
association strength of 2.84 for the AB pairs (SD =1.51, range: 2.33 to 3.62), of 3.03 for the 
CT pairs (SD = 1.75, range: 1.87 to 4.46) and of 3.31 for the CDis pair (SD=1.52, range: 2.27 
to 4.42). For the strongly associated items, the mean association strength for the AB pairs was 
6.23 (SD=1.01, range: 5.08 to 6.66), 6.07 for the CT pairs (SD=1.09, range: 4.38 to 6.38) and 
5.20 for the CDis (SD=1.53, range: 3.08 to 6.43). Association strength was significantly 
higher in the strongly associated than in the weakly associated pairs (bilateral Student t-test: 
t(24)=6.73, t(24)=5.32, t(24)=3.16; p<.001 for AB and CT, p<.01 for CDis). 
These trials were presented on a 17’’ élo 1715L touch screen (resolution: 1024x768) 
using the E-prime software (version 2.8.0.22). Data were analyzed using Statistica 8. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment took place in a quiet room at the children’s school and participants were 
tested one at a time. 
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Participants’ knowledge of the images used in the different trials was tested in order to 
ensure that incorrect answers were not due to an inability to recognize a particular item. Each 
stimulus was introduced alone and participants were asked to name it. If they could not name 
an item, they were asked if they knew how one could use it or where one could find that kind 
of item. If the child did not seem to recognize the item, its name and a short description was 
given by the experimenter. 
After this recognition assessment, the experimenter tested the two groups with two 
different procedures for the analogical reasoning task. The Standard Procedure group was 
presented with the seven images at once (i.e. A, B, C, and the four possible solution items). 
The experimenter gave the participants the same instructions as presented in chapter II for the 
Standard A:B::C:? task. 
In the AB-first Procedure (see Figure 38), children were given the same instructions as 
in the Standard Condition but were first presented with the AB pair alone and asked to 
verbalize the relation between A and B. Once they had given their interpretation of the AB 
relation, the experimenter revealed the five remaining pictures, so the children could see all 
seven images on the screen. From this point on, the procedure was identical to the Standard 
Procedure. 
 
 
Figure 38: Design of the AB-first Procedure. The “A”, “B”, “C”, “T”, “Dis” and “N” (i.e., Unrelated) were not 
displayed during the task. 
 
Finally, the experimenter assessed participants’ knowledge of the relations holding 
between A and B, and C and T. All trials that were failed due to an absence of a participant’s 
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knowledge of the relations used to construct the analogy were excluded. We did not include 
trials that had been failed because children could not recognize the relation between A and B 
or between C and Dis. 
 
III.c. Results 
Overall, less than 2% of the stimuli were not recognized during the assessment of 
children’s knowledge of the items used to construct the analogies. Twenty-seven trials out of 
624 (4.3%) were excluded from subsequent analysis because the relation between A and B or 
C and T were unknown to the participants. 
 An independent samples two-tailed t-test was used to compare the performance scores 
on the AB-first and the Standard procedures. It revealed a significant difference between the 
two procedures (t(49)=2.81; p=0.007; η²p=0.14) with higher scores for the AB-first Procedure 
than for the Standard Procedure (see Figure 39), thus confirming the hypothesis that the AB-
first procedure helped children overcome their tendency to not take into account the AB pair 
in their search for the solution. 
The effect of the new procedure seems due to attentional emphasis put by the AB-first 
Procedure on the AB pair and its semantic interpretation, not to the correctness of the first 
interpretation in itself. Children’s interpretation of the AB pair was not always correct (32 
trials out of 312). Nonetheless, when they initially chose an irrelevant relation between A and 
B, they still found the correct answer 88% of the time (28 out of 32). In addition, they did not 
give the correct answer systematically when they interpreted the AB pair correctly. They 
answered incorrectly on 30% of these trials (93 out of 312). Thus, even when the 
representation of the AB pair was correct and the relation between C and T was known, 
children’s reasoning could be disrupted. In consequence, these necessary prerequisites to 
efficiently solving the problems do not seem to be sufficient for success. 
 Overall, when children did not choose the analogical answer, they selected the 
Related-to-C distractor 87% of the time. Changing the procedure for the test did not affect 
their tendency to select the Related-to-C distractor, as there was no significant difference 
between the two groups in their tendency to choose it among the different distractors when the 
correct analogical solution was not chosen (independent-samples bilateral t-test: t(49)=0.44; 
p=0.40, η²p=.004). 
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Figure 39: Performance scores obtained by children using the Standard and the AB-first procedures (error bars 
indicate SEM). 
 
III.d. Discussion 
This experiment was designed to assess the effectiveness of a new procedure to 
facilitate children’s integration of the AB information when solving the A:B::C:? problems. 
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that when children had to search for the 
relational information between A and B before seeing the entire problem, they performed 
better than children tested with the standard procedure (i.e. showing them the whole problem 
without asking them to verbalize the relation between the AB pair). 
 These results are consistent with results of Thibaut, French, Missault, et al. (2011) 
which showed that children focused on the C term and the possible solutions. Both sets of 
results can be interpreted in an executive-function framework, and, specifically, within an 
inhibition framework. One explanation for children’s difficulties with the task would be that 
they have difficulties (temporarily) inhibiting the explicit goal of the task, and thus neglect the 
subgoal of finding the relation between A and B. In other words, they cannot temporarily 
detach themselves from the main goal (i.e., finding something that goes with C), and, 
therefore, they have difficulty focusing on the AB subgoal that is necessary to find the correct 
solution to the problem. Thus, they directly search for what is related to C, which leads to 
semantically-related errors. In this experiment, results show that, when provided with help to 
apply a more efficient strategy (i.e., explicitly focusing on the AB pair), children perform 
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better in their search for the solution than in the standard procedure. Their difficulty in 
maintaining explicit goals has been reported elsewhere and was reduced when they were 
asked to verbalize the information related to a subgoal of the task (Blaye & Chevalier, 2011; 
Gruber & Goschke, 2004). Thus, seeing A and B and verbalizing the relation between them 
could help children because they do not need to generate this subgoal spontaneously. 
Theoretical accounts have often emphasized the dependency of analogical reasoning on 
knowledge increase (Brown, 1989; Gentner & Rattermann, 1991; Goswami, 1992; 
Vosniadou, 1989). For example, the relational-shift hypothesis (Gentner & Rattermann, 1991; 
Gentner, 1988) claims that young children first focus on similarities between items. Later in 
development, a relational shift occurs, leading to the ability to focus on the similarity between 
relations. Our experiments provide support, in addition, for an executive-function explanation. 
Indeed, even though children know the relations constituting the analogical problem 
presented, they tend to have difficulty planning their search for information that goes beyond 
a simple matching of a Related-to-C image. In short, they tend not to seek the relational 
information from the AB source pair. The effect of familiarity with relations — and the 
resulting ease of using them — could explain the domain dependency of the age at which the 
relational shift occurs. In tasks of equivalent complexity, more familiar domains would lead to 
earlier solution on developmental time. 
However, the maturation of executive functions could explain why children master the 
formal A:B::C:? task relatively late in development, regardless of the type of material used 
(semantic, abstract; Thibaut et al., 2010a, 2010b), whereas other, more “ecological” 
analogical problems are solved earlier (Goswami, 1992; Singer-Freeman, 2005). Even though 
they have the relevant knowledge to construct a correct analogy, planning and goal 
representation abilities might not be developed enough in preschoolers to handle the 
complexity of the strategy required to solve A:B::C:? problems effectively. In this task 
children have to infer the relation in the source domain, in addition to mapping the elements 
between domains in order to complete the second pair. Solving strategically complex 
analogical problems, such as A:B::C:? problems, might thus rely more on meta-cognitive 
skills such as planning and goal representation. 
Using the AB-first procedure that was especially built to decrease the cognitive load of 
the task, the next experiment tried to react to the limitations of Experiment 1 and appropriate 
materials in order to make the irrelevant relation salient for children. In addition to this, 
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children saw only training trials in which the salient relation between A and B was beneficial 
for solving the A:B::C:? problem. 
 
IV. Experiment 3: Re-representation using a salient irrelevant 
relation 
 
IV.a. Objectives and hypotheses 
The failure of Experiment 1 of this chapter could be explained by different flaws in the 
ability of the former task to induce an irrelevant representation for the AB pair of analogical 
problems. The present experiment was designed to get rid of these flaws by decreasing the 
complexity of the task, by using a salient competing relation and highlighting the relevance of 
this relation throughout the task. In this experiment, we included AB pairs that could be 
interpreted in terms of two relations on two different dimensions (i.e. color relation and a 
semantic relation). In the previous experiment, 5-to-6-year-olds were not affected by the 
induction of an irrelevant relation before solving analogical problems. This can be explained 
by the intrinsic complexity of the task and by the low saliency of the irrelevant interpretation 
of the AB pair. However, we hypothesized that this would change when the AB pair would 
have a salient relation, but one that is irrelevant to the solution of the analogy problem. 
Children might initially attend to this irrelevant dimension between the A and B pictures and, 
since preschool children have well-known difficulties in switching their dimension of search 
(Blaye & Chevalier, 2011; Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008; Zelazo, Muller, Frye, & 
Marcovitch, 2003), we expected that they would tend to remain with their initial 
representation of the AB pair, rather than switch to the representation that was appropriate to 
the solution of the problem.  
The present experiment used a within-participants design, with Type of trials 
(Color/Semantic/Mixed trials) as the only factor, to study children’s ability to overcome a first 
representation of the source on an irrelevant dimension. This was tested by giving children 
trials with different dimensions of interpretation for the AB pair: “color identity” in Color 
trials (A and B were of the same color, but with no plausible semantic relation between them; 
the analogical solution was a stimulus with the same color as C), “semantic relations” in 
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Semantic trials (A and B were of different colors, but were linked by a plausible semantic 
relation, and CT had the same semantic relation), and Mixed trials (where A and B were 
linked by both a semantic and a color identity relation; for the CT pair, only the semantic 
relation made sense of the analogy). In the Mixed trials, it was assumed that children would 
focus first on the salient color dimension (i.e. color identity) that was of no use for correctly 
solving the problem. Thus, for these trials to get the correct answer children had to shift from 
a “color” to a “semantic” representation of the AB pair, thereby making use of their set-
shifting abilities. Consequently, any differences between Mixed and Semantic trials could be 
attributed to the children’s being stuck in a wrong initial representation of the relation 
between A and B.  
We only measured accuracy in this experiment, predicting that the Mixed trials would 
lead to lower scores for the children than the Semantic trials, and that the Semantic trials 
would lead to more failure to find the correct answer than the Color trials, color identities 
being very salient for children (Alexander et al., 1987). 
 
IV.b. Methods 
 
Participants 
Participants in this experiment were 23 5-to-6-year-old children (10 males, 13 females; 
M=69.4 months; SD=3.7; range: 63 to 76 months). Parental informed consent was required 
for them to participate to the experiment and were voluntarily participating. Every participant 
was tested with the AB-first Procedure presented in this chapter and were all naïve to 
A:B::C:? tasks. 
 
Materials 
The task consisted of 13 A:B::C:? problems, i.e., 2 training problems and 11 
experimental problems. Each trial consisted of 7 black and white line drawings (240x240 
pixels) for the A, B, C items, the T, one Dis and 2 U, each framed in a black square. An eighth 
black square was displayed beside the C item to symbolize the place where would go the 
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solution of the problem. Each drawing was filled with a single color (red, blue, yellow, green, 
rose, red, brown or grey). The AB pair was displayed, followed, after an interpretation of the 
AB relation had been provided, by the remaining stimuli.  
There were three types of experimental trials: three Color trials, four Semantic trials and 
four Mixed trials. The relevant relation between A and B in the Color trials was color, thus the 
solution was a picture which shared its color with the C term. The items were chosen to avoid 
any obvious semantic interpretation of the pairs. These trials ensured that color was a relevant 
dimension for interpreting analogies throughout the task. In the Semantic trials A and B had 
different colors, which meant that color was irrelevant for the analogy problem at hand. These 
trials were equivalent to the semantic problems in the usual A:B::C:? task. In the Mixed trials, 
however, the A and B were linked by a color identity and a semantic relation. A trial was 
designed in such a way that, when considering the C item and the solution set, only the 
semantic relation made analogical sense (i.e., there was no possible “same color” solution). 
See Figure 40 for examples of Semantic and Mixed trials. In order to ensure that children 
would not neglect “same color” as a possible solution during the experiment we always put 
one of the 3 Color trials between two trials of the other types (i.e., Semantic and/or Mixed 
trials). Counterbalancing was done by converting Mixed trials to Semantic trials and vice-
versa for half of the participants. 
Association strength was also controlled: 50% of the Semantic and Mixed trials were 
composed of weakly associated pairs, and 50% of strongly associated pairs as defined in the 
precedent experiment. Association strengths were rated by 11 students from the University of 
Burgundy in the same manner as previously described. For the weakly associated trials the 
mean association strength was 2.64 (SD=1.43; range: 2.33 to 3.01) for the AB pairs, 3.08 
(SD=1.87; range: 1.87 to 4.46) for the CT pairs, and 3.51 (SD=1.55; range: 2.36 to 4.67) for 
the CDis pairs. The mean association strength for the AB pairs was 6.04 (SD=1.07; range: 
5.08 to 6.26), 5.88 for the CT pair (SD=1.22; range: 4.38 to 6.13) and 5.23 for the CDis pairs 
(SD=1.70; range: 3.08 to 6.43), for the strongly associated trials. The association strength was 
significantly higher in the strongly associated trials than in the weakly associated trials (two-
tailed Student t-test: t(20)=6.31, p<.001 for AB, t(20)=4.85, p<.001 for CT, and t(20)=2.48, 
p<.05 for CDis). 
We used two different sets of Related-to-C distractors in two versions of the task to 
ensure a particular instance of a distractor did not make children choose it, but that their 
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choice was effectively dependant on the association strength between C and the distractor. For 
example, in one version of the task, the related-to-C distractor was “whiskers” (the C term 
being “cat”) and in the other version, it was “dog”. The association strength between Cs and 
the first set of distractors (M=3.5; SD=1.57; range: 2.36 to 4.42 for the weakly associated 
trials; M=5.27; SD=1.79; range: 3.08 to 6.43 for the strongly associated trials) did not differ 
significantly from the association strength between Cs and the other set of distractors 
(M=3.10; SD=1.49; range: 2.82 to 4.67 for the weakly associated trials; M=5.14; SD=1.50; 
range: 4.38 to 6 for the strongly associated trials). This was confirmed by a two-tailed Student 
t-test: t(194)=1,67; p=.1; t(180)=.52; p=.6 for the weakly and strongly associated trials, 
respectively. 
The task was presented on a 17’’ élo 1715L touch screen (resolution: 1024x768) with 
the means of an E-prime software (version 2.8.0.22). Data were analyzed using Statistica 8. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure employed was strictly identical to the AB-first Procedure presented in 
Experiment II: children first saw the AB items and were asked to verbalize the relation 
between them. They then saw the entire problem. 
 
IV.c. Results 
Only 1% of the items presented in the first phase were not spontaneously labeled or described 
accurately. Two trials out of 184 (1%) were not analyzed due to a lack of knowledge of one of 
the semantic relations composing the analogies. We separated Mixed trials in which children 
spontaneously gave a semantic interpretation for the AB pair (23 out of 92 Mixed trials; 25%) 
and those in which children gave a spontaneous color interpretation (69 out of 92 Mixed 
trials; 75%). We only included the latter trials in the main analysis, since our specific 
hypothesis was that children would have more difficulties when re-representation was 
necessary. These trials have been designated “Incorrectly-interpreted Mixed” trials. Due to 
this separation, one participant was excluded from the analysis of the trials with incorrect AB 
interpretations because of an absence of incorrect response for the Mixed trials. 
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Figure 40: Examples of Mixed (a) and Semantic trials (b). 
 
 A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was used to compare the Trial Types 
(Color/Semantic/Incorrectly interpreted Mixed trials, see Figure 41). It revealed a significant 
main effect of Trial Type (F(2,42)=14.8, p<.001, η²p=.41). A Tukey HSD post-hoc analysis 
confirmed that Mixed trials led to significantly lower performance (35% correct) than 
Semantic trials (55% correct; p<.05) and Color Trials (86% correct; p<.001). Color trials were 
solved better than Semantic trials (p<.01), confirming that this dimension was used when it 
was relevant. These results confirm children’s difficulties in re-representing the AB pair once 
they have noticed the color dimension of the items. In 94% of the incorrectly solved trials, 
children chose related-to-C distractors when they did not find the analogical answer. 
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 We also examined the scores for the Mixed trials that were spontaneously interpreted 
according to the relevant semantic dimension. The sample consisted of 14 children who 
spontaneously gave the semantic interpretation on 23 trials out of 92 (25%). The 9 remaining 
children systematically interpreted the AB pairs along the color dimension in the Mixed trials. 
The Mixed trials that received a spontaneous semantic interpretation (mean=.70, SD=.43) did 
not differ from the scores in the Semantic trials (mean=.61, SD=.28; related sample bilateral t-
test: t(13)=.78; p=.45; η²p=.045). This suggests that children failed when they first chose the 
“same color” relation because they either failed to inhibit this first choice subsequently and/or 
because they could not describe the stimuli in terms of a novel relation. When they did not 
choose the correct answer, participants chose the related-to-C distractor 86% of the time. 
 
Figure 41: Performance scores in the Semantic and Mixed trials with the AB-first procedure (error bars indicate 
SEM). 
 
IV.d. Discussion 
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that when children start interpreting the 
AB pair on a dimension that is irrelevant for the construction of the analogy, the emphasis put 
on the wrong dimension for interpreting A and B with the AB-first procedure is detrimental to 
children’s ability to find the analogical solution. One interpretation of these results is that 
flexibility is needed when reasoning by analogy, especially when the domains involved are 
rich and have different potential dimensions of interpretation. At some point in the analogy 
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process children who started with the wrong interpretation must find a novel interpretation of 
the relation between the items in the pair of stimuli. 
It is noteworthy that when children did not start with an incorrect dimension, their 
reasoning was not disrupted by the identical colors of items as a criterion for matching. Their 
scores did not differ from the pure semantic trials. 
 
V. General Discussion 
Explanations of the development of analogical reasoning have recently included 
children’s executive functions’ maturation as a limiting factor, especially inhibition 
(Morrison, Doumas, & Richland, 2011). When the first experiment failed to show consistent 
evidence of the involvement of cognitive flexibility in analogical problem solving, most 
probably because of the complexity of the task and the low saliency of the competing relation, 
the second experiment showed that, when children first interpreted the AB pair on a 
dimension (the color interpretation) that did not allow them to make sense of the analogy, 
they were frequently not able to shift their search towards a more relevant dimension of the 
AB pair. By contrast, when there was no competing dimension in AB (i.e., no “same color” 
interpretation) their performance was better.  
Overall, these experiments provide new elements in favor of the interpretation of 
children’s difficulties in analogical reasoning as stemming from their incompletely developed 
executive functions.  
Results from the third experiment illustrated set-shifting costs in children’s reasoning: 
children’s poorer performance when they first represent the relation between A and B along 
an irrelevant dimension can be explained by the fact that they cannot re-represent the relation 
between these items once they have found one interpretation of the pair. This representational 
fixity might be similar to the well-known impasse phenomenon in the problem-solving 
literature (Ash, Cushen, & Wiley, 2009). An “impasse” occurs when problem solvers have 
exhausted all paths in the problem space without finding a proper solution, given an initial 
inappropriate representation. This initial representation has to be replaced with a more 
appropriate one, which requires cognitive flexibility, to eventually solve the problem. 
However, our experiment does not distinguish strategy deficits (i.e., the inability to plan 
another exploration of the AB pair once the first attempt to find a solution, or, alternately, the 
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inability to inhibit the first interpretation) from re-representation deficits (i.e., the inability to 
find a new representation of the relation between A and B). Whether or not children try to 
reinterpret the AB pair before choosing any Related-to-C item remains an open question. 
Further research (e.g., eye-tracking studies) might help resolve this issue: if children paid 
attention to AB again after their first attempt to solve the problem, this would argue in favor 
of a set-shifting interpretation as it would indicate unsuccessful attempts to reinterpret AB. 
However, if children did not come back to A and B after trying to find an answer with the 
same color as C and continued to organize their search around C, this would reveal an 
inability to change plan. However, if children paid attention to and tried to reinterpret the AB 
pair after the failure of their first attempt, their increase in error could be argued to be due to 
an inability to change their initial representation of the source domain. In other words, 
children’s lack of flexibility could be detrimental at different levels (i.e. representation or 
strategy).  
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Chapter VI: General Discussion 
 
I. Summary of the goals of this dissertation 
 
 Analogical reasoning is a complex activity, and, as such, the associated search for 
information has to be organized. The studies presented in this dissertation aimed at studying 
the organization of the visual search in  and compare them to predictions from theories about 
analogical reasoning. It also aimed at observing the effect of analogical reasoning tasks 
differing in their goals on these strategies, and to study the interdependencies of analogical 
reasoning and executive functions, as these functions mediates the operations on information 
in a goal-oriented manner. This was achieved by the observation of adults and children in 
different tasks used in current analogical reasoning research to assess this ability that differ in 
the goals they elicit in participants. This was done at a specific level of analysis by the 
observation of the visual search of information through eye movements directed to the 
materials composing the tasks. The two tasks compared were the scene analogy task in which 
the participants is more directed toward the comparisons of different elements of the two 
domains compared on the basis of their roles, and the A:B::C:? task, which is more focused 
on the similarity relationship between the relations composing the two domains in themselves. 
It has been shown that the goals of a task indeed influence information gathering through eye 
movements (Yarbus, 1967), and current models of analogical reasoning indeed predict such 
effects (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Salvucci & Anderson, 2001). Thus, we expected that 
visual strategies would differ between these tasks, revealing their differences in goals at a 
perceptual, information gathering level. As children show goal neglect in their early years 
(Blaye & Chevalier, 2011; Chevalier & Blaye, 2008a; Marcovitch et al., 2010), we also 
expected that this inability to maintain goals efficiently while solving the task would affect 
their strategy, and that this would be visible in their search for information, neglecting to 
attend to some information linked to constraints on the solution of the problem. We thus 
compared adults' and children's scanpaths in these two tasks. 
 It is not sufficient to maintain the goals of a task active to resolve a problem, it is also 
necessary to implement these goals as a treatment on the information which is gathered to 
effectively solve the problem at hand. This operation on the information toward goal 
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achievement is handled by executive functions, the three most commonly acknowledged 
being inhibition, cognitive flexibility and working memory refreshing. Therefore, we 
expected that visual strategies in analogical reasoning tasks would reveal adults ability to 
operate on information. To do this, we manipulated the difficulty of the trials to put a higher 
load on these functions in difficult, more abstract trials than in easy, concrete ones. Indeed 
executive functions and their engagement in a task are dependent on the properties of the 
representations they operate on (Chevalier, 2010). Hence, this manipulation seemed 
appropriate to observe potential differences in the execution of the solution strategies, 
especially in adults. We also studied children’s visual search in analogical task, because 
children are known to be more limited in their executive abilities than adults (Chevalier & 
Blaye, 2006; Garon et al., 2008). We expected that they would demonstrate visual strategies 
more influenced by information irrelevant to the task solution than adults, thus showing less 
control on the implementation of the strategies. We also studied the link between children’s 
executive functions and cognitive flexibility especially, as this link was not backed up by 
extensive experimental evidence. This was done by using materials and a procedure especially 
designed for this purpose. 
 
II. Differential effects of goals of the task on visual search 
 
II. a. Mature visual search and goals 
 Visual strategies, even in adults, have not been extensively studied in analogical 
reasoning yet. In the studies presented in this dissertation, eye movement data converged to 
commonalities and differences between the different tasks commonly used to asses analogical 
reasoning. The scene analogy task put more emphasis on the mapping of elements on the 
basis of their roles in their respective domains. We observed that, at the level of eye fixations, 
participants focused on the elements of each domains that were related to the goal the task, 
i.e., the one which was pointed to in the source domain, and the one that had a corresponding 
role in the target domain. Other objects (i.e., Unrelated objects) composing the scenes were 
not fixated to a large extent. The most frequent saccades executed between elements were 
between the related elements in the source and the target, and between the element with an 
arrow in the source and the one that had a corresponding role in the target. Comparisons 
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between the different elements in the target domain were not frequent, with the most frequent 
being between the correct answer and the distractor. However, aside from the direct mapping 
between the goal elements of the task, very few saccades were made between the two 
domains. 
 Gordon & Moser's (2007) study, described in the introduction, investigated visual 
search in the scene analogy task. Their main results were that the greater fixation times were 
allocated to the corresponding goal elements in the source and target domains, that the 
elements involved in relations were fixated longer than those which were not, that the 
distractor (perceptually similar to the goal element in the source in their case) attracted more 
fixations than an unrelated entity, and than control elements put at the same place in different 
trials. They also showed that participants studied more the source picture at the beginning of 
the trial, which is compatible with Thibaut, French, Missault, Gérard, & Glady's (2011) 
results and those with adults in easy analogical trials in our third chapter. Also of importance, 
for our account of goal directed eye behaviors in analogical reasoning tasks, their participants 
made more saccades between a third, extra object, when it was related to the two other objects 
that constituted the basis for the analogy than when this same object was not related to them. 
Additionally, they observed that their participants tended to compare distractors and solutions 
of the problems presented.  
 Overall their results are consistent with ours, suggesting that participants were more 
focused, during their information search, on the internal consistency between the entities in 
the same domain, related to the encoding and inference of the relations to form a structured 
relational representation of the two domains to be compared, but also the comparison of the 
source and the distractor. These results were stable even though the instructions Gordon & 
Moser (2007) used were the original, ambiguous ones (Richland et al., 2006), asking their 
participants to find what was like the object pointed to in the source in the target picture. This 
suggests an interpretation of these instructions by adults as involving relational similarity 
more than perceptual similarity. This difference in instructions might have had a greater 
impact on children’s than adults’ visual strategies. However they did not test children with 
this same procedure, thus not allowing the direct comparison of our results. Nonetheless, 
Gordon & Moser overlooked the importance of between domain saccades as they did not 
analyze them, arguing that the intra-domain saccades accounted for 52.3% of the total 
saccades. Our studies included the inter-domain as well as the intra-domain saccades and 
found subjective significance of the saccade mapping the goal elements in the source and the 
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target domains, which we believe is an important result, and which we will discuss further 
below.  
 We also studied adult’s strategies in the classic A:B::C:? task with different types of 
materials: pictorial and verbal presentation of the terms, within or without scene presentation, 
with difficult and easy to infer and represent relations, and with different types of distractors. 
We found commonalities in all these studies: adult participants were mainly focused on the A, 
B, C and solution terms with a slight preference for B and T, without paying much attention to 
the related and unrelated distractors. However attention was still caught by related-to-C 
distractors more in this task than in the scene analogy task. The most frequent saccades were 
between the pictures representing the source and target relations (A and B, and C and T) and 
between the different potential solutions, with slight differences between the different variants 
of the task (i.e., more saccades between all potential solutions when presented in a verbal than 
in a pictorial form, and in meaningful scenes than in unrelated frames).  
 Bethell-Fox, Lohman, & Snow (1984) investigated the visual strategies of adults in 
geometrical analogical A:B::C:? problems. They found differences between high fluid 
intelligence and average fluid intelligence participants, and between easy and difficult trials, 
in the use of a strategy of construction of the response, and a strategy of elimination of the 
implausible answers. The solution construction strategy (i.e., constructing a hypothesis for the 
solution based on the knowledge of A, B and C) arose more frequently in simpler trials and in 
higher fluid intelligence participants, and the response-elimination strategy (i.e., finding the 
solution by eliminating the answer options that are not plausible) arose more in difficult trials 
and in lower fluid intelligence participants. These strategies were identified by the observation 
of the number of returns on A and B after seeing C and the solution set, the first alternative 
looked at, and the number of different alternatives observed. Another study using eye-tracking 
in this task was Thibaut et al. (2011) who also explored adult visual strategies in the A:B::C:? 
task, comparing them to children’s. Their main results with adults were overall fixations 
mainly distributed on A, B, C and T, with their participants first looking at the A and B terms 
then to the two other terms. 
Bethell-Fox et al.'s (1984) analyses of visual strategies are quite different from those 
ran in the present dissertation. Due to these inherent differences, we cannot compare 
extensively our results and theirs on what type of fixations and saccades were favored by 
participants in the solution of the trials. However, we found commonalities in the differences 
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between easy and difficult trials, in the type of strategy used by participants (i.e., constructive 
or response elimination), even though the materials used were verbal in our study. Our results 
are compatible with Thibaut et al. (2011) in that the fixations were more centered on the A, B, 
C, and solution items and less on the distractors. When we divided the trials in time slices we 
also found a first focus on the A and B terms in simple trials similar to those used in their 
study. 
 Commonalities and differences were found between the A:B::C:? and scene analogy 
tasks. Both tasks had common patterns of saccades. Participants in either the A:B::C:? or the 
scene analogy task spent a long time making saccades between the terms that were 
relationally linked within the source and the target domains, and also compared at least to 
some extent the solution and the distractor that was related in some way to the elements 
belonging to the relational structures to be compared. The first pair of saccades is most likely 
the mark of the encoding and inference of the relations between the elements compared. This 
is also suggested by the fact that, when measured, the encoding of the more complete (in 
terms of information that is given and does not have to be searched), source domain happens 
earlier than the encoding of the relations in the less known, target domain. Saccades between 
different potential answers, and especially between the related distractor and the correct 
answer is linked to the comparisons between these different answers on the basis of the 
constraints the task put on the solution, i.e., to have the same relation to C as B has to A. 
However the proportions in which these saccades were executed in the different tasks were 
different in adults, revealing different constraints of the tasks. The comparisons inside the 
target domain in general, and between the target and its related term were more frequent in the 
scene analogy task than in the A:B::C:? task. This might be because the scene analogy task 
presents the elements of the target domain together within a scene, in an obvious relation to 
each other (i.e., with pictures that depicts a movement). Another notable difference is that the 
scene analogy elicited more saccades between the goal objects in the source and target 
domain. This is of particular interest as the task explicitly instructs participants to compare 
and align these elements, when the A:B::C:? task do not. Another difference is the time spent 
looking at distractors which vary depending on the relevance of distractors to the goals of the 
task. Therefore, the two tasks seem to share the way the relations are encoded and the 
solutions are compared, but are modulated by specific goals. 
 Another effect we found that would be predicted by the goal management account was 
the fact that adults, if offered a choice allowing a cross-mapping in the A:B::C:? task (i.e., the 
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opposite-relation distractors of chapter III), tended to make a great number of errors, even 
though they virtually did not make errors with related-to-C distractors by any other type of 
relation. This was explained by the inherent focus of the A:B::C:? task instructions on the 
similarity between relations, and not roles, between the solution and C on one hand, and 
between B and A on the other: participants focus on this similarity relation without taking into 
account the mapping between the elements of the two domains. Thus, even adults would 
exhibit goal neglect in the cases displaying distractors evoking relations strongly linked to the 
goal of the task. 
 Goal effects are predicted by two models of mapping: ACME (Holyoak & Thagard, 
1989), and the path-mapping theory (Salvucci & Anderson, 2001). The first is a model of the 
mapping process on its own, and thus it is difficult to make predictions about the 
implementation of participants’ search for information, as it describes purely internal 
operations made on representations that are already encoded. The goals of the subject affect 
this model by biases put on the mappings that are connected to his current goals, which could 
be used to simulate potential task effects by using these biases to influence the mapping and 
make it more focused on relational similarity, or on role similarity, between the two domains 
compared.  
The ACME model also predicts a full alignment between the two domains compared. 
It is possible that this mapping is fully accomplished in working memory, without the help of 
a perceptual support, especially with such simple relational structures as those that were used 
in our tasks. Nonetheless, our data support a more pragmatic view of the mapping process 
itself, with only elements and relations that are relevant for the goal of the task explicitly 
mapped one on another and evaluated on the basis of corresponding roles. A way to further 
our answer to this question would be to overload working memory capacities of participants 
by using complex scenes while recording their eye movements, in a scene analogy task. If the 
mapping has to be fully accomplished, it is likely that all the elements which are involved in 
the relational structure of the two domains would be attended to a large extent, and that 
saccades between domains would be more common even between elements involved in 
relations not directly relevant to the main goal to alleviate the cognitive load of mapping two 
complex domains, thus using a perceptual support to refresh the correspondences stored in 
working memory.  
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By contrast, we would predict, together with the path-mapping theory, that there 
would be more intra-domain saccades, participants thus encoding the relational structures of 
the domains and determining the roles of the goal object in the source domain, and that the 
larger part of the inter-domain saccades would be between the goal elements in the two 
domains, or, if present, between the elements sharing similar roles in the two domains but 
violating other constraints on the solution like the systematicity constraint. 
Another noteworthy fact we observed in our experiments is that differences appeared 
in the strategies used to solve goals specific to the different tasks. This could not be predicted 
by ACME because it is not embedded in a general problem solving architecture as the path-
mapping theory is (Salvucci & Anderson, 2001). The path-mapping model predicts that 
different goals would terminate the solution process differently, as it is the information 
gathered to achieve the different subgoals of the task, subgoals which can be implemented 
specifically in face of the specificities of the different tasks that put the reasoning process to 
an end. When enough information has been gathered to activate the answering process of the 
model, the task is over. This model is also relevant as it would be able to simulate a partial 
mapping process between the two domains as long as there is enough information gathered by 
the system with this partial mapping to terminate the task.  
 As our data reveal, people do not stop exploring the scene while they are mapping one 
domain on another, but continue this exploration throughout the task. Hence, it is likely that 
all the visual behaviors that we recorded were not related to the encoding of the structure of 
the domains, but also to the encoding of information specific to the subgoal at hand, like the 
information necessary to discriminate different potential answers, perhaps on the basis of 
them belonging or not to the same category as the corresponding element in the source (Green 
et al., 2008), or to the comparison and evaluation of the similarity of the roles of elements 
under the focus of attention in the two domains, and so to achieve the mapping between the 
two domains correctly. This argues in favor of the encoding and mapping processes being 
interleaved, as Tabletop and Copycat (French, 1995; Mitchell, 1993) predicts. Thus, our 
results seem to support the path-mapping model in its predictions of how the task solution is 
implemented by participants, and also the architecture of Tabletop and Copycat in their 
interleaving of encoding and mapping processes.  
 To sum up, it seems inevitable that models designed to account for analogical 
reasoning processes in adults have to take into account the specificities of the tasks in terms of 
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goals. This is mandatory not only for the simulation of fine-grained behavior like eye 
movements and information gathering in a task, but also at a more general level to account for 
errors made during analogical reasoning tasks. 
 
II. b. Goals of the task and children's visual search 
 As goal neglect is frequent in children (Blaye & Chevalier, 2011; Chevalier & Blaye, 
2008; Marcovitch et al., 2010), it can explain that young children exhibit patterns of fixations 
and saccades in relation with the goals of the task different from those observed in adults. 
Indeed such differences were already observed between adults’ and children’s information 
gathering in an A:B::C:? task (Thibaut, French, Missault, et al., 2011). This study showed that 
children focused more on the target domain than on the source domain, and quite rapidly after 
the beginning of the task. On the contrary, adults first focused on A and B to a large extent, 
and then gathered information from the target domain. This difference might be due to 
discrepancies in the ability of children and adults to maintain the goal of comparing the 
relations between A and B, and between C and their answer, i.e., the constraint making a 
solution correct. Children might thus address a less complicated and easier to maintain goal: 
find something that is related to C, which would explain why they make more distractor errors 
than adults, distractors being related to C, but in another way than B is related to A. In our 
studies, we did not find any difference between adults and children in the way they handled 
the information coming from the A:B pair (especially AB saccades). It is possible that using 
several analogical reasoning tasks helped children to understand and maintain the goal in the 
A:B::C:? task because of a progressive alignment between the different tasks (Goswami et al., 
1998; Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996), the two other tasks being simpler as it is suggested by 
children’s higher performances. Still, although we did not replicate the differences observed 
between children and adults in the A:B::C:? task, modifying the procedure of this task to 
allow children to more easily address and maintain the goal of the task showed beneficial in 
preschoolers: when children had to look at the A and B pictures first, and to verbalize the 
relation between the two pictures, they exhibited higher performances than when they had the 
standard procedure with every picture at the same time and without having to name the 
relation linking A and B. 
 Another argument in favor of a goal neglect account for certain failures in analogical 
reasoning tasks in children come from the eye movement patterns in conjunction with patterns 
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of errors in the scene analogy task. Our studies had findings convergent with those of 
Richland et al. (2006): children made more relational errors than adults in this task, i.e., they 
chose the other element involved in the target relation but that did not share the role of the 
element with an arrow in the source. This might be due to the neglect of a constraint on the 
solution of these problems: children might not align correctly the corresponding elements 
between the two domains, thus forgetting to compare their roles in the similar relations. This 
is further suggested by the fact that, contrary to adults in the same task, children do not make 
saccades between the corresponding items in the two domains compared. Hence, this type of 
saccades, only visible in adults, might reflect this process of evaluation of the similarity of the 
two elements (i.e., the solution, and the element pointed to in the source domain) in terms of 
roles. 
 As mentioned earlier, most theories about analogical reasoning development are vague 
about the mechanisms that allow the development of such abilities. The relational shift 
observed in children could be explained by a development of strategies that are used in the 
tasks, even if the knowledge accretion explanation is preferred (Gentner & Rattermann, 
1991). The relational primacy account (Goswami, 1991, 1992) states that children are able to 
use relational similarity to solve problems from an early age on, but that qualitative aspects of 
this analogical processes change through time. Some of these qualitative changes might be 
due to strategic and metacognitive development, thus letting room for a goal management 
factor in the development of this ability. The last account of children’s analogical reasoning 
development (the Relational Complexity Theory; Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998; Halford, 
1993) would state that analogical reasoning develops because working memory capacity 
develops. However this is still compatible with the effects of goal maintenance in children’s 
development of analogy-making as the goal structure of a task has to be kept active in 
working memory while operating on the representations in working memory. Therefore, a 
limited working memory capacity might result in a competition between the refreshing of the 
representation under operation and the goal structure of the task, which could explain the 
failure of younger children to maintain the goals of the task when reasoning. This explanation 
might also explain why children make more relational errors with a greater degree of 
relational complexity (Richland et al., 2006). It would not be the relational complexity of the 
representations in itself that overloads the working memory capacity in children (children are 
able to handle ternary relations at the age of 5, but even older children, aged 6-to-7, make 
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relational errors in this task) but the competition between the refreshing of these 
representations and the refreshing of the goals. 
 The path-mapping theory, we believe, could easily model differences in analogical 
reasoning development related to goal management. The goal structure that sets the order of 
productions of the model is not subject to retrieval in the current implementation of the path-
mapping theory; only the representations of the structures of the two domains are. Allowing 
not only these representations but the different goals of the task to be retrieved or not, this 
modulated by the complexity of the goal (lower order goals in the goal structure would be 
easier to retrieve), and thus limiting the model’s working memory capacity, would let room 
for errors related to goal maintenance akin to those made by children. For instance, in the 
A:B::C:? task, the higher order goal of comparing the relations that are active in working 
memory would only be triggered probabilistically, and thus would lead to sometimes the 
triggering of an answer due to a lower order goal achievement like finding something that is 
related to the C term, whenever its relation is similar to the one between A and B or not. 
Similarly in the scene analogy task, a response could be triggered when the lower order goal 
of finding an object involved in a relation in the target similar to the one depicted in the 
source, whenever the role is the same or not. ACME could not be manipulated that way 
because it does not have any goal structure governing the answering. 
 
III. Analogical reasoning and executive functions 
 Goal management is inherently dependent on executive functions as these functions 
permit the necessary operations on information in order to perform a task: keeping active and 
updating the information stored in working memory, keeping inappropriate or irrelevant 
information from entering working memory, and actively trying to change the representation 
of a problem when it leads to a wrong, inappropriate solution, or no solution at all.  
 
III.a. Executive functions in adults' analogical reasoning 
 The link between goals and executive functioning was visible in adults’ information 
gathering in different ways in our experiments. First, the distractor in the scene analogy task 
was not considered as very informative by participants who made short fixations and few 
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saccades between the distractor and other pictures. This was interpreted as due to the 
irrelevance of the distractor to goals leading to a lower attentional focus to the distractor, thus 
needing less inhibition to answer correctly. However, in the A:B::C:? task, distractors were 
more relevant to the goals of participants, as they were related to C in some way, echoing the 
emphasis of the instructions on finding something that goes with C. Hence, in the A:B::C:? 
task, participants made longer fixations on the distractors. Second, there was a difference 
between types of distractors in the A:B::C:? task: participants looked longer to distractors 
when they were oppositely related to C than when they were related to C, but this relation not 
sharing similarity with the relation between A and B. This similarity of relation, in addition to 
causing longer fixation times, also increased the number of errors of participants in 
comparison to the condition with the distractor related to C in any way. Taken together, these 
results suggest that the close relation between goals and their achievement is real and that 
goals will condition what type of information is found informative by the subject but also to 
what extent one will be able to deal with and to inhibit certain types of information.  
 A second factor that seemed to modulate the role of executive functions in participants 
was their ability to clearly represent the relations between the terms of the analogical 
problems and the structure of the problem. Indeed when items were judged difficult, thus 
causing more errors and most probably due to the abstractness of the concepts to be 
represented, participants had to display cognitive flexibility. Their gazes returned to A and B 
later in trials in comparison to easy trials, revealing the necessity to change their 
representation of the relation between A and B after having seen the set of potential responses 
and not finding any corresponding answer. This suggests that when there is a greater 
uncertainty on the solution due to, for instance, semantic factors such as imageability, people 
have to re-represent the source domain in order to find a representation of the whole problem 
that fits all the criteria of the task. Another finding related to this point is that our participants 
devoted more resources in executive functioning, especially inhibition when they were 
presented with A:B::C:? problems with a right-to-left order of the terms composing the 
problem: they made more saccades between the C term and the distractor in this order of 
presentation than in the left-to-right, classic order of presentation. Thus, when competing 
resources were engaged to represent a task correctly in an unusual manner of presenting it, 
less cognitive resources were available to participants to inhibit distractors irrelevant for the 
solution of the task, resulting in more attention allocated to this distractor. 
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 These results are coherent with current views of executive functions as inseparable 
from their substratum (Chevalier, 2010): the recruitment of these functions in analogical 
reasoning seems to depend, on one hand, on the ability of the subject to represent the 
relational structures that are compared, and, on the other hand, on the constraints on the 
solution and the goals of the task which will bias the subject to attend to different information. 
 Most of the computational models presented in the introduction of this dissertation do 
not take into account executive functions, even those who acknowledge the role of goals in 
the solution of analogical problems. Indeed the path-mapping theory which puts goal as 
central to the procedural outputs of the model to perform the task do not say much about how 
execution of the goals are implemented. On the contrary, it takes for granted the execution of 
the goals, as they are represented as “if…then” rules: as long as the conditions for the 
execution of the procedure leading to the achievement of the goal are gathered, the result of 
the operation triggered by this rule is guaranteed. Thus, this model does not handle the kind of 
results reviewed above about differences of engagement of executive functions as a 
consequence of the ability to represent the structures compared. This is due to the fact that 
representations are handcrafted by the experimenters and are not built by the model itself, like 
in Copycat or Tabletop. The only model reviewed above that incorporates at least on 
component of the executive functions is LISA (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997), in which 
inhibition plays a great role in the ability of the model to represent the structures and to 
compare them. We saw in our experiments that the inability to inhibit some parts of the 
information (i.e., distractors) is concomitant to an increase in the number of errors. LISA 
would predict this as the lack of horizontal inhibition would lead to errors in the 
representations of the structures and of mapping, just like it is observed in participants. 
However, this model does not say much about the perceptual processes underlying the 
mapping process. Analogical reasoning in adults also seems to engage flexibility in the 
representation of domains compared. This flexibility is well captured by the architecture of 
Copycat and Tabletop, as new global representations of the problem can emerge from new 
incoming information and new lower-level structures.  
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III.b. Executive functions involvement in the development of 
analogical reasoning 
 The involvement of executive functions in analogical reasoning seems to evolve with 
time as these functions develop with age. Children are more prone to look at distractors, 
search and maintain their relation with C in working memory, and to select them as an 
answer, than adults. This was observed in all the tasks we used with children and adults. It 
suggests that their inability to maintain goal while searching for the solution has consequences 
on their ability to inhibit irrelevant information, thus making them look at these distractors 
and make distractor errors. Other evidence of differential engagement of executive functions 
between children and adults come from the variability of children in their scanpaths while 
solving analogical reasoning tasks when compared to adults, and by the fact that children, 
once anchored in an irrelevant representation of the AB pair, have problems finding the 
correct solution. Indeed, children's and adults' scanpaths were classified in distinct groups by 
a neural network on the basis of a measure of their difference that took into account the 
structures of their scanpaths, which indicates that they proceed in different ways globally, 
while searching information to solve the task. Moreover, cognitive flexibility seems to be 
involved in analogical reasoning, as children who have notable difficulty changing their 
representation over time when leading to incorrect responses (Blaye & Chevalier, 2011; 
Chevalier & Blaye, 2008b) had difficulty in the A:B::C:? task when they first settled on a 
dimension appearing irrelevant for the solution of the analogical problems subsequently.  
These results illustrate well the dependency of the engagement of executive functions 
on goal representation. As the goal is difficultly maintained, the distractor might not be 
represented as a distractor, and even as a correct answer (i.e., as fitting the criterion for the 
simpler goal substituted to the real goal of the task). Similarly, as children have difficulty 
maintaining the representation of the task’s goals, it might be that the apparent lack of 
flexibility observed in children in the A:B::C:? task is due to the goal of finding something 
that completes a relation similar to the one between the source pair being replaced by a goal 
easier to maintain, finding something that is related to C. This would explain why the A and B 
terms of the analogy become irrelevant for children during the solution of the task. Thus, part 
of the executive failures observed in children might be due to ill-representing the constraints 
of the task. Therefore, children’s difficulty could result from the inability to correctly connect 
the goals of the task with their representations and trigger the appropriate operations on these 
representations rather than from a deficit in the operations themselves. This would let the 
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possibility that the development of executive functions might simply be the development of 
the ability to correctly represent and maintain the goals of a task, i.e., a procedural sequence 
executed on the representation to have an output. 
IV. Perspectives 
 A logical follow-up of our study of visual strategies and their differences in the 
different tasks we used between adults and children, and a way to confirm differential effects 
of goals, using materials more controlled in their similarity, would be to make participants 
perform the scene analogy and the within-context A:B::C:? with the same scenes. It is indeed 
possible to use the scenes used to make the A:B::C:? task within a “natural” context to 
perform the scene analogy task, by simply changing the instructions and the place of the 
arrow from the target domain to the source domain. This would permit to overcome the 
inherent limitations due to the use of Richland et al.'s (2006) and our materials in the different 
tasks. The original scene analogy task materials show elements obviously interacting with 
each other (e.g., a cat chasing a mouse) when the materials we used for the A:B::C:? task only 
put the different elements in the same scene, without any obvious interaction between the 
elements. Thus, the relations between them still have to be inferred. Using the same materials 
in the two tasks would be a finer test of our hypothesis that goal of the task influences the 
visual strategies, controlling extraneous effects due to the presentation of the problems. 
 If goals are important in the solution of analogical reasoning, it would be interesting to 
study goal neglect, using it as an independent variable, in different population known to have 
differences in their ability to maintain goals, i.e., children and adults. A way of studying 
differences in goal management between children and adults, and the need of working 
memory capacity to maintain the goals active when solving the task, would be the following 
task: manipulating the working memory load due to the representation of the two domains and 
the goal activation as two independent variables. Varying the goal activation would be 
allowed by, for instance, manipulating the number of trials with literal similarity (i.e., 
resembling objects have resembling roles) in a session and measuring children and adults’ 
reaction times and number of errors in cross-mapping trials, while keeping the total number of 
trials constant across participants with a varying number of filler trials constituted of true 
analogies (with only relational but not perceptual cues; see Kane & Engle (2003) for a similar 
manipulation of goal activation in the Stroop task). We would predict that even adults would 
show goal neglect with a sufficiently demanding working memory load, or with a sufficiently 
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extinguished relational similarity goal. However, it would be important to unable the 
possibility to chunk information from the relational structures of the domains, chunking being 
an effective way to reduce this load (Halford et al., 1998). We would also hypothesize that 
children and adults would show goal neglect at different degrees of relational complexity. 
Another prediction would be that adult participants with different working memory spans 
would fail at different levels of relational complexity. 
 A possible way of testing the distinction between executive functioning per se (i.e., the 
possibility to use them efficiently) and their recruitment (i.e., their use when it is relevant to 
do so), dependent on goals, by children in analogical reasoning would be to use the task 
designed to test the involvement of cognitive flexibility presented in chapter V with an eye-
tracking technology. If the failure in the task is due to a difficulty to execute a shift of 
representation, it is likely that children would look back to A and B, but would fail anyway. 
However if the relational similarity goal of the task leaves place to a simpler goal, they should 
not even look back to A and B, as these pictures would be irrelevant for this simpler goal of 
finding something that goes with C. 
 Other, wider perspectives would be to study the interaction between the differential 
cognitive resources recruited in executive functioning depending on the semantic properties of 
the materials more systematically. This perspective has not been studied extensively even 
though the theories of analogical reasoning, and especially of its development, do not deny 
the possibility of interactions between semantic knowledge and executive functions, but put 
the emphasis on either of these explanations being preponderant in the development, i.e., it is 
either semantic knowledge accretion, or the development of executive function and working 
memory that drives the development of analogical reasoning. Some semantic properties have 
already showed to be involved in analogical reasoning and to interact with executive functions 
in the solution of analogical reasoning tasks, like the association strength between the pairs 
(Thibaut et al., 2010b). In this dissertation, we saw that a possibility to explain the difficulty 
between our easy and difficult trials was the concreteness or imageability of the relations 
linking the different terms. Nevertheless, we did not test this hypothesis specifically. It has 
also been shown that the common categories between the elements mapped between the 
domains are activated during the reasoning process. However, we do not know how these 
different semantic factors cause a higher or lower recruitment of these functions, either in 
adults or children. For instance, if mapping is really guided by common categories between 
corresponding elements (Green et al., 2008), it is likely that base categories would be easier to 
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activate and use as a guiding cue than superordinate categories, which include more disparate 
elements. Developmental studies would be of particular interest in the study of the interaction 
between executive functioning and semantic factors as both develop during childhood and 
adolescence, but not synchronously (Bird, Franklin, & Howard, 2001; Diamond, 2013; 
Mervis & Crisafi, 1982). 
 Perspectives shed by the present dissertation on the interaction between goals, 
executive functions, and representations, would be interesting to take forward by 
implementing them in a model. Neither of the models presented in this dissertation took into 
account these different factors at the same time, even though each model had strengths in the 
simulation of particular factors on their own. This would also be interesting to make the 
model able to be tracked in its fine-grained actions, i.e., to make it a production system, to test 
hypotheses and simulate phenomena about the interaction between goal management, 
executive functions and representation at different levels of observation, either subtler like eye 
movements, or rougher like response accuracy and reaction times. Necessary features of such 
a model, in order to comprehend these interactions, would be that it builds its own relational 
representations from the presentation of the materials, as Copycat and Tabletop do, that its 
working memory capacity would be limited, as LISA’s working memory is, and that it 
handles goals which leads to differential triggering of operations on the representations built, 
like the path-mapping model does. Goal structure of the task and domain representations 
should be processed in working memory and able to be partly forgotten based on the 
competition between the loads these amounts of information put on working memory. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 The findings presented in this dissertation suggest that goals modulate the recruitment 
of both executive functions and the perceptual system underlying the representation of the 
domains compared in analogical reasoning. Goal specific visual strategies were engaged in 
different analogical reasoning tasks, and goal neglects were shown to happen in children as 
well as in adults while solving these tasks. These different goals seem also to differentially 
engage executive functions in children and adults, as it is suggested in attention allocated to 
distractors, and returns to the source domain information. In addition to this, a possibility left 
open by the present results about children’s ability to shift representation is that their 
difficulty to maintain goals throughout the solution of the tasks might explain their inability to 
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engage efficiently executive functions even though they show the ability to engage it in other 
tasks. However, this remains to be tested systematically. Goal management and executive 
functioning was also shown to be differentially recruited in function of difficulty of trials, this 
difficulty most likely due to the level of ease to represent the relational concepts clearly, i.e., 
to have a representation of it that allows a clear-cut discrimination of potential solutions in the 
solution set. Taken together, these results suggest that goal management, executive function 
recruitment and representation interact in close ways. This interaction is not predicted by 
current models of analogical reasoning as no model includes these different parameters at the 
same time. Further studies and modeling attempts should thus study and simulate such 
interactions to give a more extensive account of how analogical reasoning is achieved in 
specific tasks, and how it develops during childhood. 
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